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Abstract
Large–scale distributed environments can be seen as a conflict between the
selfish aims of their participants and the group welfare of the population
as a whole. In order to regulate the behaviour of these participants it is
often necessary to introduce mechanisms that provide incentives and stimu-
late cooperative behaviour in order to mitigate for the resultant potentially
undesirable availability outcomes which could arise from individual actions.
The history of economics contains a wide variety of incentive patterns
for cooperation. In this thesis, we adopt bartering incentive pattern as an
attractive foundation for a simple and robust form of exchange to re–allocate
resources. While bartering is arguably the world’s oldest form of trade, there
are still many instances where it surprises us. The success and survivability
of the barter mechanisms adds to its attractiveness as a model to study.
In this thesis we have derived three relevant scenarios where a bartering
approach is applied. Starting from a common model of bartering:
• We show the price to be paid for dealing with selfish agents in a bar-
tering environment, as well as the impact on performance parameters
such as topology and disclosed information.
• We show how agents, by means of bartering, can achieve gains in goods
without altruistic agents needing to be present.
• We apply a bartering–based approach to a real application – Internet
directory services.
The core of this research is the analysis of bartering in the Internet Age. In
previous times, usually economies dominated by bartering have suffered from
high transaction costs (i.e. the improbability of the wants, needs that cause
a transaction occurring at the same time and place). Today, the world has
a global system of interconnected computer networks called Internet. This
interconnected world has the ability to overcome many of the challenges of
previous times. This thesis analyses the oldest system of trade within the
context of this new paradigm. In this thesis we aim to show that bartering
vii
has a great potential, but that there are many challenges that can affect the
realistic application of bartering which should be studied.
viii
Resumen
Entornos distribuidos y a gran escala pueden ser un punto de conflicto entre
los objetivos ego´ıstas de sus participantes y el bienestar de la poblacio´n.
Con la idea de regular el comportamiento de los participantes en el sistema,
es necesario introducir mecanismos que fomenten incentivas y estimulen un
comportamiento cooperativo con el objetivo de compensar la impredecible
disponibilidad de recursos.
La historia de la economı´a contiene una gran variedad de patrones para
incentivar la cooperacio´n. Nosotros nos centraremos en el patro´n de intercam-
bio (i.e. trueque) por su simplicidad y robustez como forma de re–asignar
recursos. Mientras podemos asegurar que el intercambio es la forma ma´s
antigua de intercambio, au´n existen muchos ejemplos donde e´ste puede sor-
prendernos. El e´xito y la supervivencia de los meca´nismos de intercambio
an¯ade atractivo al estudio de este modelo.
En esta tesis hemos creado tres escenarios relevantes donde se ha aplicado
el intercambio. Todos ellos partiendo de un mismo modelo de intercambio,
tenemos:
• La exploracio´n de caracter´ısticas y viabilidad de un mercado de inter-
cambio comparando su rendimiento,
• Mostrar un sistema de intercambio con una poblacio´n no altruista y
con diferentes tipos de poblaciones,
• Aplicar un sistema de intercambio a una aplicacio´n real como es el
servicio de directorios.
El nu´cleo de la investigacio´n es el ana´lisis del sistema de intercambios
en la e´poca de Internet. En e´pocas previas sol´ıa suceder que una economı´a
dominada por el intercambio sufriera un elevado coste de transaccio´n (la
imposibilidad de que los deseos y necesidades que provocan una transaccio´n
ocurran en un tiempo y lugar determinado). Hoy en d´ıa, el mundo dispone de
un sistema global de interconexio´n de redes de ordenadores llamado Internet.
Este mundo interconectado ofrece nuevas oportunidades para superar las
ix
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limitaciones de una economı´a de intercambio. Esta tesis analiza el sistema
ma´s antiguo de negociacio´n en este nuevo paradigma. Mostrando que el
intercambio tiene un gran potencial, pero que al mismo tiempo, deben ser
revisados una gran cantidad de desafios que pueden afectar a su aplicacio´n. El
trabajo se ha focalizado en la experimentacio´n y la extensio´n de un conjunto
de escenarios donde se realiza economı´a de intercambio.
2 CONTENTS
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In August 2000 the world’s economic leaders met for an annual policy con-
ference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Alan Greenspan was there, as were the
heads of the central banks of Britain, Japan, and 26 other countries.
One of the attendees, Mervyn King, Deputy Governor of the Bank of
England, ruminated on the impact of electronic commerce and the future of
money. His conclusion, quoted below, was be startling to some:
• “There is no reason that products and services could not be swapped di-
rectly by consumers and producers through a system of direct exchange–
essentially a massive barter economy.
• All it requires is some commonly used unit of account and adequate
computing power to make sure all transactions could be settled imme-
diately.
• People would pay each other electronically, without the payment being
routed through anything that we would currently recognise as a bank.
Central banks in their present form would no longer exist–nor would
money.”
A standard dictionary defines barter as trading goods or services without
the exchange of money. This is conducted between parties who have products
or services that each other need or want. The keyword here is need. Barter
has survived to this day. Why? Simply because people needed it then, as
they need it now, only the methods have changed over time.
In the days before the Internet, skilled business owners performed barter
exchanges mostly by word-of-mouth, choosing to approach others in other
trades based in a large part on the recommendations of business owners they
knew and trusted. At present barter has been used in situations of economic
5
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crises, as in U.S. or recently in Argentina1. In these situations, money loses
its value and obtaining goods requires the use of other means. In this context
barter offers up a way to interchange goods with similar values. However,
bartering has many other sides where it is relevant. This thesis explores
cases where bartering could be applied. The thesis first develops a common
model for bartering amongst electronic entities and then explores a number of
different bartering scenarios with diverse and exclusive properties. Starting
each case from the same model, specific properties are studied. Results are
subsequently and verified by means of simulations and analysis which to
explore the dynamics underlying each scenario and the validity of the model
is checked.
In human society, resource re–allocations are, in most cases, performed
through markets. This occurs on many different levels and in many different
scales, from our daily grocery shopping to large trades between big companies
and/or nations. Barter has been used as many times as ways to supply the
needs of developing societies.
Old Meets New: The large–scale barter networks – In the modern day,
the advent of computers not only revolutionised the world, it also facilitated
a sudden resurgence of bartering. The tremendous capabilities of this new
technology of tracking barter transactions and maintaining huge inventories
made bartering an easy and inexpensive form of trading. Today, it is amaz-
ing to see what can be obtained through bartering: computer hardware and
software, household items, jewellery, books, CDs, movies, hotel accommoda-
tions, etc. The list is endless. Barter is a big business and getting bigger
with every passing day.
Several modern barter tales illustrate the growing sophistication and
resurgence of the barter. Some examples of exciting transactions:2
• A broker arranged the exchange of 500 Fujitsu laser printers for 1.7
million units of military ready-to-eat (RTE) meals, which were in turn
sold to relief agencies for immediate use in hurricane-ravaged Florida
and Hawaii. The RTEs were surplus from the Persian Gulf conflict.
• In the largest trade deal ever inked between a U.S. corporation and
the former Soviet Union, PepsiCo, Inc. agreed in April 1990 to renew
its agreement to trade Pepsi-Cola concentrate syrup for Stolichnaya
Russian vodka until the year 2000 – a pact worth more than $3 billion in
total retail sales. Several innovative countertrade mechanisms will allow
PepsiCo to use foreign exchange credits from vodka sales to build dozens
1Argentines barter to survive http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1977804.stm
2Behind the barter boom by Rod Willis in http://www.allbusiness.com
7of bottling plants and several Pizza Hut restaurants in the Coalition of
Independent States.
• New York City’s Lexington Hotel obtained a sophisticated computer
system for almost nothing. In 1991, a barter firm gave the hotel money
to buy the computers in exchange for more than $300,000 in room
credits that the firm could use or, with the hotel’s approval, sell or
barter for other goods or services.
• Another recent innovation is bartering goods and services for excess
office space. Both SGD and ICON3 trade advertising time, hotel rooms,
or office equipment, among other goods and services, for unused space.
• Occasionally, barter gets amazing deals as the legendary purchase of
an island by Peter Minuit, who in 1626 bartered trade goods valued at
60 gold coins for an island called Manhattan.
One of the most visible examples of electronic bartering today is the
use of peer–to–peer technology to complete multi–party barter exchanges
in file sharing applications. The bartering strategy ensures that for a peer
the amount of incoming data is roughly equal to the amount of outgoing
data. The use of mass collaborative network exchanges goes from public to
private environments. In this latter, to get an account it is necessary to
know someone who is already a member (e.g. funfile4, pretome5, stmusic6).
File–swapping networks have been used for:
• Changed the values of music and its a role in the music industry’s future
• Diffusion of films and TV shows
• Distribution of patches and upgrades
With the Internet which is inherently global, bartering could change the
face of global e–commerce. The Internet reintroduced bartering back into
our economic systems. Being capable of connecting an infinite number of
traders and opening an unlimited opportunity for trade partners.
3ICON in http://www.icon-intl.com
4Funfile in http://www.funfile.org
5Pretome in http://pretome.net
6Stmusic in http://www.stmusic.org
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1.1 Motivation
Exchange represents the basis of human economic behaviour and is perva-
sive in Social and Artificial Societies. Many different areas are involved in
exchange theory:
• Sociology: The premise that all social life can be treated as an ex-
change of rewards or resources between actors. See [24], [107].
• Politics: Exchanges between citizens and holders of political authority.[146]
• Economics: Money and services are exchanged for goods.
• Artificial Societies: Exchange of digital items or resources has been
identified in Artificial Societies such as P2P [12], Grid [194], and MAS
[126].
Barter has been used as system of exchange by ancient and modern civil-
isations. Also, barter is widely applicable in setting of distributed Artificial
Societies with examples present in many different areas such as file shar-
ing [7], query forwarding [31], routing [23], knowledge diffusion ([47], [127]),
storage–sharing systems ([46], [49], [56], [140]), and WIFI hotspot sharing
[62]. It is applied in commercial platforms like Linspot7, Netshare8 or Fon9.
Barter has also been used in B2B commerce with many others examples such
as BizXchange, ITEX, BarterCard and Continental Trade Exchange. Many
hopes are riding on barter mechanisms in the Internet Age. From [123] and
[184]:
“Is it possible that advances in technology will mean that the arbitrary
assumptions necessary to introduce money into rigourous theoretical models
will become redundant, and that the world will come to resemble a pure
exchange economy? Electronic settlements in real time hold out that possi-
bility.”
Nicholas Negroponte puts it as follows:
“A parallel and more intriguing form of trade in the future will be barter.
Swapping is a very attractive form of exchange because each party uses a
currency that is devalued for them i.e. an unwanted possession, that other-
wise would be wasted. The most stunning change will be peer–to–peer, and
peer–to–peer–to–peer- ... transaction of goods and services. While this is
nearly impossible to do in the physical world, it is trivial in cyberspace. Add
7Linspot by Biontrix http://www.linspot.com
8Netshare by Speakeasy Inc. http://www.speakeasy.net/netshare
9Fon in http://www.fon.com
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the fact that some goods and services themselves can be in digital form, and
it gets easier and more likely.”
Bartering is an attractive model to study in distributed environments
such as P2P–Networks, Ad–Hoc Networks and Multi–Agent Systems and
other forms of peer production. These offer clear examples of large–scale
environments which apply effective bartering practices. These communities
consist of autonomous entities that need cooperation to exploit participant’s
resources. Without proper incentive mechanisms, a system may become use-
less because entities may engage selfish behaviour. To counterbalance this,
external incentives for cooperation are indispensable. In this thesis, a bar-
tering approach is considered as an incentive scheme. See [29], [81].
From a technical point of view, the work draws together results from the
following fields:
• Market Dynamics.
• Dynamics of economic Networks.
• Complexity and Markets.
• Economic Models.
• Agent–Based Simulation.
• Scalability and performance issues.
• Cooperation, Competition and Autonomy.
• Self–Organization/Adaptation of Multi–Agent Systems.
• Peer–to–peer, Grid and other open distributed systems.
• Novel applications.
The thesis is divided into three related parts with a common aim:
• A bartering framework: Resource allocation amongst selfish, ratio-
nal and autonomous agents.
• A bartering phenomena: A sequence of bartering exchanges that
turn a paperclip into a house.
• A bartering application: A distributed barter–based directory ser-
vices.
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
These parts have a high degree of complexity associated with them be-
cause:
• As one may imagine, the barter principle strongly constrains the design
of a content–distribution algorithm. The efficiency–loss incurred is the
price to be paid for dealing with selfish agents as opposed to cooperative
ones, and the way to trade, in our case a bartering approach.[76]
• Searching a path from lower values to higher values items in domains
with selfish and dynamic entities.
• The collection of challenging characteristics and competing entities (i.e.
popularity and scarcity of resources) that inhabit the environment.
The general approach taken to investigate the many hopes on bartering
by means of development of theoretical framework, and system building and
assessment.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis has been focused on investigating resource allocation using a
bartering mechanism, with particular emphasis on applications in large–scale
distributed systems, without the presence of altruistic participants in the
environment. In addition to the individual summaries that are located at
the end of each chapter, we also want to sum up briefly the content of this
thesis as a whole. The most significant contribution of this research are as
follows:
• General Framework: A representation of the functioning of a bar-
tering system. The design and development of a general framework
applied to three specific scenarios. Each one of these help us to show
that bartering is more in use than ever:
– Developing a barter network in order to review the efficiency of
bartering.
– Developing a simple agent population model based on active and
passive agents with ranges of personal value without altruism.
– Design, implementation and evaluation of a distributed directory
services based on a bartering mechanism.
• Bartering Networks: Comparison of the performance of bartering
algorithms with respect to the optimal one and the influence of infor-
mation on efficiency.
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• Trading Paperclips: Demonstration of the trading up process by
finding beneficial chain of trades.
• Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services: The application
of bartering to a core network service such as directory services.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured into 9 chapters which are grouped in 3 parts. The
first part consists of this current introduction together with the chapter that
maps out the methods used and a literature review. The second part is the
backbone of the thesis. In this part, the problem, implementation, and re-
sults are discussed. The four chapters that make up this part are technical
chapters. In the first, a framework is developed which, over the next three
chapters, develops bartering scenarios. The last part contains the contri-
butions, conclusions and future work. Figure 1.1 sketches the order of the
thesis. The structure of this thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 1 Introduction, introduces the work and presents the overall
picture, of the bartering mechanism.
• Chapter 2 Bartering, shows the definition and challenges of bartering.
• Chapter 3 Methodology, maps out the methods that were utilised.
• Chapter 4 Related Work, reviews related work and how it addresses
the presented problems.
• Chapter 5 General Framework and Simulation, describes the conceptual
development.
• Chapter 6 Bartering Networks, shows relevant features that have an
effect on the performance of the allocation of resources.
• Chapter 7 Trading Paperclips, describes and extends the story of Kyle
MacDonald.
• Chapter 8 Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services, develops a bar-
tering application.
• Chapter 9 Contributions and Conclusions, presents specific conclusions
drawn from the results of each stage of the investigation in earlier
chapters.
12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.1: Thesis structure.
Chapter 2
Bartering
The work in this chapter investigates interactions amongst selfish, rational,
and autonomous agents in resource allocation, each one with incomplete
information about other entities, and each seeking to maximize its expected
utility by means of exchanges in our case bartering. The distribution of a set
of items amongst a set of distributed and autonomous agents, with varying
preferences, is a complex combinatorial problem.
Bartering could be done by two or more participants. In restricted ex-
change, two actors exchange resources with each other. In other words, the
resources that one actor gives are directly contingent on the resources that
the other gives in return. If A gives to B, B is the person who would re-
ciprocate to A. This type of exchange is very common. Examples include
exchanges between teachers and students, economic transactions, employers
and employees, and so on. Most of the social exchange network research that
has emerged since the 1980s in sociology focuses only on restricted exchange.
Thus, reciprocation is direct.
A different way to relax the barter requirement is to allow transitive use
of credit (i.e. triangular barter) – A will upload to B if B is simultaneously
uploading to C and C is simultaneously uploading to A. We call this tri-
angular barter. This is more flexible than simple barter, since can receive
data even if does not have data that is useful to A. Clearly, one could gen-
eralize this idea to allow cyclic barter, involving cycles of any length – but
cheat–proof implementation of this generalization is likely to be complex.
Multilateral bartering is more complex but allows trades that would not be
possible with bilateral bartering. Complex, because multilateral bartering
with even more participants involved in the exchange process, the protocol
becomes more difficult to design, but at the same time the large scale of
participants increases the opportunities.[11]
In contrast to restricted exchanges, which occur between two actors, gen-
13
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eralized exchange inherently involves more than two people. In generalized
exchange, there is no one–to–one correspondence between what two actors
directly give to and receive from each other. A’s giving to B is not recipro-
cated by B’s giving to A, but by C’s giving to A, where C is a third party.
Thus, reciprocation is indirect, not mutual.[22]
In this thesis, both Trading Paperclips and Distributed Barter–Based Di-
rectory Services scenarios follow a restricted exchange pattern. However,
Bartering Networks scenario follow both exchange approaches. Because the
aim of Bartering Networks is to study the optimal allocation and primitive
pair–wise exchange schemes that follows a simple tit–for–tat strategy [42]
are performing unsatisfactorily, due to the classic problem of the “double
coincidence of wants”: “To find two persons whose disposable possessions
mutually suit each other’s wants. There may be many people wanting, and
many possessing those things wanted; but to allow of an act of barter [142],
there must be a double coincidence, which will rarely happen. . . . The owner
of a house may find it unsuitable, and may have his eye upon another house
exactly fitted to his needs. However, even if the owner of this second house
wishes to part with it at all, it is exceedingly unlikely that he will exactly
reciprocate the feelings of the first owner, and wish to barter houses. Sell-
ers and purchasers can only be made to fit by the use of some commodity
. . . which all are willing to receive for a time, so that what is obtained by sale
in one case, may be used in purchase in another. This common commodity is
called a medium, of exchange, because it forms a third or intermediate term
in all acts of commerce.” (Jevons, 1876, chap. 1). The second difficulty for
the serving peer to predict which one he is serving to would be serving him
in the future (i.e. future needs). Thus it has to be unnecessarily generous in
giving. And this extra generosity can be exploited by free–riders. To avoid
this behaviour our environment assumes that the agents follow a selfish be-
haviour and by means of the information that they can get from the market,
the agents try to avoid the lack of coincidence of wants.[101]
In all the scenarios studied, the agents exchange following a classical
symmetric scheme (i.e. imposing upon users to contribute at least as much
as they use the system). Bartering as any form of trade requires search,
negotiation, and exchange, which are activities that absorb resources.
Properties that are distinctive to bartering and a proper characterization
of those features of an application that might make bartering preferable.
Demonstrating applicability in specific applications:
• File sharing.
• Peer–to–Peer (P2P) VoIP-PSTN peering.
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• P2P backup, query forwarding, hotspot sharing.
Bartering is arguably interesting for the following features.
• Self–regulation.
• Distributiveness.
• Preserves autonomy (i.e. local decision).
• Incentive scheme by nature.
• Robust.
• Simplicity.
• Forces nodes to keep items; making items highly available and less
likely to be lost.
• Memory–less and therefore goal focused.
• Anonymity.
• Under–utilized capacity, excess or unsold inventory.
All of these features greatly favour the use of bartering in distributed
environments with self–interested participants. However, the major problem
of bartering is the inefficient – time consuming search for a double coincidence
of wants.
2.1 Bartering Challenges
The three challenges in this case are:
1. Detection of needs: In organizational systems where agents have to
explore a search space and interact with other agents, information, as
preferences and ownership of neighbours, is an indispensable tool in the
decision–making process.
2. Network structure: Network structure is another determining fac-
tor of the utility/level of satisfaction (los) to the society of involved
players. Network exchanges and markets consist of environments con-
taining many interconnected agents interested in buying and selling
items. In many realistic situations, agents are only connected to a lim-
ited number of other agents, and unable to directly trade with all the
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agents that are present in the environment. For instance, a buyer’s
expected satisfaction from a trade may depend on how many sellers
this buyer is negotiating with, together with how many other buyers
they are connected to.[48]
3. Individual interest: Koutsoupias [37] coined the term “the price of
anarchy” to refer to the increase in cost caused by independent selfish
behaviour [129] with respect to a social welfare–maximizing solution.
Classical approaches to the assignment/allocation problem (AP) strive
for just such a social welfare–maximizing solution. Specifically the
problem consists in allocating a finite set of items to a finite set of agents
where each agent has a specific satisfaction for each objects. Classical
AP only focuses on maximizing the overall social welfare [120], whereas
a bartering approach, and more concretely, the competition associated
is a good mechanism to promote collaboration.
These three challenges can be detected in multiple scenarios. From P2P
networks, which share content amongst peers, to people networks which share
items or resources sharing amongst dynamic collections of institutions dis-
tributed across the world as in Grid systems.
In order to solve the assignment problem (AP), there are standard opti-
mization methods that provide a solution1 ([30], [112]). However they make
several important assumptions. The first is that allocations are made by a
centralized process which A) has access to the preference information of all
agents (i.e. knowing the needs/wants of agents or complete information), and
B) is empowered to make this allocation. Secondly, the method should take
into account the fact that members are fully connected (i.e. assuming that
everyone knows everyone) all the time. Thirdly, these methods implicitly
assume that agents in the population accept the results of the allocation –
even if their own satisfaction may decrease in a particular global solution (i.e.
they act in an altruistic manner towards the overall population). However,
in a distributed environment, where agents try to obtain maximum benefit in
an independent way, the assumptions accepted by classical AP methods are
unrealistic since they deal with the problem of allocation at the community
level that assume fully connected topologies and they ignore the autonomy
of the individual. The scenario addressed is:
• There are centralized procedures that achieve the optimal allocation;
1“Matching”, in our case one–side matching, [156] is the part of economics that focuses
on the question of who gets what, particularly when the scarce items to be allocated are
heterogeneous and indivisible.
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• In general, it is not possible to find a decentralized procedure that
achieves the optimal allocation.[137]
In systems involving multiple autonomous agents, it is often necessary
to decide how scarce resources should be allocated. Moreover, when selfish
agents have competing interests, they may have incentive to deviate from
protocols or to lie to other agents about their preferences. Against this
background, this chapter studies resource allocation in Multi–Agent Systems
in which each agent 1) is selfish and 2) has incomplete information about
the other entities in the world under a barter–based approach. Barter trade
exhibits several characteristics that are desirable in the environment in which
we face, i.e.:
• Anonymity: The participating entities do not have to disclose their
identity.
• Enforcement: Bartering is an incentive scheme by nature.
• Scalability: The incentive pattern may be effectively applied by a
large number of entities.
• Localization: Cooperation and remuneration do not require interac-
tion with dedicated entities.
2.2 Bartering Features
Barter transaction between two or more parties has features that are reviewed
in this section:
• Market topologies and structures: The relationship between par-
ticipants in a market/barter network can take many different forms.
Participants follow rules at the instant of offering items to the market.
These rules decide which available items the agent should offer to its
neighbours. They are influenced by the items offered in the market. If
the market is offering valuable items, the agent is willing to offer its
items. When an agent is connected to the rest of the agents in the
system (i.e. fully connected topology) it has more opportunities than
when an agent has a reduced number of connections. Thus, the fewer
neighbours that an agent has, the greater the reduction in the possibil-
ity of useful items being offered. This second case could be for several
reasons – it could be informational (i.e. certain sellers and buyers are
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not aware of each other) or institutional (i.e. conventions prohibit cer-
tain sellers from transacting with certain buyers) or each buyer could
prioritize the sellers somehow, and only be interested in trading with
the highest–priority seller.
• Agent-based distributed resource allocation: The problem of
how to allocate resources in a distributed manner has been addressed
since the beginnings of agent–based research. Algorithms or method-
ologies have been developed that specifically take into account the de-
centralized system structure of Multi–Agent Systems and their ability
to communicate and coordinate. For example, multi-agent system ar-
chitectures are well suited to dynamic resource allocation. These classes
of allocations are defined by their degree of distribution of control and
degree of synchronization [33], [52]. Well–known methods of this type
include blackboard structures or auction-like algorithms (see [40], [160],
[188] for a summary). The method which will be investigated here is
based on economic markets, since resource allocation is also a basic
problem in Human Societies. See [25], [35], [68].
• Grid resource allocation: Resource allocation is the key technol-
ogy in Grid computing. Economic based grid resource allocation is
an area of study due to a lack of resource ownership and control.[95]
Projects such as the POPCORN project2 provide a market-based mech-
anism for trade in CPU time to motivate processors to provide their
CPU cycles for other peoples computations. Nimrod–G3 is a computa-
tional economy-based global Grid resource management and scheduling
system that supports deadline and budget constrained algorithms for
scheduling parameter sweep applications on distributed resources. In
this way, bartering of resources on grids have been studied in different
papers [136], and in projects such as Gossiptron [190] and Catallaxy
[67].
• Both-Sided and one-sided matching models: In cases where both
sides of the market have preferences over the other side, a satisfactory
answer to this question, called stable matching, was proposed by Gale
and Shapley (G–S) [75]. Since then, this concept was used in many
applications including matching medical students to hospitals. One of
the most important properties of stable matchings is that they always
exist.
2POPCORN in http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/∼popcorn/
3Nimrod-G in http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/∼davida/nimrod/nimrodg.htm
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There are markets where only one side has preference over the other (i.e.
one–sided matching). Such markets correspond to situations where one
side of the market consists of agents with preferences, and the other
side consists of items that can be allocated to the agents. In cases
where there is an initial assignment of items to the agents (e.g., in
some models of the housing market), there is an algorithm commonly
known as the top trading cycle algorithm (TTC) that always finds a
solution with satisfaction properties.[167]
Qualities that G–S brings:
– Not necessarily Pareto–optimal.
– Strategy proof.
– Stability – eliminates justified envy.
– A stable matching exists that is preferred to any other stable
matching.
Qualities that TTC brings:
– Pareto–efficient.
– Strategy proof.
– Does not eliminate justified envy.
The preferred algorithm will depend on whether it is more important
to be fair or to be efficient.
• Bilateral/pairwise/direct and multilateral exchanges: Bilateral
or multilateral commitments often refer to the mutual provision of ser-
vices. From an abstract point of view, such mutual provision of services
represents an exchange of items [131]. Pairwise exchange is a simple
way of bartering, in which two peers directly satisfy each other’s needs.
Fortunately, we can generalize pairwise exchange to group exchange,
by introducing the notion of an exchange circle. In a circle, each par-
ticipant provides content to the next person in the circle, and receives
content from the previous person in the circle.
With respect to the quantity of participants involved in the barter
process:
– In restricted or bilateral/pairwise exchange, two actors exchange
resources with each other. In other words, the resources that
one actor gives are directly contingent on the resources that the
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Figure 2.1: Bilateral exchange versus Multilateral exchange.
other gives in return. If A gives to B, B is the person who would
reciprocate to A. This type of exchange is very common (see
Figure 2.1 a)).[54]
– In contrast to restricted exchanges, which occur between two ac-
tors, generalized or multilateral exchange inherently involves more
than two people. In generalized exchange, there is no one–to–one
correspondence between what two actors directly give to and re-
ceive from each other (see Figure 2.1 b)). See [97], [175]. The
following list shows features of N–way exchanges:
∗ A generalization of barter, which retains some of its simplicity.
∗ “Provide to those [who provided to those]* who provided to
me”.
∗ A type of indirect reciprocity (sociology).
∗ Scales to larger populations, compared to direct–only exchanges.
∗ Does not require (central or distributed) authorities.
General weaknesses related to bartering are:
∗ Exchanged items must be of equal value (at least for the per-
sonal point of view of their participants).
∗ Missing valuation mechanisms ⇒ equal items (e.g. file parts).
∗ No possibility to pay for more consumption or to get paid for
more contribution.
The exchange process is the interaction between buyer and seller
in which each participant gives the other something of value. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the interaction between a seller and a buyer in an
exchange process. Firstly, the buyer sends the want–list (WL)
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Figure 2.2: Skeleton of the general framework.
to the seller. This is re–send for each item offered. The buyer
reviews this list and checks which offers are beneficial or not (i.e.
have list HL). Once, the buyer has the list of entries proposed by
the seller, and it gets the list of items to exchange, the last task
is to make the exchange process. The strategy in the exchange
process should be to exchange only the best deal or to make any
available exchange.
In any exchange process one of the following situations could oc-
cur:
∗ The exchange moves the goal directed agent nearer/farther
to/from the objective item.
∗ The exchange means that the agent gets something more valu-
able than the targeted item in terms of general market value.
∗ The exchange means that the items obtained will never be
replaced by other items, breaking the chain of trades or open-
ing a new sub–optimal chain of trades (e.g. the item is one
nobody else desires).
The exchange algorithm 1 takes the following steps:
– Finally we have exchanges with restricted lengths: Let us
suppose that the size of the basic coalitions are restricted. Thus
the outcome of the game is an l–way exchange that contains no
cycle with length more than l. Obviously, an l–way exchange
is equivalent to a vertex–disjoint packing of directed cycles with
length at most l. [97] If l = 2, so only pairwise exchanges are
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Algorithm 1 The exchange algorithm
Step 1: The propagation of advertisements.
agent1: To offer the items to the agent2’s
Step 2: The pairwise matching.
agent2s: To comparison of the PVagent2(item offered by agent1) of the item
offered in step 1 with its PVagent2(own item)
if PVagent2(item offered by agent1) > PVagent2(own item) then
offer any of its own items to agent1
end if
Step 3: The selection of the optimal pairwise matching.
agent1: To choose of the item with a large MV offered in the step 2
Step 4: End conditions for agent1.
if the item has obtained in step 3 is equal to the item desired then
to stop
else
to go back to step 1
end if
allowed, then the problem becomes a matching problem in an
undirected graph G with the same vertex set. In this case, an
edge links two vertices if a pairwise exchange is possible between
the corresponding pairs.
With respect to the time when is rewarded the participants in-
volves in the barter process:
∗ Immediate service in return: The participants provide a
service in return simultaneously.
∗ Non-immediate service in return: Sometimes it is infea-
sible to give a service in return, in this case the participants
promise a service in return.
• Long or short path: An interesting question in N–way exchanges is
how to choose from different feasible exchanges. In principle, a pref-
erence for larger rings should improve overall performance, as more
participants are served. On the other hand, participants prefer smaller
rings as the search cost is lower, and the expected exchange volume is
also higher for smaller rings, as the probability of a peer either discon-
necting or completing is higher for larger rings. Assuming participants
care less about global performance and more about their own benefit,
there is no clear incentive to put additional effort into looking for larger
rings when even a two-way exchange has been located. This question
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is very related to the performance. [7] Also, the multilateral trade has
associated a higher transaction cost because all participants should be
synchronized. See [58], [64].
– An intrinsic problem that arises is that some of the users who
should participate in a proposed path of exchanges may fail be-
cause users may learn of a better choice to exchange its items, e.g.,
a direct exchange with one of the users participating in proposed
path.
– Another problem is that an agent could act as a middleman be-
tween two agents that could perform an exchange directly with
each other, and obtain an object without doing any useful work
for the system. Specifically, let us assume that agent A has itemx
and wants itemy, and agent B has itemy and wants itemx. The
cheating agent C, interested in itemx claims that he has itemy
and wants itemx when talking to agent A, and that he has itemx
and wants itemy when talking to agent B. Agent C would start
getting blocks of itemy from agent B and exchanging them for
blocks of itemx with agent A which in turn are passed to agent
B for more blocks of agent D. In this scenario, agent C does not
contribute any useful work to the system, and can still get high–
priority service. If this can happens, then the exchange–based
incentives could be broken down.
• Types of optimal allocations: Depending on the environment an
optimal allocation or other could be achieved (see Figure 2.3):
– Initial optimal allocation (IOA): The allocation in the initial
state.
– Bilateral optimal allocation (BOA): A BOA is an allocation
that can not be improved upon by bilateral trade.
– Multilateral optimal allocation (MOA): A MOA is an allo-
cation that can not be improved upon by multilateral trade.
– Pareto optimal allocation (POA): A POA is achieved when it
is not possible to make anyone better off without making someone
else worse off.
– Global optimal allocation (GOA): The maximum allocation,
it is when everyone has that they want.
From IOA to BOA the following assumptions should be applied [69]:
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    IOA BOA MOA POA GOA
d(IOA     BOA)
d(BOA     MOA)
d(MOA     POA)
d(POA     GOA)
d(A     B) is the
distance between
allocation A and B.
- +level of satisfaction
Figure 2.3: Ordered sequence of allocations.
– A rotating trading pattern: which forces every pair to trade peri-
odically.
– Strictly convex preferences.
• Optimal: The first step of inquiry, we concentrate on the simple hous-
ing market introduced by Shapley and Scarf [153] and [167]. This sim-
ple environment describes pure barter of indivisible items yet important
issues concerning efficiency, envy and decentralization can be analysed.
At each period, a pair of traders is matched randomly and they trade
their endowments if and only if trade is mutually beneficial therefore,
myopia is a component of their behaviour. See [71], [118], [152], [168].
The performance in pair–wise exchange–based is limited in systems
with large populations and great diversity of interest, for it is relatively
rare to match users in pairs. Furthermore, primitive pair–wise exchange
schemes with the simple tit–for–tat strategy, also perform unsatisfac-
torily, due to the difficulty for the serving participant to predict which
other participant it is serving who may serve its in the future. In or-
der to increase the possible exchanges a way is to increase the number
of participants. For example, the natural extension from 2–way ex-
change is the 3–way exchange, 3–way exchange–based scheme enlarges
the matching possibility by introducing 3 participant exchanges. The
main task in the 3–way schemes is to realize feasible exchanges with 3
participants. On the other hand, this new approach is adding complex-
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ity in the exchange protocol. The original requester C selects a node
S from the query results for downloading the entries. Due to poten-
tially large traffic, C and S make a direct connection to retrieve entries
rather than communicating through a chain of neighbours. However, S
has no incentive to upload entries to C as it only costs S its resources.
Thus, C needs to find either an altruistic S that unconditionally up-
loads to C or a circular dependency of requests. For example, if S also
wants to download some other entries from C, S and C form a circular
dependency of length 2. Or if there exists a node P such that P wants
to download from C, and S from P , they form a circular dependency
of length 3. If a circular dependency is found, they are likely to agree
to serving one in exchange of being served by another.
If a cycle is established, then all the nodes in the cycle would simul-
taneously participate, leading to higher utilization. In this way, the
N–way scheme can improves effectiveness but comes at the expense of
the prohibitive discovery procedure. However, to make 3–way or more
exchanges is more difficult to achieve than 2–way exchange.
Maximal two–way exchanges are found through different versions of
the algorithm of J. Edmonds (see [43], [61]), as discussed in Roth et al.
[155] maximal two–way, three–way and maximal unrestricted exchanges
are found through various formulations of the exchange problem as an
integer programming problem. The ability to perform three–way or
more exchanges has been demonstrated by increasing the number of
possible exchanges that can be identified. See [54], [69], [80], [109].
• Bartering strategies: In a bartering economy, each agent relationship
can be viewed as an instance of an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD).
In each round, agents play part of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Let Rlocal
denote the value of local resources and Rremote the value of remote
resources. The reward R for cooperation for both traders is thus Rremote
– Rlocal. The punishment M for mutual defection is zero. Finally, the
temptation to detect T and the sucker’s payoff S are Rremote and – Rlocal,
respectively. Hence, we have the necessary conditions for a Prisoner’s
Dilemma: T>R>M>S.
Since users are considered to be self–interested rather than malicious,
the best way to discourage defections is to offer an alternative that gives
them better performance at a lower cost. It is useful for the system as
a whole, and respects their desire.
• Centralized versus distributed allocations:
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– In the centralized case, a single entity decides on the final allo-
cation, possibly after having elicited the preferences of the other
agents.
– In the distributed case, allocations emerge as the result of a se-
quence of local negotiation steps. Such local steps may or may
not be subjected to restrictions such as:
∗ Structural: bilateral deal, topology
∗ Informational: open, restricted
∗ Behavioural: selfish, malicious, altruist
Unfortunately, these factors make it difficult to reach the optimal allo-
cation (GOA) in the distributed approach (see Figure 2.4). Since the
agents do not wish to disclose all their information, for example, other
agents need to base their decisions on incomplete information. The
situation is even more complex when agents are competitive because
agents will be inclined to make selfish decisions, rather than doing what
is better for the group.
The centralized approach is applicable to problems in which global
information is available and agents are cooperative. Problems in which
some agents want to keep their information private for competitive or
other reasons call for distributed methods ranging from coordination
amongst cooperative agents (Durfee et al. [59]) to negotiation amongst
competitive agents (Sandholm [159]).
The distributed model seems also more natural in cases where find-
ing optimal allocations may be (computationally) infeasible, but even
small improvements over the initial allocation of resources would be
considered a success.
Decentralization comprises constraints on the distribution of informa-
tion and authority among participants in a distributed system. In a
decentralized system, the information state of an individual is consid-
ered private, and is disseminated only by voluntary communication
acts. This contrasts with centralized systems, in which it is gener-
ally assumed that a single entity can obtain knowledge of the entire
information state, for example by compelling communication. Decen-
tralization constraints clearly restrict the computations performed by
individual participants, and apparently of the system as a whole.
Because computational environments are increasingly decentralized in
some respects (e.g., Multi–Agent Systems, where agents represent dis-
tinct individuals or organizations with diverse information and inter-
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Figure 2.4: Approaches relating to the problem space.
ests), it is important to understand the computational properties of
decentralized systems.
• Myopic or non–fully vision: Agents may not know all the state of
the system such as preferences and ownership of the rest of the popula-
tion. When the preferences are not common knowledge, self–interested
agents often fail to explore win–win possibilities. A mechanism to over-
come the informational restrictions is to add a list of preferences and
ownership for each agent in the environment. Even the result of the
allocation we could assume non–malicious agents when they are provid-
ing their preferences. Indeed, non–rational trades should be accepted
even when the agents have all information to reach the GOA.
• Emergent computation: Many systems in nature exhibit sophisti-
cated collective information-processing abilities that emerge from the
individual actions of simple components interacting via restricted com-
munication pathways. Some often cited examples include efficient for-
aging and intricate nest-building in insect societies (1), the spontaneous
aggregation of a reproductive multicellular organism from individual
amoeba in the life cycle of the Dictyostelium slime mold (2), the paral-
lel and distributed processing of sensory information by assemblies of
neurons in the brain (3), and the optimal pricing of goods in an econ-
omy arising from agents obeying local rules of commerce (4). Allowing
global coordination to emerge from a decentralized collection of simple
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components has important advantages over explicit central control in
both natural and human constructed information-processing systems.
There are substantial costs incurred in having centralized coordination,
not the least being (i) speed (i.e. a central coordinator can be a bottle-
neck to fast information processing), (ii) robustness (i.e. if the central
coordinator is injured or lost, the entire system collapses), and (iii)
equitable resource allocation.
The value of an information sharing community is often directly pro-
portional to the size of the community: larger communities may provide
more information to the individual users and so provide greater value.
As communities grow, however, locating information becomes a critical
challenge. A resource location operation, to find out who owns the item
they need, is required in a bartering market. See [51], [198].
• Replication and non–replication: In information diffusion the non–
rivalry property is commonly assumed. In contrast, in our approach
items only belong to an unique member in the social network at the
same time. For this reason, when items change hands, the owner of
these items loses the utility/los associated with the items and this does
not happen in the information diffusion approach.[186]
2.3 Summary
This chapter outlines the features that exhibit the bartering model. The
rest of the thesis uses the bartering model focusing on different elements of
bartering.
• General Framework and Simulation chapter sets the guidelines for the
next three chapters.
• Bartering Networks chapter is focused on network structure challenge.
• Trading Paperclips chapter is focused on individual interest challenge.
• Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services chapter is focused on de-
tection of needs and network structure challenges.
Chapter 3
Methodology
In this chapter, the methodology followed during the production of this thesis
is discussed. This work applies a general model which establishes base rules
applicable to a wide range of bartering situations. Starting with a common
model brings several advantages such as focusing on a common purpose,
avoids irrelevant issues, and allows us to reach an agreement about the rules
used in concrete models. Once the base rules are known, the next task is
to customise this general model into a concrete one. Then looking at the
general model, the types of issues to be considered in such bartering worlds
included:
• What is the loss between bilateral allocation and Pareto optimal al-
location? (i.e. the loss in allocation efficiency and is there indeed a
loss?)
• What is the price to be paid for dealing with selfish agents in distributed
environments, versus altruistic agents?
• What conditions are necessary in a market to ensure that a decision–
maker will turn up a non–valuable item into a valuable item?
• How many decision–makers following the same pattern can achieve such
an objective?
• Can the use of bartering be applicable in a real scenario? Is it useful?
• How does the request distribution affect the stability of the knowledge
acquired during the bartering process? and, if so, how?
Checking relevant examples and simulations allows us to derive results
relevant to the efficiency and efficacy of bartering environments. Figure 3.1
sketches this methodology chapter.
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Figure 3.1: Methodology structure.
The experimental settings are centred on evaluation of the results – pos-
itive or negative evidence from the following scenarios:
1. Investigation of the general features of bartering environments and on
the study of performance of exchanges from two–way to tree–way ex-
changes.
2. Analysis of how applying beneficial exchange to get valuable goods and
the replication of patterns.
3. Provides in a competitive environment access to information in a di-
rectory. This is a validation of a specific application.
3.1 Conceptualisation
Conceptualisation refers to deliberate analysis beyond the known i.e., be-
yond beliefs, assumptions, commonplace interpretations, prevailing theories,
habitual conclusions and so on to see what is not yet known. The inspiration
for our work comes from many places, but the heart of our design is always
driven by the main goal, to explore and analyse bartering in the Internet
Age. This section shows way to analyse complex distributed systems that
match with our vision of the world.
Most modern computing systems are distributed: large collections of in-
terconnected components whose interactions lead to macroscopic behaviours.
A common property of these systems is that they are extremely complex to
design, debug, and maintain. The other main challenge is the autonomy of
the participants in the environment. Without a centralised control, the power
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is distributed amongst the participants and this entails important changes
with respect to a centralised solution.
One vision of this world is agent–based modelling. The first advantage
of agent based modelling is its capability to show how collective phenomena
came about and how the interaction of the autonomous and heterogeneous
agents leads to the genesis of these phenomena. Furthermore, agent-based
modelling aims at the isolation of critical behaviour in order to identify in-
dividual agents that more than others, driving the collective results of the
system.
The second advantage of agent–based modelling, which is complementary
to the first one, is a more normative one. Agent–based models are not only
used to get a deeper understanding of the inherent forces that drive a system
and influence the characteristics of a system. Agent–based modellers use
their models as computational laboratories to explore various institutional
arrangements, various potential paths of development so as to assist and
guide e.g. firms, policy makers etc. in their particular decision context.
Agent–based modelling uses methods and insights from diverse disciplines
such as evolutionary economics, cognitive science and computer science in its
attempt to model the bottom-up emergence of phenomena and the top–down
influence of the collective phenomena on individual behaviour.[19]
Building on the work by Schelling, Epstein and Axtell [66], who used
agent–based computational experiments to investigate how various collective
behaviours might arise from the interactions of agents following simple rules
of behaviour [151], with respect to the relevance of the market structure,
Wilhite [192] uses a model of a bilateral exchange economy to explore the
consequences of restricting trade to small–world trade networks.[189]
The method of agent–based computational economics can be summarised
as below [179], [178]:
• Firstly research defines the problem to resolve.
• The researcher then constructs a virtual economic world with groups
of agents.
• The modeller sets initial conditions of the world, cf. the trading rules
of the world, the attributes and learning model of the agents, what are
the preconditions of the experiment.
• The modeller then lets the world evolve over time without further out-
side intervention.
• Finally the researcher analyses and attempts to explain the data gen-
erated according to economic principles or proposes policy suggestions
32 CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
to guide practices.
A different vision comes from methodological individualism [13]. Method-
ological individualism is a philosophical method aimed at explaining and un-
derstanding broad society–wide developments as the aggregation of decisions
by individuals. This theory is an essential part of modern neoclassical eco-
nomics, which usually analyses collective action in terms of rational, utility–
maximising individuals. This is the so called Homo–economicus postulate.
In this view, the structure and dynamics of most economic institutions can
be analysed.
Cognitive economics [28] has emerged in recent decades as the study of
economic systems based on the cognitive capacities and processes of the par-
ticipating social agents in social networks, their knowledge, beliefs, desires
and intentions. Cognitive economics studies:
• The processes of individual and collective decision-making and rea-
soning, distributed problem solving and individual and organisational
learning;
• The social interactions between economic agents and their co-operation,
co-ordination, and competition;
• The role and emergence of norms and other institutions, the influence
of different norms (in particular market rules) on individual behaviour
and collective outcome;
• The evolution of rules, norms, and institutions and the processes of
self–organisation of societies.
The P2P paradigm exhibits three characteristics related to this thesis:
self–organisation, symmetric communication and distributed control.[157]
The difficulty of finding, retrieving and using network resources (i.e. content,
services, or hardware), increases with network size and degree of decentral-
isation. The problems that can be solved with proposed P2P approaches,
amongst others, are data sharing and dissemination as well as distributed
system control.[125]
Further, many P2P research efforts are centred on the key issue of altruism
versus selfish behaviour in peer networks – targeting specifically how to avoid
misbehaviour and non–desired behaviour. See [144], [187].
Researchers in economics have turned also to the modelling of artificial
economies using, in many cases, Multi–Agent Systems (MAS) like paradigm
as a powerful approach to be applied to problems involving complex dynam-
ics such as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents [182], firm
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formation [17] and consumer behaviour [5]. Software-based agents systems
try to solve complex tasks by using a set of autonomous agents. Once the
word software is removed, there are many similarities between multi–agent
systems and societies of humans. Multi Agent–Based Simulation (MABS) is
an intensive field of research for example in computer science, social science,
mathematics or economics. The study of economic systems with MABS have
become known as Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE). Economies
are modelled as independent evolving systems of autonomous interacting in-
telligent agents. The goal of market simulations is to assess the market
behaviour and its development over time. Agents applied in simulations nor-
mally use simple decision rules, learning algorithms, or statistical analysis
to adapt their strategies. Tesfatsion [180] provides a detailed overview on
ACE research and describes studies of market simulations in electricity and
financial markets.
This thesis spans a wide range of research areas, such as economy, agents
and P2P systems. Therefore, the methodology used also takes into account
existing methodologies of these three areas.
3.2 Data Collection
Within the thesis work, three techniques of data collection have been used:
• Experiments: An experiment focuses on investigating a few variables
and the ways in which these are affected by the experimental condi-
tions. Typically, experiments are used to verify or falsify a previously
formulated hypothesis.
• Case Study: A case study project is undertaken as an in-depth ex-
ploration of a phenomenon in its natural setting. A characteristic of
a case study is that it involves a limited number of cases, sometimes
even a single case. This allows to undertake a detailed examination of
the phenomenon.
• Application: Many projects in computer science and information sys-
tems consist of developing new solutions. Such a solution can consist
of a new software architecture, method, procedure, algorithm, or some
other technique, which solves some problem in a new way, which has
some advantage over existing solutions. In a project of this type, it is
often necessary to implement the proposed solution, in order to demon-
strate that it really does possess the proposed advantages. The goal of
the application, then, is to demonstrate that the solution has certain
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properties/conditions it behaves in a specific way. This application of-
ten needs to be compared with applications of existing solutions, before
conclusions can be drawn.
The experiments are applied in the Bartering Network, Trading Paper-
clips and Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services (DBBDS), case study
technique was applied in Trading Paperclips and lastly, the application tech-
nique for Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services.
3.3 Simulation
Multi–Agent Simulation was selected as the chosen approach within the the-
sis, given its strong suitability for the exploration of resource allocation in
economics research (see the section above on Conceptualisation).
The model in this thesis assumes a large population of n peers joining
a network. We examine the behaviour of autonomous and rational peers
who maximise their utility within a fixed time period, considered as a time
unit. Each peer acts as a strategic player, whose decision variable is the level
of his contribution, ranging from zero to a maximum quantity, that reflects
any constraints on content availability. All peers act simultaneously during
a time period and the only way to exchange is by means of bartering. At
each exchange the agents only wants to improve its utility/satisfaction. At
the end of a time period, each peer realises its total payoff.
The experiments in the scenarios cover a wide range of parameters. How-
ever, each scenario is focused on showing different sides of bartering. For
example, Bartering Networks is related to efficient and conditions in the bar-
tering exchange. Trading Paperclips estimates the conditions in the market
and the percentage of agents that can obtain a valuable item. Finally, Dis-
tributed Barter–Based Directory Services is focuses on query behaviour. For
this reason, the parameters depends on the features of each scenario.
3.4 Experimental Boundaries
The world modelled in this thesis is composed of interconnected decision–
makers. The only available way to negotiate within the environment is using
bartering. As a network, the topology and information is a relevant feature
in the model. In Figure 6.7 topologies with a wide range of links are shown:
from fully–connected to sparse–connected topologies. Figure 8.5 shows two
topologies: Erdos–Renyi and random structure. These structures allow the
study of the relevance of quantity of links in direct exchange scenarios. The
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quantity of participants in the models ranges from 500 nodes in Bartering
Networks, 5,000 nodes in Trading Paperclips and 100 nodes in DBBDS. An-
other feature is the behaviour of the agents. Assuming that any decision is
always taken for its own benefit, two behaviours are modelled – active and
passive: active is when the agent is looking for a trade and passive is when
the agent is expecting a trade proposal.
In general terms, the boundaries for the experiments have these values.
All of them follow a similar approach because all of them start from a common
model but each one has some variations in the parameters.
3.5 Summary
The study of dynamics of social networks in distributed environments such
as MAS and P2P can help us to understand the allocation of content or
resources. One has to consider underlying social beliefs and desires, whose
connectivity and topology play important roles in mediating agent–agent or
peer-peer interactions.
We are interested in selfish communities, or in other words, communities
that do not presume altruism in their members. The reason for this is that
in open environments with autonomous and rational peers/agents who want
maximise their utility, to assume this type of behaviour can not be considered
a reasonable condition.
Experiments focus on investigating a limited number of variables and
the ways in which these are affected by the experimental conditions starting
from a general model. The next task was to fine tune this general model and
run simulations to see how each one of the concrete models were affected by
different variables.
Our point of departure in agent–based modelling is the individual: We
gave agents rules of behaviour and then move the system forward in time
and see what the performance and the content distribution and re–allocation
changes that emerges together with their features and properties.
Following the method proposed by agent–based computational economics
in this thesis, the problem definition and construction of the virtual economic
world is depicted in General Framework and Simulation chapter. Initial
conditions, developing the environments and evaluating the results are shown
in the Bartering Networks, Trading Paperclips and Distributed Barter–Based
Directory Services chapters.
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Chapter 4
Related Work
This chapter summarizes existing work, particularly in the fields of economic
theory, Multi–Agent Systems (MAS) and Peer–to–Peer (P2P) from the sci-
ences that have the which are of relevance to our work. The thesis is focused
on three scenarios. Each of these scenarios are interconnected, but there are
appreciate subtle differences between the related work for each of one of these
scenarios. To further this end this chapter discusses relevant research fields
which is followed by a related fields section for each scenario. But firstly a
wide range of examples and fields where bartering is present together with a
P2P example are disclosed:
• An art student, Lina Fenequito, created an interactive vending machine
placed in public places such as bars and cafes and where different kinds
of artefact could be swapped for others by the users. As Fenequito com-
ments on her website: “The Swap–O–Matic1 will attempt to promote
the recycling of objects through the interface of a vending machine,
which features used rather than new products. Participation with the
system will allow users to rethink spending patterns, view consumption
with a different perspective, and explore issues of material possessions
and American consumption through a public installation. The Swap–
O–Matic is intended to be both a solution and critical response to the
gluttonous culture that we live in today. Its core function is to support
the reuse and recycling of consumer products through swapping among
participants.”
• The BitTorrent protocol a P2P file–sharing that has attracted millions
of users and uses a bartering technique for downloading in order to
prevent users from free–riding.
1Swap–O–Matic in www.swap-o-matic.com
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These two examples show the wide range of scenarios where bartering is
applicable. Therefore, this involves a variety of related fields studied in this
chapter.
4.1 Research Fields
Three research fields are very related with to research of this thesis. Ob-
viously, the economic and bartering theory perse. In many cases the com-
plexity of the economic situation was explained by the interaction of simple
participants, mainly behaving in a structured environment. The scarce of re-
sources is lead using economic approaches. Other area is agent–based model,
the agent–based modelling allows to model the bottom–up emergence of phe-
nomena and the top down influence of the collective phenomena on individual
behaviour. The last research that is useful for the work is P2P computing.
P2P devised solutions to problems that appear again in our model. In this
section the links between the related research fields are discussed.
Economic and bartering theory: Decentralized market economies are
complex adaptive systems, consisting of large numbers of adaptive agents in-
volved in parallel local interactions. These local interactions give rise to
macroeconomic regularities such as shared market protocols and behavioural
norms which in turn feed back into the determination of local interactions.
The result is a complicated dynamic system of recurrent causal chains con-
necting individual behaviours, interaction networks, and social welfare out-
comes. To build an agent–based world capturing key aspects of a decentral-
ized market economy, introducing self–interested trades and observing the
degree of coordination that results from the interaction of its participants.
Multi–Agent System: Agent–based models or agent simulations are
a powerful methodology to gain insight into these complex systems. Thus,
agent models can provide results and findings that can help to better under-
stand complex social processes that take place in society. The first advantage
of agent based modelling is their capability to show how collective phenomena
came about and how the interaction of the autonomous and heterogeneous
agents leads to the genesis of these phenomena. The second advantage is it
flexibility.[66]
P2P: Direct exchange of resources is the simplest to implement incen-
tive mechanism. It is enforced by definition and is totally memory-less and
anonymous. For example, BitTorrent [42]. BitTorrent is an example of a
real world application focusing on bandwidth provisioning for content distri-
bution, which actually implements a reciprocative incentive scheme without
relying on past transactions of peers but on a direct exchange of resources.
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Because the incentive scheme does not rely on tracking the long term be-
haviour of peers it is simple to implement and largely immune to problems of
false trading and whitewashing. Also notice that direct exchange is a natural
mechanism used in other areas such as in preservation systems [44] and P2P
multicast streaming.[94]
4.2 Related Fields
This section compares the subject matter of in this thesis with other related
works. Showing the relevance of this work with respect to previous work
made in similar research.
Bartering Networks: We assume that agents aim to optimize their
exchanges in terms of these goals under imperfect, local information without
initial knowledge about others’ characteristics or knowledge about the global
network structure [92]. As we will show, these assumptions do not preclude
the emergence of complex networks. These assumptions, in a greater or lesser
degree, have been touched in previous papers as:
Contract Types for Satisfying Task Allocation: I Theoretical Results [159]
and Contract Types for Satisfying Task Allocation: II Experimental Results
[8] review different types of contract, analysed them and experimented with.
Bilateral Trading Processes, pairwise Optimality, and Pareto Optimality
[69] studies the bilateral trading process, showing that under certain con-
ditions a sequence of bilateral trades will carry the economy to a pairwise
optimal allocation.
On the Communication Complexity of Multilateral Trading [64] is de-
ployed a negotiation framework which makes multilateral deals a necessity;
this is the price to pay for the simplicity of our agent model based on the no-
tion of rationality. If agents only agree to deal with something that improves
their own welfare (i.e. rather than being prepared to accept a temporary
loss in utility in view of potential future rewards), then deals involving any
number of agents as well as resources may require to be able to guarantee
socially optimal outcomes.
Bartering Leftovers on the Internet [196] proposes a centralized algorithm
for finding maximal sequence of exchanges which is implemented only as
an advise for the users in the system. Because it is assumed that users
will frequently tend to not follow the solution suggested by the algorithm.
The protocol is designed to allow negotiations between the users before they
agree with a proposed exchange. Negotiations allow users to choose the
next exchange using updated information about the preferences and modified
offers of relevant users.
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Inefficiencies in Task allocation for Multi–Agent Planning with Bilateral
Deals [54] explains that without recontracting and multilateral deals the al-
location problem can be inefficient. Recent studies show that under certain
assumptions simply allowing recontracting can lead to repeat cycles of mak-
ing and breaking contracts. However, there are protocols that prevent such
deadlock situations. For example, the levelled commitment protocol intro-
duces penalties for breaking contracts (Sandholm & Lesser 2001).[161]
How to exchange Items [162] shows that for a given system there always
exists a unique stable re–allocation, and presents a simple and fast algorithm
to find it from the revealed lists.
On Optimal Outcomes of Negotiations over Resources [65] are studied
conditions to obtain optimal outcomes.
On Cooperative Content Distribution and the Price of Barter [76] is devel-
oped a barter–like mechanisms and explores the three–way trade–off between
the mechanisms enforceability, their ability to incentive uploads, and the effi-
ciency of content distribution. To this end, they are considered three different
mechanisms based on barter, informally analyse their incentive structure, de-
rive lower bounds and develop actual algorithms for content distribution.
In Monotonic Concession Protocol [63] is explained the Monotonic Con-
cession Protocol (MCP) process. The MCP is a bilateral bargaining process.
The process begins by requesting all interested suppliers to propose a deal
simultaneously in the first round. The contractor and suppliers will then
make a concession alternatively until an agreement is reached. If neither the
contractor nor suppliers make a concession in the same round, then negoti-
ation terminates with a conflicting deal. The disadvantage of MCP is the
uncertainty associated with the bargaining process at termination, as a party
cannot identify the environment and opponents accurately.
The problem of optimally allocating data objects given space constraints
is well known in computer science. Distributed bin packing problems [122]
and the File allocation Problem [38] are known to be NP–hard.
Anagnostakis and Greenwald [7] propose exchange based mechanisms for
providing incentives for cooperation. This approach is generalized to n-wise
exchanges among rings of peers and a search algorithm for locating such
rings is presented. For its part, the work from O¨zturan [136], Roth [154]
have revealed the importance in the market performance with respect to the
individuals that involves a bartering arrangement.[155]
In our case, we have focused on requirements of barter environments and
performance in two [69] and three way exchanges comparing these results
with respect to Kuhn–Munkres algorithm that resolves the optimal assign-
ment problem and maximal two–way exchanges from the algorithm of J.
Edmonds. Developing infrastructure to perform three–way as well as two-
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way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of exchanges
that can be arranged. And computing not only the actual maximal number
of exchanges, but also the predicted number based on the formulas derived
above.
Exchange–based mechanisms are also discussed in [49] for incentivizing
users of peer–to–peer storage systems to contribute resources. The work
most closely related to ours is BitTorrent, a system for large–scale content
distribution where peers exchange blocks of the same file in an effort to
expedite the distribution of large files [42]. The approach is more limited
in that it only supports two–way exchanges on the same file, and appears
to be vulnerable to free–riding middlemen. To the best of our knowledge,
our study is the first to examine the effect of exchange mechanisms on peer
performance and their value as an incentive mechanism in a file–sharing
system. Systems such as Scrivener [128] adopt a more advanced content
trading mechanism called transitive trade. Transitive trade establishes a
credit path from the requesting node to the node that has the desired file.
Credits are then transferred along this path and the download may start.
Discovering credit paths is, however, a complex problem, and there is always
a chance that no path exists between two particular peers.
Trading Paperclips: The increasing popularity of P2P networks and
other such forms of distribution networks, has made the bartering model in-
creasingly relevant to the modern technological world. See [29], [81], [150], [1].
Examples are present in many different areas such as file sharing [7], query
forwarding [31], routing [23], knowledge diffusion [47], storage–sharing sys-
tems [46], and WIFI hotspot sharing [62]. Barter has also been used in B2B
commerce with many others examples such as BizXchange, ITEX, Barter-
Card, SwapAce and Worldwide Barter Board or SwapTree and Continental
Trade Exchange. Barter mechanisms are therefore of significant interest in
the Internet Age.
Trading Paperclips scenario is a classic example of bartering and arbi-
trage [55] – where value is extracted by playing on the asymmetries of users
valuations. Betting exchanges have many similarities to the Kyle’s exper-
iment. Betfair2, Betdaq3 and other similar betting exchanges have a huge
turn over now, and many billions of pounds are gambled each month on these
markets. In betting exchanges an arbitrageur exploits existing price discrep-
ancies when bookmakers’ prices differ enough that they allow the backing of
all outcomes and still make a profit. In paperclip exchanges, Kyle exploits
personal values discrepancies. Both Kyle and sports betting take advantage
2Betfair in http://www.betfair.com
3Betdaq in http://www.betdaq.com
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of the personal valuation differential between agents in large–scale markets.
But there are still barriers which stop everyone from being successful in both
scenarios. Both scenarios require capital, time, organization and energy, to
make profits.
More research is needed on analysing the global behaviour of a sys-
tem based on individual negotiations/exchanges between agents4 ([130], [99],
[91]). To predict the overall behaviour that emerges as a result of interaction
agents we have proposed an economic model, which provides a variety of real
economy features and we use simulations to show their performance. Also
this scenario touches approaches from different methods and features such
as:
• Path–finding: Path–finding is a term used mostly by computer appli-
cations to plot the best route from point A to point B. In the Trading
Paperclips, point A is the start range and point B is the last range.
• Limited backtracking: Backtracking algorithm is a method of solv-
ing problems automatically by a systematic search of the possible so-
lutions. Limited backtracking is not an exhaustive search.
• Competitive search: It relies crucially on the assumption of a com-
petitive environment where each trader decides whether to trade up
and each trace has influences on environment.
In a telecommunications network, a call between two parties may be con-
nected via one of a number of paths. The process of deciding which of these
paths to use is called routing. Choosing an efficient path is important because
the networks capacity for handling traffic is finite, and when it is saturated,
calls have to be turned away. This constitutes a loss of income to the net-
work provider. However, finding the optimal path is problematic because
the network state continually evolves. By the time the information needed
to compute the optimal path between any two nodes is made available at the
node where that decision needs to be taken, the network state will probably
have changed, rendering that decision obsolete. Furthermore, efficient rout-
ing decisions, those which maintain a balance in utilization of the network
resources, require information about the utilization of all network resources
to be made simultaneously available to the process making that decision.
Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services (DBBDS): Domain
Name System (DNS), probably the best and widely known of directory ser-
vice, has some alternatives in looking for distributed systems ([145], [50])
4For example, the Mancur Olson conjecture that larger groups encourage free riding
and lead to lower supply has been confirmed.
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revealing pros and cons to turn a centralized directory service into a dis-
tributed one. Community–based replication has connections with DBBDS.
In these communities multiple archives cooperate to preserve data. Each
site contributes storage resources to the system, and in return reserves the
right to store copies of its own collection at other sites. A community–based
replication system is subject to two constraints:
• Each site is autonomous.
• Each site has limited resources.
Because each site wants to make its own decisions about how to allocate its
sparse resources, it is not feasible to have a central authority dictate which
copies will be stored at which sites. Such a central authority is not desirable
in any case, since the system is more robust if allocations can be made in a
distributed manner. To overcome these constraints, [27] et al. have designed
a framework for negotiations between sites to allocate resources. The basis
of these negotiations is a trade, where one site essentially says to another:
“I will store a copy of your data if you will store a copy of mine.” If both
sites agree to this proposition, then they conclude an agreement and allocate
space for each others use. This distributed, barter–based negotiation allows
each site to decide what agreements to conclude and thus how to use its own
resources. Moreover, they can study policies for deciding when to make trades
that allow a site to make the most of its limited resources . In turn Cooper
et al. [46] propose a bartering storage system for preserving information.
Institutions which have common requirements and storage infrastructure can
use the framework to barter with each other for storage services.
The major drawback of existing large scale content distribution systems
is the directory service, which generally consists on an index server and a
tracker server. The index server (e.g., a web server) hosts all the metadata
of shared content. In effect, such a directory service does not scale well as it
cannot accommodate a large number of requests when the population of the
system increases rapidly. In order to overcome this problem, many systems
propose a decentralized service directory infrastructure ([50], [57]) such as
Novell’s NDS, Microsoft’s Active Directory and others.
To improve the performance of large scale content systems, most of the
work has been focused on keeping the cache information close to the client
applications that access the directory information [41]. For example, to en-
hance web browsing, content distribution networks (CDNs) [174] move web
content closer to clients by caching copies of web objects on thousands of
servers worldwide. Additionally, to minimize client download times, such
systems perform extensive network and server measurements, and use them
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to redirect clients to different servers over short time scales. CDNs include
systems such as those provided by AKAMAI5, Mirror Image6, BitGravity7,
CacheFly8, and LimeLight9.
In general, any redundancy systems that allocate limited resources can use
a trading mechanism as an infrastructure component. Some existing systems
allocate redundant resources in a fixed, static way. Although it is possible
to reason about good or even optimal policies for certain configurations, it is
difficult to do so in a distributed system with autonomous peers. Moreover, if
the configuration is highly dynamic then the fixed allocation may no longer
be appropriate. In contrast, other existing distributed and Peer–to–Peer
systems allocate resources in response to user demand, or even randomly.
Allocating in response to user requests may mean that less popular collections
are not preserved at all. Allocating randomly may make inefficient use of
community resources. If the goal is to ensure redundancy and high reliability,
then trading provides a way to achieve effective allocation while dynamically
adapting to changes in user requirements and network configuration. See
[44], [46].
A trading–based P2P system has several advantages: First, it preserves
the autonomy of individual peers. Second, the symmetric nature of trading
ensures fairness and discourages free–loading. Third, the system is robust
in the face of failure. Because the trading network is composed of binary
trading links, individual links or sites can fail without crashing the whole
network. See [173], [148].
Our approach, differs from these systems in a fundamental way: these
systems relies on the other participants. For example a distributed DNS
requires people publishing names to rely on other people’s serves to serve
those names. This is a problem for many P2P systems: there is no incentive
to run a P2P server rather than just use the servers run by others. In our
proposal, directory systems work by following a similar idea but applying a
bartering mechanism. See [111], [1]. The providers of entries want to have,
or to have near, the content most requested by their clients, this proximity is
achieved by exchanging entries with neighbours that follow the same strategy.
Each self–interested provider/trader starts with some given initial bundle of
entries. A new set of required entries, is build up from the clients queries.
The providers discuss the proposal distribution among themselves taking the
best choice for its clients (i.e. trying to get the most requested entries by
5AKAMAI in www.akamai.com
6Mirror Image in www.mirror-image.com
7BitGravity in www.bitGravity.com
8CacheFly in www.cachefly.com
9LimeLight in www.limelight.com
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its clients). If a provider/buyer decides that it can do better on its own,
with its given initial entries, it makes a proposal of exchange that the other
provider/seller should evaluate and this proposal only will be accepted if it
is beneficial. When both parties accept the exchange, entries are transferred
between them.[102]
4.3 Summary
To conclude, this chapter shows the state of the art in bartering, mainly
from the fields of economics, agents and P2P systems. This thesis combines
techniques from these three areas.
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PART 2: Innovation and
Execution
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Chapter 5
General Framework and
Simulation
This chapter provides an overview of the topic of concern of the thesis and
will be used as a foundation for the next three chapters: Bartering Networks,
Trading Paperclips and Distributed Barter-Based Directory Services. Each of
these chapters cover theoretical, experimental and practical bartering issues
respectively, starting from the common point of view depicted in this chapter:
• Bartering Networks is the most theoretical vision of bartering. This
scenario is focused on optimal assignment, the distribution of a set
of items amongst a set of distributed and autonomous agents, with
varying preferences.
• Trading Paperclips shows bartering dynamics in an open bartering en-
vironment by means of simulations. This scenario is focused on social
mobility, the degree to which goal–driven individual’s or groups move
up and down the value system playing on the asymmetries valuations.
• The Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services chapter is a practical
example of bartering used in an application. This scenario is focused on
the distributed directory services, the problem to solve is to repeatedly
allocate a set of entries in accordance with clients demands at successive
points in time. The basic model behind this service involves partial
customer preferences over entries, and where the directory services aims
is to satisfy these preferences as fast as possible.
The heart of the matter in all cases is to investigate interactions amongst
selfish, rational, and autonomous agents [169] each one with incomplete in-
formation, and each seeking to maximize its expected utility by means of
exchanges. Therefore, the general scenario addressed is:
49
50 CHAPTER 5. GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND SIMULATION
• A population of distributed agents with randomly distributed content,
• Local interactions give rise to global regularities.
• Global regularities feed back into local interactions.
• Taking into account the fact that different agents have content which
others may want and viceversa,
• A market is used as an incentive mechanism to help the agents to
organize themselves in the sense that they reorganize the location of
the content to improve their levels of satisfaction.
• Taking into account the combination of factors which include the pri-
vate and limited nature of the information together with the inherent
rivalry of agents which together restrict trade opportunities.[79]
• Where the trade mechanism used is bartering.
In the following chapters, a distributed, open and large–scale environment
where self–interested agents try to get its optimal satisfaction is considered,
but this chapter is the starting point of all the research undertaken during
this thesis. For this reason, the general model is explained in detail in the
rest of the sections of this chapter. The next section provides the details
necessary to understand the common frame–based bartering approach. This
is followed by the key integrating section setting out our methodology and
detailing how it might deployed.[98]
5.1 Model Description
Our discussion is based on the assumption that each participant within the
market environment is separate and modelled as an individual entity, that
is networked with other individual participants. The allocations made are
the result of interactions between various participants, interactions that are
guided by local and selfish decisions and these allocations could only be done
by means of exchange between participants.
The details of our general model are as follows:
• Initially, items are randomly assigned to agents.
• The market studied is composed of agents (nodes) which desire items.
• Nodes are located in a network and are linked to a small quantity of
other nodes.
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Figure 5.1: Skeleton of the general framework.
• The links amongst nodes are static, but the nodes that form the network
have periods of being switched on and off.
• Each item has a unique level of satisfaction associated with it for each
agent in the system (level of satisfaction – los). The los provides from
the items that an agent has.
• Trades are conducted by means of currency or bartering.
• Trades modify the global los.
• Members take only local decisions.
• Information about available items is only available from local connec-
tions.
• Members can only trade with directly connected neighbours.
• Members only decide to trade when the trade is immediately beneficial.
• Global performance is measured as the sum of los over all agents.
• A steady state is achieved when no more trades are possible.
Figure 5.1 shows a skeleton with the common elements that composes
a Bartering Networks. The network has autonomous and self–interested
participants. Each participant has a set of desires (i.e. want–list (WL))
and some ownerships (i.e. have–list (HL)). Participants in the market are
connected to other participants, by means of these connections they can
engage in trades.[162]
Models should be as simple as possible, and predict as much as possible.
The elements that compose the model are:
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• A list of agents: The decision–makers in the market.
• A list of items: The content with the which agents trade. In the model
the assumption is made that sharing is carried out in such a way as
to not violate copyright prohibitions and hence not allow copies to be
generated.
• Links/Relations: Each agent is connected to a set of the members in
the market with which the agent can trade.
• Social behaviour: Within behavioural finance, it is assumed that the in-
formation structure and the characteristics of market participants sys-
tematically influence individuals’ investment decisions as well as market
outcomes.
– Altruistic behaviour: Agent that follows this behaviour is offering
items that could implies a certain cost associated for nothing. See
[139], [106].
– Selfish behaviour: In this case, the agent only wants to increase
its satisfaction.[53]
• Information: Two different kinds of information are used.
– List of preferences (i.e. want–list (WL)): The items that the agent
wants.
– List of ownership (i.e. have–list (HL)): The items that the agent
has.
The list of ownerships values the items of an agent, and the list of
preferences values the items wants. The former always contains infor-
mation for the local agent only. However, the latter can be composed
of local preferences or external preferences provided by neighbours in
the market.
• Agent preferences: This element reflects the popularity of items in the
system. Two different scenarios are analysed:
– Heterogeneous preferences lists: In this case, agents each value
items in the system independently, that is, each agent may have
different preferences. For example, agentA and agentB are inter-
ested in item1 and they value the item in 2,000.
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– Homogeneous preferences lists: In this case, agents have the same
valuations for each item as other agents do that is, all agents value
each item in the same way. For example, agentA and agentB are
interested in item1. In this case, agentA values item1 in 2,000, and
for the agentB the same item has a value of 3,000.
• Content distribution: At the initial steps, each agent has assigned a
randomly distributed content. By means of exchanges this distribution
will be modified.
• Roles: A population of agents in which each agent plays one of these
two roles:
– Goal driven agent (GDA): These agents are looking for rich/beneficial
trading encounters in order to move upwards in market value.
– Passive agent (PA): These agents have an item and do not seek
any new concrete item, however they know a good deal when they
see one.
• Forms of trade:
– Bartering: To trade content with the exchange of content. In this
case, a trade is carried out, if, and only if, agenta wants content
from agentb and viceversa. Furthermore, each agent must improve
its own satisfaction with the trade (in some variants trades may
be allowed if there is no decrease in value). With agentx with
item2 and agenty with item1. See Eq. 5.1.
{PVx(item1) ≥ PVx(item2)andPVy(item2) ≥ PVy(item1)}.
(5.1)
– Currency: To trade content with the exchange of tokens. In this
case, a trade is achieved, if and only if, agenta wants content
from agentb, agenta has tokens to buy the content and agentb is
interested in selling the item.
∗ Rule 1: An agent ab will never buy an item f , if ab is already
its owner.
∗ Rule 2: If something costs more tokens than an agent ab has,
ab cannot buy it.
∗ Rule 3: If an agent ab has enough tokens or it is not interested
in any content, ab will not offer its content.
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Figure 5.2: Skeleton of Bartering Network framework.
Figure 5.3: Skeleton of Trading Paperclips framework.
Mainly, the thesis is focused on scenarios with a set of agents related to
agents with selfish behaviour and heterogeneous preferences list and where
the form of trade is the bartering mechanism.
These common elements are the set of components used in the rest of the
work; each one with their particularities, but all of them keeping the spirit
of the general framework.
• Bartering Networks: Figure 5.2 shows the model for Bartering Net-
works. In this model the type of exchanges are prioritised and proper-
ties in the environment are reviewed.
• Trading Paperclips: Figure 5.3 shows a model for Trading Paperclips.
In this model, the most relevant points are the trading–up process and
the model of a list of ordered items where the agents move from a low
value range to a higher one.
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Figure 5.4: Skeleton of DBBDS framework.
• Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services: Figure 5.4 shows a model
for Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services. In this model, rele-
vance is defined as the query distribution from the clients.
5.2 The Environment
The environment in which bartering occurs is characterised as follows:
Distributed Environment: Matching markets where a centralised au-
thority must find a matching between the agents on one side of the mar-
ket, and the items on the other side. Such settings occur, for example, in
mail–based DVD rental services such as NetFlix1 or in some job markets.
Centralised search algorithms have been known for a long time. Also, service
registration and discovery are functionalities central to any service–oriented
architecture, and they are often provided by centralised entities in today’s
systems. However, there are advantages of scalability, robustness, as well as
distribution of control and cost by further decentralisation of these function-
alities to all the participants in the system. However, it has a cost.[60]
Open and Large–Scale Environment: In an open environment where
agents interact with each other to reach their individual goals, agents need
to overcome two problems. They must be able to find each other and they
must be able to interact ([89], [100]). In the model, in order to find the
desired items, propagation mechanisms are used. This mechanism consist of
use the neighbours information and the interactions are regulated by market
policies. In a large population, agents adapt their behaviour to one another
1NetFlix in www.netflix.com
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and their circumstances. Large–scale of population following a same pattern
can show interesting dynamics in the market state.
Agents: The market is a set of agents interacting. Jennings et al. define
an agent as an entity which is:
• Situated in an environment.
• Autonomous, in the sense that the system can act without direct in-
tervention from others (humans or other software processes).
• Flexible, which is further broken down into three properties: responsive
(perceives its environment and responds to changes in a timely fashion),
proactive (exhibits opportunistic, goal–directed behaviour) and social
(able to interact with humans or other artificial agents).
This definition corresponds to the capacities equip in the agents studied.
The agents are situated in a market environment. Each interaction amongst
the agents has an effect on the environment. Each agent in the market is an
autonomous entity with its own objectives. Finally, the agents in this work
follow the three properties that compose flexibility in Jennings’ definition.
• Responsive because they take decisions depending on the information
that they manage.
• Proactive since they are always are looking for beneficial exchanges.
• And sociable since the exchange process is a type of interaction.
Topology: Markets are interesting and complex exchange environments
where buyers have links to multiple sellers and sellers have links to multiple
buyers [110]. Users who join a network have incentives to contribute to the
network, they try to use the uncertainties that exist in the exchanges within
the system to their own advantage. The result is an inefficient network where
the overall levels of contributions are less than would be the case if each
peer acted in the interest of the entire network of peers [9]. A decentralised
market structure, might be termed as a bazaar structure. In this model,
all negotiation is conducted directly between peers, rather than through any
centralising entity. The importance of deeply understanding of the topology
of a complex network is clear. In fact, the structure heavily affects the
functionality, the performance and the effectiveness of a network. See [3],
[4], [96]. Initially, if all agents are free to trade with any individual in the
global market, global resources are optimally allocated assuming the agents’
preferences with few trades, but only after a tremendous amount of search
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and negotiation. If trade is restricted searches are simple but difficult to
achieve. For this reason, the network that shapes the relations between
agents (buyers and sellers) have a deep effect in the performance.[16]
Self–interest: Individual self–interest is the basis for the whole market
system. The consumer acts according to its self–interest when it buys things
at the lowest prices and with the best quality it can find. The producer acts in
its self–interest in trying to make the highest profit possible. Both consumer
and producer attempt to profit from their market transactions; if either side
did not expect to gain, no trade would take place. This double utilisation
of the profit motive efficient results. Self–interested agents, by definition,
simply choose a course of action which maximises their own utility. See [10],
[149], [7], [49].
Optimal: The market get an optimal state when everyone has every-
thing that they want. The maximal two–way exchanges are found through
different versions of the algorithm of J. Edmonds, as discussed in Roth et
al. [154]. Maximal two-way, three-way and maximal unrestricted exchanges
are found through various formulations of the exchange problem as an inte-
ger programming problem. The integer programming formulation maximises
the number of exchanges subject to the constraint that the cycle size not
exceed the specified exchange size (i.e. two–way, three–way, or unrestricted).
Extending to maximal unrestricted exchanges or multi–way bartering is a
NP–hard problem.[136]
Self–organisation: A market is perhaps the most commonly system
or network, whose local dynamics profoundly affect the global system. Self–
organising systems are autonomous and open, maintaining themselves through
continual interaction with their environment. Similar to what occurs in a de-
centralised marketplace (see [170], [87], [77]). Market–based approaches view
macro-economic phenomena as emergent results of local interactions of the
economic entities [86]. Mainstream economists consider that competition in
a market consisting of agents pursuing pure self–interest, can self–organise or
reach equilibrium – a matter of faith [34]. Making the most of a free market
economy as a system for allocating items in a society: supply and demand
within the market determines who gets what and what is produced, rather
than the central organisation. Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu [14] have
shown that under certain idealised conditions, a system of free trade leads
to Pareto efficiency. The rules ordering a social self–organising system pro-
mote and reward cooperation. The rules of a self–organising market make
it easier for people to enter into complex economic transactions. In a self–
organising system competition grows out of the lack of perfect coordination
amongst cooperative endeavours [164]. Self–organising systems are dynamic:
the components are constantly changing their state to each other by means of
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local information (i.e. components only interact with their immediate neigh-
bours). Some relative states are preferable for each agent, in the sense that
they will be reinforced, while others are inhibited or eliminated. In markets
the interactions are interchanged amongst participants. And the satisfaction
entailed in each trade manages the preference of the buyers–sellers.
A society of self–interested computational agents can exhibit oscillatory
or chaotic behaviour and order [183]. The initial state has a random dis-
tribution. Bilateral exchanges turn an initial and random assignation into
an ordered allocation and during the order process only was taking local
decisions. Studying how self–organisation emerges in terms of content dis-
tribution. A system described as self–organised is one in which elements
interact in order to get a global aim. Its function is not imposed by a single
element, distribution is instead achieved dynamically as the elements inter-
act with one another by means of exchanges and each exchange is decided
by an individual depending of its goals. These interactions produce feedback
that endogenously regulates the system. In this case, the global aim is to get
an optimal global content distribution in a file (or goods) sharing systems,
search systems, and directory services systems and where the regulation is
achieved by means of a market–based approach.
Generosity and altruism: Notice that, as for many P2P applications,
an user valuation for the service depends on the generosity of other users:
each user benefits from others’ shared capacity. However, there is no direct
incentive to offer one’s own capacity to the others, and users are then given
an incentive to free–ride. It seems reasonable to assume that each user is
selfish, i.e. sensitive only to the quality of service it experiences, regardless
of the effects of its actions on the other users.
There exist several intangible value generators from participating in such
a system, which often involve altruism, community building, fighting the
system, and more. Actually, some of these might be part of the reason why
the theoretical results of economic theory are not always compatible with
the performance of real P2P applications, which seems to be acceptable even
without explicit incentives for cooperation. Golle et al. [81] made a first
effort to model the utilities and costs associated with the participation in a
P2P file sharing system. See [91], [70].
The value of the information: Information guides the decision–making
process in order to choose the best trades. Competition (see [110], [192])
arises from the individual and conflicting objectives amongst the members
of the market. Competition encourages buyers–sellers to compete amongst
themselves in order to get the best items. This scenario is addressed in [34],
[90], [193].
What is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational
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economic order? On certain familiar assumptions the answer is simple. If we
possess all the relevant information, if we can start out from a given system
of preferences and if we command complete knowledge of available means,
the problem which remains is purely one of logic. The economic problem of
society is a problem of the utilisation of knowledge not given to anyone in
its totality [87]. Also, to add complexity at the system, agents are assumed
to be self–interested. The assumption of incomplete information is intuitive
because in practice, agents have private information, and for strategic rea-
sons, they do not reveal the strategic reasons, constrains or preferences. The
assumption that the agents follow an individual objective is a very likely in
real environments.
Under these assumptions, the outcomes in a distributed system are highly
sensitive to costs of information and communication. The magnitude of the
improvement in allocating efficiency depends critically on the cost of provide
information to traders.
Query distribution: Depending on what content agents want, the per-
formance in the distribution can suffer sensible variations. Random and Zipf
query and content distribution are studied in our work. See [26], [74]. It
is well–known that the query distributions of several popular applications,
including DNS and the web, follow a power law distribution.[102]
5.3 Agent–Based Simulator
Pressure to make models more realistic can become as hard to interpret as
the natural phenomena they try to explain. Agents representing individual
behaviour within an agent–based market simulation show promising results
in studying markets as evolving systems. An exchange economy is a system
where the agents exchange the items that each one has in order to get a
better distribution. In this context, the question is if the end distribution is
efficient or not. See [165], [105], [166].
The implementation of a distributed market–based market has been ap-
plied in previous works such as [82], [113], [126], [180], [185]. Using simulation
and real–world data show the performance of the models proposed. Simula-
tion and real-world data show the performance of the models proposed. In
our case, the simulator used for evaluating our work should be able to eval-
uate the three issues that shape the thesis: i.e. Bartering Networks, Trading
Paperclips and Distributed Barter-Based Directory Services. Starting from a
similar skeleton, three simulators have been customised in order to simulate
the architecture that shares the following characteristics:
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• The topology is generated by Pajek2. A program for analysis and
visualisation of large networks.[21]
• The event–driven simulator is implemented in Java. The simulator was
deployed following the same approach than the model. The first task
was deployed a common library that will be used by the concrete sim-
ulators. The second task was to extend the simulator to each scenario.
• Results processing follows a similar pattern.
Agents representing individual behaviour within an agent-based market
simulation show promising results in studying markets as evolving systems.
In this computational framework for the study of complex system behaviours
by means of controlled and replicable experiments are involved the following
components:
• Graphical user interface (GUI) permits experimentation by users with
no background in programming.
• Modular/extensible software support permits computational labora-
tory capabilities to be changed or extended by users who have pro-
gramming skills.
The first advantage of agent based modelling is their capability to show
how collective phenomena came about and how the interaction of the au-
tonomous and heterogeneous agents leads to the genesis of these phenom-
ena. Furthermore, agent–based modelling aims at the isolation of critical
behaviour in order to identify agents that more than others drive the col-
lective result of the system. It also endeavours to single out points of time
where the system exhibits qualitative rather than sheer quantitative change
[182]. In this light it becomes clear why agent–based modelling conforms
with the principles of evolutionary economics. See [114], [115].
The second advantage of agent–based modelling, which is complementary
to the first one, is a more normative one. Agent-based models are not only
used to get a deeper understanding of the inherent forces that drive a system
and influence the characteristics of a system. Agent–based modelers use
their models as computational laboratories to explore various institutional
arrangements, various potential paths of development so as to assist and
guide e.g. firms, policy makers etc. in their particular decision context.
Agent–based modelling thus uses methods and insights from diverse disci-
plines such as evolutionary economics, cognitive science and computer science
2Pajek in http://pajek.imfm.si
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in its attempt to model the bottom-up emergence of phenomena and the top
down influence of the collective phenomena on individual behaviour.
In our human society, resource re–allocations are in most cases performed
through markets. This occurs on many different levels and in many different
scales, from our daily grocery shopping to large trades between big companies
and or nations. The market approach to re–source allocation in the human
society has inspired the Multi–Agent Systems community to construct simi-
lar concepts for MAS, where the trade is performed between computational
agents on computational markets it is know as market oriented programming.
See [191], [192], [84], [85], [47].
5.4 Conclusions
Given this background, the resource allocation problem (see [78], [171]) in a
network with multiple, non co–operating agents can be recast as the prob-
lem of reconciling competition between self–interested, information–bounded
agents. An effective mechanism for achieving this goal in the real world is the
market economy. Examples of market–based methods: auctions, commodity
markets, bartering. Concretely, this work is focused on barter trade pattern3.
Thus resource allocation takes place against the assumption of competition,
rather than cooperation between the components.
The most important objective of items distribution/reallocation applica-
tion is that its users have everything that they need/want from the market.
The important issue was in this case to know how a market–based approach
that follow a bartering mechanism is successful with respect to the optimum
assignment and the performance of the market.
A large number of goal–oriented entities interacting through social net-
works, each engaged in self–interested behaviour in a competitive way. The
network connects each for the participants with others, but no one is con-
nected to all others. The participants receive periodic communication from
those with whom they are connected. Each individual is able of reasoning
and take decisions on the information it receives (i.e. local knowledge) and
they make a decision based on the benefit that comes from the exchange.
The interactions between participants changes its environment. Therefore,
decentralised market economies are complex adaptive systems, consisting of
large numbers of agents involved in parallel interactions.[18]
Our overview of the problem is composed by distributed, open a large–
scale environment with selfish agents trading in sparse networks, looking for
its optimal beneficial.
3Barter is a self–enforcing response to absence of trust and functioning capital markets.
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5.5 Summary
To conclude, this chapter explains the approach chosen in the thesis. How
starting from a similar view point (i.e. the general framework), and assuming
a set of guidelines, the three major ideas such as Bartering Networks, Trading
Paperclips, Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services are developed.
Chapter 6
Bartering Networks
This chapter describes the model and experiments made in distributed bar-
tering networks. The classical meaning of trading without money involves
the establishment of a pairwise matching (i.e. formation of directed cycles of
length two) which leads to a mutually beneficial exchange – i.e. quid pro quo.
However, it is also possible to form arbitrary length directed cycles amongst
agents. This forms a multilateral trade. Multilateral trade means that the
quid and the quo are separated both spatially and temporally.
In a bartering economy, each agent relationship can be viewed as an
instance of an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IP ). In each round, agents
play part of a Prisoner. Let Rlocal denote the value of local resources and
Rremote the value of remote resources. The reward R for cooperation for
both traders is thus Rremote – Rlocal. The punishment M for mutual defection
is zero. Finally, the temptation to detect T and the sucker’s payoff S are
Rremote and – Rlocal, respectively. Hence, we have the necessary conditions
for a Prisoner’s Dilemma: T>R>M>S.
To encourage large–scale cooperation amongst agents, strategies must
be aware of defections and respond in an appropriate manner to encourage
cooperative behaviour. Strategies based on reciprocity and feedback have
these properties.[158]
Since users are considered to be self–interested rather than malicious, the
best way to discourage defections is to offer an alternative that gives them
better performance at a lower cost. It is useful for the system as a whole,
and respects their desire.
An allocation procedure to determine a suitable allocation of resources
may be either centralized or distributed. Clearly, the centralized approach
is applicable to problems in which global information is available and agents
are cooperative. Problems in which some agents want to keep their infor-
mation private for competitive or other reasons, call for distributed methods
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ranging from coordination amongst cooperative agents (Durfee et al. [59])
to negotiation amongst competitive agents (Sandholm [159]).
The protocols needed for cooperative agents and those needed for self–
interested agents differ. Cooperative agents can be assumed to take care of
each others’ tasks without compensation whenever that is beneficial for the
society of agents. Self–interested agents need some compensation to take care
of some other agent’s task. This compensation can be organized as barter
trade: one agent takes care of some of another agent’s tasks if the latter
agent takes care of some of the former agent’s tasks. Barter trades that
benefit both agents do not always exist even if it is profitable to move a task
from one agent to another. Secondly, identifying beneficial barter exchanges
is more complex than identifying one way transfers of tasks – especially in a
distributed setting.
Agents may not know the whole state of the system such as preferences
and ownership of the rest of the population. When the preferences are not
common knowledge, self–interested agents often fail to explore win–win pos-
sibilities using existing protocols and end up with inefficient agreements. In
the second approach a mechanism to overcome the informational restrictions
is to add a list of preferences and ownership for each agent in the environment.
Even the result of the allocation we could assume non–malicious agents when
they are providing their preferences. Indeed, non–rational trades should be
accepted even when the agents have all information to reach the goal optimal
allocation.
In principle, a preference for longer paths should improve overall perfor-
mance, as more agents are served, more agents are happy. On the other
hand, agents prefer shorter paths as the search cost is lower, and the ex-
pected exchange volume is also higher, as the probability of a agent either
disconnecting or completing is higher for longer paths. Assuming agents care
less about global performance and more about their own benefit, there is no
clear incentive to put additional effort into looking for longer paths.
A cycle indicates a possible trading arrangement. When a loop of pro-
posed performative is accepted for all of its members the trades can be con-
firmed. The more participants that there are in an exchange, the greater
number of people benefit from the exchange. The expectation is also that
the benefit for all of the agents will also be improved over a transaction which
involves only a small number of agents. See [83], [135].
An intrinsic problem that arises in such subsystems is that some of the
users who should participate in a proposed path of exchanges may fail because
users may learn of a better choice to exchange their own items, e.g., a direct
exchange with one of the users not participating in proposed path.
The market get an optimal state when everyone has everything that they
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want. The maximal two–way exchanges are found through different versions
of the algorithm of J. Edmonds, as discussed in Roth et al. [154]. Maximal
two-way, three-way and maximal unrestricted exchanges are found through
various formulations of the exchange problem as an integer programming
problem. The integer programming formulation maximizes the number of
exchanges subject to the constraint that the cycle size not exceed the specified
exchange size (two–way, three–way, or unrestricted). In the case of three–
way exchanges, we additionally constrain the solution to have the minimum
number of three–way exchanges (and hence the maximum number of two–way
exchanges) consistent with maximizing the number of exchanges. Extending
to maximal unrestricted exchanges or multi–way bartering is a NP–hard
problem.[136]
The questions to respond are:
• Where does non bilateral (i.e. pairwise) – multilateral trade lead?
• Where does bilateral – multilateral trade lead?
• When is a bilateral optimal allocation (i.e. an allocation can not be
improved upon by bilateral trade) also Pareto optimal?
• When is a multilateral optimal allocation also Pareto optimal?
• When is possible to reach the global optimal?
• What is the difference between Pareto optimal, multilateral optimal,
bilateral optimal, sub-optimal?
• How many trades are necessary and or sufficient to reach a X–optimal?
• What are the characteristics of an optimal sequence of interchanges
given a particular starting point. Is it like search – what do local
minima looks like?
Bartering networks in our work are equivalent to an assignment problem.
It consists of finding a maximum weight matching in a weighted bipartite
graph. The assignment problem could be resolved with the Hungarian algo-
rithm. This is a combinatorial optimization algorithm which solves assign-
ment problems in polynomial time (O(n3)).
Touching algorithms are:
• Assignment allocation problem or weighted bipartite matching.
• Weighted vertex disjoint cycles.
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6.1 The Bartering Network Model
The model of the bartering network problem has the following characteristics:
• The studied market is composed of participants that offer items.
• Participants are located in a network and are linked to a small quantity
of other participants.
• The links amongst participants are static, but the participants that
form the network have periods of being switched on and off (to simulate
variable up-times of participants).
• Each item has a unique level of satisfaction associated with it for each
agent in the system (utility or level of satisfaction – los).
• Initially the items are randomly assigned to participants.
• Trades are conducted by means of bartering.
• Trades modify the global los.
• Members take only local decisions.
• Information about available items is only available from local connec-
tions.
• Members can only trade with directly connected neighbours.
• Members only decide to trade when the trade is immediately beneficial.
• Global performance is measured as the sum of los over all participants.
• A steady state is achieved when no more trades are possible.
6.2 Implementation Overview
The first approach to improve the performance of bilateral exchanges is to
expand the number of participants in the bilateral exchange protocol.
• 2–way exchange: 2–way exchanges is showed in Figures 6.1 and 6.2
and the Algorithm 2 – 2–way protocol. The algorithm shows that an
exchange will only be done if it is beneficial for both buyers and seller.
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Algorithm 2 2–way protocol
pB sends req(o2)
pA saves B wants o2
if (pA has o2) & (PVpA(o1) > PVpA(o2)) then
pA sends ack(o1:pA,o2:pB)
end if
if (pB has o1) & (PVpB(o1) < PVpB(o2)) then
pB sends ring(pA:o2,pB:o1)
end if
Figure 6.1: 2–way exchange.
PB AP
o1 o2req(o2)
ack(o1:PA,o2:PB)
ring(PA:o2,PB:o1)
Figure 6.2: 2–way protocol.
68 CHAPTER 6. BARTERING NETWORKS
Algorithm 3 3–way protocol
pB sends req(o2)
pA saves B wants o2
pA sends req(o1)
pB saves A wants o1
for i = 0 to IRQpB do
pB sends ack(o2:pB,o1:pA,o3:pOi)
pOi saves A wants o1
pOi saves B wants o2
pOi saves B has o3
if (pOi has o1) & (PVpOi (o3) > PVpOi (o1)) then
pOi sends ring(pA:o2,pB:o3,pOi :o1)
end if
end for
if IRQpB has not received the ring then
for i = 0 to Neighbour pB /∈ IRQpB do
pB sends ack(o2:pB,o1:pA,o3:pNi)
pNi saves A wants o1
pNi saves B wants o2
pNi saves B has o3
if (pNi has o1) & (PVpNi (o3) > PVpNi (o1)) then
pNi sends the ring(pA:o2,pB:o3,pNi :o1)
end if
end for
end if
Figure 6.3: 3–way exchange.
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PB AP
o1 req(o2)
ack(o2:PB,o1:PA,o3,Poj)
ring(PA:o2,PB:o3,Poj)
CP
oj
req(o1)
Figure 6.4: 3–way protocol.
• 3–way exchange: 3–way exchange is show in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 and
the Algorithm 3 – 3–way protocol. In this case, three participants are
involved in the exchange.
• 3–way recursive exchange: Figure 6.5 shows examples of 3–way
recursive exchanges.
In Figure 6.5 the first 3–way exchange E o3 ⇔ o4 B and A o4 ⇔ o2 B.
The second 3–way exchange E o3 ⇔ o4 B and A o4 ⇔ o2 B.
Between the first and second 3–way exchange the agent B is taking a
risk because during these two exchanges another agent can exchange
with an agent from the second 3–way exchange such as E and A.
• Limited markets: A market mechanism provides a powerful way to
regulate exchange between members of a community, in which each
one of these members wish to maximize its utility/satisfaction. This
section shows pitfalls in market exchanges.
– Time limited markets: In this case, the number of interactions
in a given market place is limited (i.e. time limited). Concretely,
this means that in a time the system will cease functioning. For
example, if all files are exchanged, a certain deadline passes or
after some signal is given. In a time unlimited market, members
cooperate with the objective of getting a benefit in a long term
future1. However, when the time is limited, the hope of a future
benefit is not apparent because members know that in a concrete
time the game will finish. To understand the effect of this fact,
1The shadow of the future [15].
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Figure 6.5: Examples of 3–way recursive exchanges.
we suppose that players know that a game has exactly n rounds.
Then, no matter which round has been reached (say n − 1) the
agent is aware that the incomes kept will no longer be useful after
the end of the game. Hence no agent will offer content in the
last round (round n). Subsequently this also means that the in-
comes kept is not useful not only after the end of the game but
also not in the last round. Similarly no agent will offer content
in round n − 1 and so forth. By repeating this argument many
times, rational agents would deduce that they should not offer
content at all (unless their motivation changes because someone
else offers something they want). In a simulation where an agent
can chose between two strategies, the only difference between the
two strategies (s1,s2) and (s
′
1,s2) is that in the period t the first
strategy chooses C (cooperate – offer content) and the second
strategy chooses D (defect – not offer content). Until the end T
of all iterations the benefits of choosing the strategy (s′1,s2) will
be greater than (s1,s2). This concept is clearly analogous in the
well known game theory known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
[15] result for games of known duration.2 The conflict between the
individual and collective interests is expressed in this game, which
has implications in real life in areas like policy, society, economy.
Concretely the relation is with a subset of PD, named PD with
2PD rules are explained in detail in [141].
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finite repetitions.
– Content limited markets: This hypothesis considers that the
content is limited even if time were unlimited. In such world the
number of total different content items is finite and unchanging.
In an ideal world all members in the market should obtain all
contents that they want. If agents are aware of this fact, this goal
will not be achieved. When an agent obtains all the content that
it desires (i.e. satisfied agent) it is conscious of the fact that it has
all it may want, so a rational agent would cease offering content.
The reason is similar to that in the previous case: the agent will,
in the future, not derive benefit. This fact entails that other non–
satisfied agents may not obtain all the content they desire if some
of it is hold by satisfied agents. Once it is known that there is no
more new content to obtain, the exchanges opportunities tends to
zero. In turn, this causes the agent to become resistant to offering
content before all possible useful exchange have been made. Only
altruists would continue once they had obtained everything they
needed.
– Time and content limited markets: Under these restrictions,
a market has little hope of functioning. An interesting example
of this can be seen as exemplify by Clive Thompson in his article
“Not With a Bang but a Whimper” about the game Asheron’s
Call 23, an online game scheduled to cease functioning in Decem-
ber 2005. Characters in the game could pick up items such as
tools, armours and weapons at once within a container and they
can trade these items with other players. When the game was flow-
ering the characters used to sell their items but when the game
shut down was first announced, the majority of players left the
game. This happens because without a sense of future capitalism
ends. In other words there is no demand in a condemned world.
These markets were studied to investigate their fruitfulness. However,
they will not be investigated further as, in the next chapters, only
non–limiting markets will be dealt with.
• Information: Information is a powerful tool for the agent buyer–seller
in the decision–making process. Information is shaped by the detection
of needs and network structure. With respect to the detection of needs,
two different kinds of information are studied:
3http://ac2.turbine.com
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Figure 6.6: List of preferences and area of influences by agent A and F and
the list of preferences and ownership for agent B and F .
– Lists of preferences (i.e. want–list WL): The items that the agent
wants.
– Lists of ownership (i.e. have–list HL): The items that the agent
has.
List of preferences: This list contains the items preferred by the
individual, the items preferred by nearer neighbours, and finally the
items preferred by far neighbours, in this order. The order in the list
is important, because this determines the relevance of the items.
Figure 6.6 shows the intention that follows this list as distance–based
propagation with the idea to take advantage of the spatial locality. By
means of bold and non–bold boxes, the degree of influence a node has
over its neighbours. A bold line indicates a greater degree of influence
than a non–bold line. Concretely the figure shows the influence that
agent A and F have with respect to their neighbours. For example,
agent B is more influenced by A than F . This implies that in B′s list
of preferences items wanted by agent A appear before items wanted by
F . In the want–list the most valuable items appear as the top entries,
and the least valuable items are at the bottom of the list.
List of ownership: This list contains the items that an agent has, the
items that the nearer neighbours have, and finally the items far away
neighbours have.
Without propagation, each agent has used knowledge of their neigh-
bours in order to evaluate possible exchanges of items. However, while
some trades can occur if items should travel multiple hops in sparse
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topologies, it could restrict market activity. In our study, a list of pref-
erences has been added. This list contains the items that neighbours
desire and the information that will be used to make trades. The own-
ership list contains items and links where can be obtained. The prop-
agation of preferences/ownership takes the steps listed in Algorithm
4:
Algorithm 4 Propagation of preferences
for i = 0 to all neighbours do
agenti sends(preferences)
agenti arranges(preferences)
end for
Three extensions have been implemented and the results obtained from
the experiments have been compared with the original propagation.
– Extension 1: Avoid the re–sending of preferences. In order to
avoid a neighbour re–sending duplicate preferences to the original
owner, this extension re–uses that otherwise wasted space.
– Extension 2: Promoting the propagation of preferences in agents
with few links and to promote the propagation of neighbours in
agents with many links. The idea behind this extension is to
make that agents with few links put more wishes in the list of
preferences. It gives more emphasis to the desires of the agent.
With respect to agents with many links, the extension gives more
emphasis to the preferences of their neighbours.
– Extension 3: In terms of extending the propagation of pref-
erences, the list of ownership provides information which allows
agents to direct their demand propagation mechanisms in the net-
work.
This additional information has a number of consequences. The first
one is that the quantity of trades increases because agents are not
only trading taking into account their preferred items. Instead of this,
they extend their range of preferences, treating the preferences of their
neighbours as their own preferences. This increases the probability that
double coincidence of wants will be achieved. However this increases
the traffic in the network.
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6.3 Experiments
6.3.1 Experimental Configuration
Bringing together descriptions of the problems from the previous section, the
properties of the model are the following:
• Initially, items are randomly assigned to agents.
• All the agents follow a GDAs behaviour.
• GDAs is linked with a set of agents, depending on the network topol-
ogy.
• The simulator offers the opportunity to make an action per cycle.
6.3.2 Topology Variation
The goal of the experiments is to investigate the importance of the variations
in the topology with respect to the quantity of links. Looking for this goal
we vary the topology of the network with respect to degree. Table 6.1 gives
an overview of the measures related to the scenarios studied. This range of
scenarios allows us to recognize when the market is affected by the lack of
links. The scenarios share the same set up. The only altered parameter has
been the quantity of links. In these scenarios the quantity of links decreases
from scenario 1 to scenario 6. From scenario 1, that has a fully connected
structured with 124,759, to the scenario 6 that only has 779 links. For each
scenario, a set of different network topologies have been tested in order to
verify that the results are not dependent on a concrete wired network. Figures
6.7 and 6.8.
In order to determine the quantity of links required by the market (W ),
it is necessary to know the diameter, average path length and the average
degree in the network. Also, in all of the scenarios, the number of unreachable
pairs is equal to zero to ensure a graph is not disconnected. The diameter
(D) of a network is defined as the maximum distance amongst all distances
between any pair of nodes in the network (i.e. the longest shortest path
between any pairs of nodes). The average path length (L) of a network is
defined as the mean distance between two nodes, averaged over all pairs of
nodes (i.e. average distance amongst reachable pairs of nodes). Finally, (R)
is the average degree of the network.
In order to contrast the effect that the quantity of links has on the per-
formance of the market, a set of scenarios where the quantity of links has
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Scenario Quantity of links Average path length Diameter Average degree
s1 124,759 1 1 500
s2 5,457 2.72 4 16,07
s3 3,897 2.90 4 11,47
s4 2,338 3.02 5 6,88
s5 1,559 3.57 6 4,59
s6 779 5.34 11 2,29
Table 6.1: Network measures
been varied, has been simulated: from a fully connected topology to a quasi
non–connected topology.[177]
Figure 6.9 shows the progression of the los in a simple bartering environ-
ment.
Up until now, each node has used knowledge of their neighbours to eval-
uate possible exchanges of objects with its neighbours. However, while some
trade can occur in which objects travel multiple hops, it is clear that sparse
topologies significantly restrict market activity. In order to explore what
happens when more information is available, applying propagation of pref-
erences, every node is now assigned a propagation list. This list contains
the items that neighbours desire and the information will be used to make
trades. Results of these simulations are shown in Figure 6.10.
It can be seen from the simulations that using propagation of preferences,
the whole los in the market increases.
Results of these simulations are shown in Figure 6.9. In the initial time
(i.e. from time 0 to 15) behaviour is similar to that of the previous case. In
scenarios 1, 2 and 3, the los is above 9,000 points. In scenario 4 the los is
near to 8,500 points. When the network has 1,559 links (i.e. scenario 5) the
los is around 7,500 points and in the scenario 6 is where the value obtained
is farthest from the optimal los. In this case, the worst results appear when
L is greater than 3. This shows that propagation begins to extend the range
of trade, yet only in a limited way.
It can be seen from the simulations that using propagation of preferences,
the whole los in the market increases. The results show that in scenarios with
a small number of links the los is substantially reduced.
Figure 6.10 shows the los when the market is using propagation of pref-
erences based on extension 1 and extension 2. The experiments shown here,
focus on scenarios 4, 5 and 6 as these are the scenarios where there are sig-
nificant variations in the los. The first column of the set is with the market
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Pajek
Pajek
Pajek
Figure 6.7: Structure of the trade network from scenario 1 (i.e. fully con-
nected) to scenario 3
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Pajek
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Pajek
Figure 6.8: Structure of the trade network from scenario 4 to scenario 6 (i.e.
quasi non–connected).
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Figure 6.9: Results working without propagation. In the graphs, x–axis
represents the past of time and y–axis the los.
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Figure 6.10: Results working with propagation. In the graphs, the x–axis
represents the passing of time and y–axis the los.
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using the original propagation, the second column is the los obtained with
extension 1 and finally the last column is related to the extension 2. The
results reveal that with 779 links neither extension 1 nor extension 2 work
properly. The low quantity of links makes this market a sterile market, as
much for the original approach as well as for the proposed extensions. In sce-
nario 5 with 1,559 links, the results using extension 2 are better than in the
original and extension 1 approaches. In scenario 4, both extensions improve
the results of the original approach.
6.4 Conclusions and Future Work
The most important objective of goods distribution application is that its
users have everything that they need/want from the market. The important
issue in this case is to know how a market–based approach is successful with
respect to the optimum assignment, and which elements affect the perfor-
mance of the market.
The results show that the quantity of links has an impact on the per-
formance of the market. In fully connected networks, all agents are free
to trade with any agent in the market. Optimal allocations are possible
amongst agents with few trades. The drop in one–to–one trades is less than,
for instance, where a chain of one–to–one is necessary for trades as occurs
in many spare networks. Furthermore the market performance is affected by
the use of propagation of preferences. Even simple propagation can signifi-
cantly change the efficiency of the market. Focusing our efforts on content
distribution:
• There exist centralized algorithms, but can we get close to a distributed
way without altruists needing to be present?
• Given N agents each with randomly assigned goods, how do you design
mechanisms by means of which they can improve their overall satisfac-
tion without the need for altruistic distributors.
The General Framework chapter described the bartering environment.
This chapter together with the following of chaptes follow the assumptions
and game rules outlined in the General Framework chapter.
• The Bartering Networks chapter studies the relevance of information
(i.e. propagation and quantity of links) and the 2–way versus 3–way
exchange protocol.
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• The Trading Paperclips chapter reviews the competition between par-
ticipants in the market, therefore this chapter is related to the perfor-
mance of the market.
• The Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services chapter shows the
importance of topology in a directory services and the propagation of
the preferences i.e. information distribution.
Key issues for future work include:
• To apply different market rules in order get closer to the optimal as-
signment as well as in the quantity of trades necessary to get to this
assignment, considering that exchange is costly.
• The comparison between assignment problem and content distribution
to other market scenarios, for example to have a set of files for an agent
could be considered more valuable that to have only some parts (e.g.
chapters of some series), with copies.
• In terms of extending the propagation of preferences, work now focuses
on propagation which has longer and more directed reach across multi-
ple nodes in a network. An important first step that is the propagation
of ownership, who owns which objects. This provides a counterpart to
demand information which allows agents to direct their demand prop-
agation mechanisms in the network.
6.5 Summary
To conclude, this chapter shows:
• Markets properties and limitations: Limiting time and/or content
not everyone can obtain all that they want.
• Topology: The topology has a direct effect on the performance of the
market.
• Information: That the quality and quantity of information from one
individual to another, in our case propagation of preferences, has a
positive influence on the performance of the market.
• Long path: Increasing the number of participants in exchanges is
increasing the opportunities and complexity in the protocol.
Chapter 7
Trading Paperclips
This chapter starts with the story of Mr Kyle MacDonald who, by mean of
a sequence of swap bartering exchanges between July 2005 and July 2006
managed to trade from turns a red paper–clip into a house in the Town
of Kipling Saskatchewan [119].1 While much of the press coverage of the
amazing story focuses on the role of the internet in mediating and discovering
trades, the events are also interesting from a trading point of view. The story
is composed of a goal driven agent starting with paper–clip and wanting a
house, as well as a set of passive agents who have different items and are in
the market expecting profitable exchanges. This story reveals that no matter
what item you have, what matters is reaching the right people to trade with.
What is more important than ownership is to find a beneficial chain of trades
in the market. This starting point raises many issues such as: “How does the
goal driven agent know that an exchange gets them closer to their dreams?”,
“How many goal driven agents can make their dreams reality?” and more
generally “What conditions are necessary in the market to assure that the
goal driven agent will get the desired item?”.
Although the motivation for making trades amongst the participants in
Kyle’s story2 is unknown, some of them may have been motivated by altru-
ism. In this case, altruism can be defined as a willingness to accept something
of lower value in order to help Kyle on his way or to obtain other peripheral
secondary in–direct benefits (such as a desire to participate in an interest-
ing experiment). However, it is likely that the majority of participants were
probably making trades in which they at least sought significant value (if
not full value) – Kyle was deliberately seeking out potential exchange part-
ners who valued his current item the most. Further, while the motivations
1http://oneredpaperclip.blogspot.com
2One Red Paperclip: Or How an Ordinary Man Achieved His Dream with the Help of
a Simple Office Supply.
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of the original participants are unknown, a key question in such scenarios
is – “Would such a general mechanism work if there were no altruists at
all?”. Scenarios where self–interested agents barter/exchange resources in
order to increase their individual welfare are ubiquitous ([111], [162]) exam-
ples include The trueque club, Peerflix (DVDs)3, Read It Swap It (books)4,
Intervac (holiday houses)5 as well as Kyle MacDonald’s story. In all of these
examples the motivation is to exchange what you have, and get what you
need without cash and to obtain a satisfaction or benefit. And hence it is of
interest to understand whether such trading patterns could arise.
The One Red Paperclip is a classic example of arbitrage [55] – where value
is extracted by playing on the asymmetries valuations. Betting exchanges
have many similarities to the Kyle’s experiment. Betfair6, Betdaq7 and other
similar betting exchanges have huge turn over now and many billions of
pounds are matched each month on these markets. In betting exchanges
an arbitrageur exploits existing price discrepancies when bookmakers’ prices
differ enough that they allow to back all outcomes and still make a profit.
In paperclip exchanges Kyle exploits personal value discrepancies, taking
advantage from the personal valuation differential between agents. Other
similarity is that sports arbitrage are more accessible to everyday people
because of the internet as in the Kyle’s experiment a large–scale market
benefit. But there are still barriers which stop everyone from being successful
in both scenarios. Both scenarios take capital, time, organization and energy
to make profits.
Furthermore, bartering has been used in commercial applications such as:
SwapAce8 and Worldwide Barter Board9 or SwapTree10. These systems are
innovative online marketplaces where individuals or communities trade and
interact with each other - which may potentially exhibit similar dynamics to
those studies in this paper. In particular participants are not motivated by
pure market value – but by value to them at a particular point in time.
Kyle’s and other similar experiences show alternative economic visions to
normal electronic transaction which are anonymous and money oriented, by
relying on personal encounters which are mediated by useful trades for both
parts of the negotiation. This is a more basic trading approach but opens
3Peerflix in http://www.peerflix.com
4Read It Swap It in http://www.readitswapit.co.uk
5Intervac in http://intervac-online.com
6Betfair in http://www.betfair.com
7Betdaq in http://www.betdaq.com
8SwapAce in http://www.swapace.com
9Worldwide Barter Board in http://www.worldwidebarterboard.com
10SwapTree in http://www.swaptree.com
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new opportunities for exchanging and negotiation studies in large–scale social
context. The One Red Paperclip is a search problem that has the following
components:
• Initial state: Includes the board position and identifies the player to
move.
• Successor function: Returns list of (move, state) pairs, each indicat-
ing a legal move and the resulting state.
• Terminal test: Determines when the game is over (i.e., when we are
in a terminal state).
• Utility function: Gives a numeric value in terminal states (i.e., -1, 0,
+1 in chess).
There are four criteria in designing a search algorithm:
• Completeness: The algorithm guaranteed to find a solution if a so-
lution exists?
• Time complexity: This is often measured by the number of partici-
pants visited by the algorithm before it reaches a goal node.
• Space complexity: This is often measured by the maximum size of
memory that the algorithm once used during the search.
• Optimality: The algorithm guaranteed to find an optimal solution
if there are many solutions? A solution is optimal in the sense of
minimum cost.
Path finding addresses the problem of finding a good path from the start-
ing point to the goal. This problem has the following features:
• Large–scale or non–large–scale: Peer-to-Peer, MAS and Grid tech-
nologies enable an arbitrary large number of users to participate in
distributed services like content distribution or collaboration tools.
• Two player or teams of players: In environments with multiple self-
interested agents, an agent’s outcome is generally affected by actions
of the other agents. Consequently, the optimal action of one agent can
depend on the actions of others.
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• Imperfect or perfect–information games [72]: From Game The-
ory, the concept of imperfect information is observed if a player does
not know exactly what actions other players took up to that point.
Technically, there exists at least one information set with more than
one node. If every information set contains exactly one node, the game
is one of perfect information.
• Zero–sum or non–zero sum games: In game theory and economic
theory, zero-sum describes a situation in which a participant’s gain or
loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the other participant(s).
• Competitive or cooperative games: In competitive environments
[6] agents have distinct goals but may still interact to advance their own
goals whereas in cooperative environments [116] agents work toward
achieving some common goals.11
• Deterministic or non–deterministic algorithm: The transition
from one state to the next is not necessarily deterministic; some algo-
rithms, known as probabilistic algorithms, incorporate randomness.
• Complete and optimal search: A search method is called complete
when it is guaranteed to find a solution if there is one. A search method
is said to produce optimal solutions when the method is guaranteed to
output the highest–quality solution when there are several different
solutions.
• Irreversible or non–irreversible changes: An example of irre-
versible change is the chemical synthesis:
– The operations can be: Add chemical x to the pot, change the
temperature to t degrees.
– These operations may cause irreversible changes to the potion
being brewed.
– The order in which they are performed can be very important in
determining the final output.
– Non partially commutative production systems are less likely to
produce the same node many times in search process.
– When dealing with ones that describe irreversible processes, it
is partially important to make correct decisions the first time,
although if the universe is predictable, planning can be used to
make that less important.
11http://www.thegamesjournal.com/articles/FamilyPastimes.shtml
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The work in this chapter develops a simple agent population model based
on active/goal–driven and passive agents with ranges of personal value distri-
butions for the items they own. Then is applied a simple trading mechanism
to show that scenarios such as Kyle’s story are indeed possible for goal driven
agents without relying on altruistic behaviour. The work characterizes the
conditions necessary for this to occur and goes on to study the emerging
dynamics as an increasing number of goal striven agents become active. The
main contributions are:
• Providing an intuitive model for such open bartering environment.
• Showing that the effect can be seen in simple populations of agents.
• Showing that the market does not require altruistic agents to be present.
• Studying the dynamics of what happens if there are many agents pursue
goal–driven strategies:
– Showing that as the balance changes between goal driven agents
(GDA’s) and passive agents (PA’s), goal driven agents can no
longer achieve their goals.
– Analysing failure states.
7.1 The Trading Paperclips Model
The model developed for the scenario is relatively simplistic, but captures
the main elements of Kyle’s trading environment. The model consists of the
following components (see Figure 7.1):
• A population of agents in which each agent plays one of these two roles:
– Goal driven agents (GDA): These agents try to reach a dream
(i.e. an item with a value that seems infinite to them and is also
very high on the general market value ranking). The initial item
of property this type of agent owns is considered low in the gen-
eral market ranking. The agent deliberately seeks rich/beneficial
trading encounters in order to move upwards in market value.
– Passive agents (PA): These agents have an item and do not
seek any particular new item, however they know a good deal when
they see one. In the case that a GDA tries to trade with a PA,
the PA only accepts it if it is beneficial – i.e. its own satisfaction
is increased by the trade.
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• A list of items: An item is any type of private good such as food,
clothing, toys, furniture, cars etc. This list follows a strict order in
function of a general market value (MV ). MV is the value fixed and
determined by buyers and sellers in an open market.
• Personal value: Each agent has a personal value (PV ) for each item
in the market (and hence for each item they own). This PV differs
for each agent in the market with a statistical deviation (which may
be positive or negative) – in other words an agent may value certain
items at above or below general MV . MVi(gj) and PVi(gj) represent
the MV and PV respectively of the agenti with respect to the item gj.
• Links: Each agent is connected to the rest of the members in the
market.
• A set of ranges: A range contains multiple items with the same MV
and a range of possible PV restricted to two values [-σ, +σ] related to
this MV . Without this partition the cost of finding all possible ways
would be too expensive12.
• The exchange strategy: An exchange between two agents GDA and
PA is accepted iff there exist two items gi, gj, where j=i+1 that are in
neighbouring ranges such as:
{gi ∈ GDA, gj ∈ PA : PVPA(gi) > PVPA(gj) and MVGDA(gj) > MVGDA(gi)}.
(7.1)
Where in the equation 7.1:
– PVGDA(gj) > PVGDA(gi) could not be true because the GDA is
more concerned about MV for future trades than in PV . Never-
theless, it is natural that PVGDA(gj) > PVGDA(gi).
– PVPA(gi) > PVPA(gj) could not be true because the PA is more
concerned about its PV than in MV .
An example is when the GDA has the item A and PVGDA(B) =
60, MVGDA(A) = 65 and PVGDA(B) = 70 and agent PA has an
item B and a PVPA(B) = 65, MVPA(B) = 70 and PVPA(A) =
75. Under these conditions GDA and PA can make the exchange
of items A by B (see Figure 7.2).
Nevertheless, the equation 7.1 is not enough to assure that the item
obtained in the exchange that GDA gets is one of the items that takes
12This is reviewed in section 7.2– Using backtracking
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Figure 7.1: A goal driven agent wants to turn an item with low value into
an item with high value by means of a sequence of exchanges.
part of the chain of items to obtain the desired item (i.e. the house).
The equation only guarantees that the trade is profitable in both sides
and therefore it could be done.
The work experiments with a number of cases based on the following
general parameters and for the cases of a single GDA and of multiple GDAs.
• Initially, items are randomly assigned to agents. One item per agent.
• The number of ranges is fifty. Each range is composed of one hun-
dred items. Range 1 contains the items of lowest value and in range50
contains those of highest value.
• The market is composed of one hundred agents which have items.
• The GDA knows where all the rest of the agents are located and can
communicate with them (i.e. the system is fully connected).
• Items have an unique MV but each agent has its own PV of the item.
• Trades are conducted by means of bartering. An exchange is always
between a GDA with an item from rangex and a PA with an item from
rangex+1 (see Figure 7.2).
• The GDA only take local decisions.
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Figure 7.2: The GDA is increasing its MV and the PA is decreasing its MV
but it is increasing its PV .
• GDAs only trade when the interchange is immediately beneficial ac-
cording to general MV . The PAs only trade when the interchange is
immediately beneficial according to its PV .
• The PV of the items follows a ∼ N (µ, σ). Then, µi - µi+1 represents
the distance between ranges or between cluster of items with the same
MV and σ represents the variation of PV .
• In each of our graphs, each data point is an average of ten simulations,
and we provide statistical significance results to support our main con-
clusions.
• A blocking situation is when a GDA wants some item but one of the
agents does not trade until it gets the GDA offers the items the agent
itself desires.
• A steady state is achieved when the GDAs reach the desired item.
• The model can be generalized to accommodated multiple GDA agents,
all with the same behaviour.
The exact adjustment path and the speed of movement along that path
can be crucial to a policy achieving its specified goals. Other issues:
• Single and multiple goal driven agents (GDA): The most basic
form of the systems to be explored is that in which there is only a
single GDA looking for a desired item which has the highest value in the
market (i.e. from a paperclip to a house). Once proven that an isolated
GDA can reach an item from the last range under some configurations,
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the next step is to balance the quantity of PAs (i.e. PAs are not
looking for beneficial trades) and GDAs, to check the behaviour of the
market with other distribution populations. Therefore, the strategy is
to increase the percentage of GDAs in the market in order to reveal
the dynamics that appears in front of the variation of populations.
• Backtracking: Kyle’s experiment can be seen as a path finding prob-
lem13 where problem are focused on finding an efficient, and possibly
optimal path a some initial state to some final state. The aim for any
GDA is to reach the desired item in the last range. In a single search
process when it is not possible to progress, the process ends. This does
not mean, however, that other paths will not be possible (i.e. other ex-
changes could carry on to satisfy the GDA). In order to look for other
paths a classical backtracking algorithm has been applied [143]. Un-
til now, the searching process works without backtracking (BT ), this
means once the search process arrives at a range where it is not possible
to advance, the process ends (i.e. monotonically) as is showed in the
monotonic search algorithm. However, the BT algorithm [108] tries to
overcome this situation by looking for new paths (i.e. non–monotonic
search). In the worst case, the classical BT algorithm has an expo-
nential cost. In order to reduce this cost the search space has been
restricted. To apply BT is necessary to include downward exchanges.
Two types of exchanges are considered (see Figure 7.3):
– Upward exchanges: An exchange between an GDA with an
item from rangex and PA with an item from rangex+1.
– Downward exchanges: An exchange between an GDA with an
item from rangex+1 and PA with an item from rangex. This type
of exchange will be done when a GDA makes a backtrack.
• Value–enhance action: This action allows the GDAs to improve
the value of an item of certain categories. For example, a GDA can
clean an old item adding an extra value to this item for the rest of
members in the market. Figure 7.4 shows a GDA with itemx and a PA
with itemy where MV (itemy) > MV (itemx). In a) PA evaluates that
PV (itemx) < PV (itemy) for that reason PA prefers to not exchange
with the GDA. However, in b) GDA value–enhances the itemx and for
13Path finding problems are focused on finding the path from some initial state to some
final state. When solving this type of problem, the start and end points of the search
might be known in advance. Finding an efficient, and possibly optimal, path between the
start and end state is the goal.
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Figure 7.3: a) Upward exchange. The GDA is increasing its MV and the PA
is decreasing its MV but it is increasing its PV and b) Downward exchange.
The GDA is decreasing its MV and the PA is increasing its MV and PV .
Figure 7.4: Non–value–enhancement versus value–enhancement situation.
the PA in this case will be PV (itemx) > PV (itemy) making possible
the exchange. Each GDA can follow one of the following strategies:
– To exchange (E): The GDA only trades up.
– To value–enhance first, to exchange after (V EE): In this case
the GDA is able to value–enhance items belonging to a set of
categories. Firstly, the agent value–enhances the item when it is
possible. If the item cannot be value–enhanced it is because the
item does not belong to any of the categories that the GDA is
related to, or because the item has been already value–enhanced.
Afterwards, the GDA tries to exchange the value–enhanced item.
– To exchange first, to value–enhance after (EV E): It follows an
equivalent behaviour that in the previous case but changing the
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order of the actions.
– The last possible strategy is only to value–enhance (V E), but it
does not make sense, because the main aim of the GDAs is to get
an item from the last range. For this reason, this strategy will not
be considered.
• Devaluation process: Items lose part of their properties/value over
time. A devaluation value (i.e. a substantial drop in the value of an
item) is included in the model in order to reflect this natural property.
For the owner of the item, the devaluation process is not detectable.
For example, if you have an old car and you can travel back and forth
without problems, this old car has a level of satisfaction/utility (i.e.
PV ) optimum or near to the optimum for someone. However, people
that are looking for a car may have another rating about your old
car. Therefore, each item in the market has a MV for the owner (i.e.
MVlocal) and a MV for the rest of the population (i.e. MVglobal).
7.2 Implementation Overview
The network modelled is shaped by bidirectional links from GDA’s to PA’s.
A Java simulator is used in order to model different scenarios/experiments.
The simulator follows the model explained in this chapter. For the ex-
periments, the quantity of items per agent is always one. With respect to
the items, a low index in the items indicates a low MV and a high index is
related to high MV . During the chain of trades it is possible that the PV
of the GDA decreases. This is logical because GDA is only interested in the
target item which has an infinite value to him. The rest of the items only
have value with respect to how useful/valuable they are to the members in
the market. The list of issues observed:
Quantity of items and agents: The quantity of agents and items in
the market have a great impact on the performance of the market. Finding
a profitable exchanges for buyer–seller (i.e. double coincidence of wants)
depends on how many members are shaping the market. As the number of
agents and items increases, the chances for Kyle also increase.
Range of values: One way to analyse the quantity and distribution of
items in the market is in fixed ranges of value – each representing different
levels of value and containing multiple items in one range. In a range/level
with few items the distance between the MV increases and when the quantity
of items increases the distance is reduced. The steps to generate the MV
that will compose the market are:
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Figure 7.5: a) with σ = 5 and b) with σ = 25
1. To establish a range values (i.e. levels of value).
2. To determine a quantity of items in total.
3. To uniformly distribute the items in the range.
The distribution of MV and PV : Figure 7.5 shows a set of five normal
distributions where µ0 is equal to 200 and the following µ’s are increasing its
value in two units. When the µ value is close, the probability that exchanges
can be made is high. With σ = 5 and µi+1 = µi + 2 the items with which
it would be possible to trade is a maximum of seven. However, with σ = 25
the items for which to trade rises to thirty five. Therefore, the range of MV
with which it is possible to make an interchange is greater with σ = 25 than
when σ = 5. Not that these are only possible trades – since an actual trade
still depends on the individual valuations of the agents.
A higher σ increases the quantity of agents to negotiate with and chances
of jumping between differently valuables items (i.e. in passing from ga to gd
where MV (ga) ≪ MV (gd)).
When σi = 2 the P(agenti ⇔ agenti+1) = 0.30 with σi = 5 the P(agenti
⇔ agenti+1) = 0.42. As greater value of σ is the greatest the probabil-
ity of making an interchange. Also, the number of agents with which it is
possible to exchange increases. Following the example and assuming that
(∀ a,b ∈ items µa = µb + 2) if σi = 2, the majority of exchanges will be only
with µi+1. However, when σi = 5 the range of agent who exchanges will be
µi+1 and µi+2. Increasing the probabilities of making an exchange.
Neither the distance between MV nor value of standard deviations (i.e.
demand/supply) can be changed by any individual in the market.
Figure 7.6 shows normal distributions with σ = 2 and σ = 5. In the first
case, P (a > 202.5)= 0.105 and P (b < 202.5)= 0.105. In the second case,
with σ = 5, P (a > 202.5)= 0.38 and P (b < 202.5)= 0.30. This shows that
σ = 5 with P (a > 202.5) & P (b < 202.5) is greater than with σ = 2.
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Figure 7.6: Normal distributions with a) σ = 2 and b) σ = 5.
In order to arrange realistic experiments, one needs to study the prob-
ability of a GDA getting the desired item. In the proposed environment,
the GDA has the worst item gA and the objective is to reach the best item
gZ . The question is “what it are the chances of successfully completing this
task?”. The first task to consider is to know what the probability of passing
from gA to gB where MVGDA(gB) >MVGDA(gA).
Let, X ∼ N (µ1, σ1) and Y ∼ N (µ2, σ2). Then ∃ an exchange iff the
value of the item x1 is greater than the value of the item x2 by the node that
has x2. This is equivalent to saying that ∃ an exchange iff µ2(x1) > µ2(x2).
Finally, it is possible to turn this into equation 7.2.
{P (µ2(x1) > µ2(x2)) = P (µ2(x1)− µ2(x2) ≤ 0)}. (7.2)
Due to the properties of the normal distribution and given that X and Y
are normal random variables with means µ1 and µ2, and variances, σ1 and
σ2, then:
1. The mean of Y - X = µ2 - µ1,
2. The variance of Y - X = σ2 + σ1.
Once normalized, the values to a z-score mean we can find the probability
that P (Z < z). In this case with z is equal to zero.
In a market it is usual to have many items to exchange. For this rea-
son,there are multiple ways to start with item gA and reach the item gZ . In
94 CHAPTER 7. TRADING PAPERCLIPS
1=>2 2=>3 3=>4
1=>4
1=>3 2=>4
MVµ µµ µ1 2 3 4
Figure 7.7: All paths from node 1 to node 4 showing the MV = µ as a set
of standard deviations.
Figure 7.7 four items appear; each one with its MV , all of them following a
normal distribution.
In this example, the paths from µ1 at µ4 by means of exchanges are:
• To exchange x1 by x2 (1 ⇔ 2) and afterwards x2 by x3 (2 ⇔ 3) and
finally x3 by x4 (3 ⇔ 4), or
P(A1) = P((µ2(x2) - µ2(x1)) <0) ∩ P((µ3(x3) - µ3(x2)) <0) ∩ P((µ4(x4)
- µ4(x3)) <0)
• To exchange x1 by x2 (1 ⇔ 2) and afterwards x2 by x4 (2 ⇔ 4), or
P(A2) = P((µ2(x2) - µ2(x1)) <0) ∩ P((µ4(x4) - µ4(x2)) <0)
• To exchange x1 by x3 (1 ⇔ 3) and afterwards x3 by x4 (3 ⇔ 4),
P(A3) = P((µ3(x3) - µ3(x1)) <0) ∩ P((µ4(x4) - µ4(x3)) <0)
or
• To exchange x1 by x4 (1 ⇔ 4) directly
P(A4) = P((µ4(x4) - µ4(x1)) <0)
No other way exists. Each one of these sequences of exchanges is named
an event.
The objective is to calculate the probability of all of these events (i.e.
P(A0 ∪ . . .∪ An)). From the basic properties of probabilities (see Eq. 7.3).
{P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∩B)}. (7.3)
Extending to n events in the next equation is obtained:
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P (A0 ∪ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An−1 ∪ An) = P (A0) + . . . + P (An)
−(P (A0 ∩ An) + . . . + (P (An−1 ∩ An))
+(P (A0 ∩ A1 ∩ A2) + . . . + P (An−2 ∩ An−1 ∩ An))
−/ + . . .− / + +P (A0 ∩ . . . ∩ An).
To simplify the formulation of the union of n events, let Eα (α = 1, 2,
. . . , n) be Eq. 7.4.
{P (
n⋃
α=1
)Eα =
n∑
α=1
P (Eα)−
n∑
β>α=1
P (Eα∩Eβ)+. . .+(−1)
n−1P (E1∩. . .∩En)}.
(7.4)
Given that the events are independent then Eq. 7.5:
{P (
n⋃
α=1
)Eα =
n∑
α=1
P (Eα)−
n∑
β>α=1
P (Eα)P (Eβ)+. . .+(−1)
n−1P (E1) . . . P (En)}.
(7.5)
Where n is the quantity of different events. And P(A0) is the probability
that the event A0 happens. And where P(A0 ∩ A1) is the probability that
the events A0 and A1 happen. In order to simplify the calculation of the
equation 7.5:
P (A1 ∪ A2) = P (((µ2(x2)− µ2(x1)) < 0) ∩ ((µ3(x3)− µ3(x2)) < 0) ∩
((µ4(x4)− µ4(x3)) < 0) ∩
((µ3(x3)− µ3(x1)) < 0) ∩ ((µ(x4)− µ4(x3)) < 0)) ≡
P ((µ2(x2)− µ2(x1)) < 0) ∩ P (((µ3(x3)− µ3(x2)) < 0) ∩
((µ3(x3)− µ3(x1)) < 0)) ∩
P (((µ4(x4)− µ4(x3)) < 0) ∩ ((µ4(x4)− µ4(x3)) < 0)) ≡
P ((µ2(x2)− µ2(x1)) < 0) ∩ P (µ3(x3) < min{µ3(x2), µ3(x1)}) ∩
P ((µ4(x4)− µ4(x3)) < 0) ≅
P (µ2(x2)− µ2(x1) < 0)P (µ3(x3)− µ3(x1) < 0)
P (µ2(x2)− µ2(x1) < 0)
The final task is to calculate how many paths exists from gA to gZ . The
approach, in our case, to thinking of the paths form gA to gZ as a tree. Where
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Figure 7.8: All paths from node 1 to node 6 showing as a tree.
the root is the gA and the following items in an increasing order shape the
tree. And the lowest are the gZ items. Figure 7.8 follows this approach
showing the all paths with six items in the market. Taking the root of the
tree to be the GDA with the item1, the rest of nodes are PA’s. The leaves
are the best items in the market. In order to count the quantity of paths
between two items was defined the recursive function in Algorithm 5. With
minimum changes this function can provide one–to–one the paths from the
root to the leaves.
Algorithm 5 Function counting(index, indexs, indexd) to count all paths
between two nodes
value ⇐ 0
if index is inxedd then
value ⇐ 1
else
for i = index + 1 to indexd + 1 do
value ⇐ value + counting(i, indexs, indexd)
end for
end if
value
The cost to create all paths is computationally explosive:
• With 10 items =⇒ 255 paths =⇒ 1,280 entries (i.e. µa ⇒ µb)
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• With 15 items =⇒ 8,190 paths =⇒ 58,847 entries (i.e. µa ⇒ µb)
• With 20 items =⇒ more than 110,000 paths =⇒ more than 1,200,000
entries (i.e. µa ⇒ µb)
This limitation only has allowed to work with 10 or 15 items. The ranges
for the MV were 25, 50 and 100. The scenarios and results obtained are in
the table 7.1. Being many of these paths are redundant.
α = 2 α = 5 α = 10
range/items 10 15 10 15 10 15
25 0.0011 0.026 0.81 ≃ 1 ≃ 1 ≃ 1
50 1.69E-10 8.91E-8 0.01 0.19 ≃ 1 ≃ 1
100 ≃ 0 2.21E-22 0.968E-8 1.45E-5 ≃ 1 ≃ 1
Table 7.1: Scenarios with σ = 2, 5 and 10 with different ranges.
Two different probabilities are related to this model based on ranges:
• Inter–range: The probability of reaching the desired object starting
with the chain of trades from the worst item (i.e. from range0 to
rangeN). This is a binomial random variable, a random variable that
counts the number of successes in a sequence of independent Bernoulli
trials with fixed probability of success. In our case, the probability of
passing to the next range (i.e. of having a successful jump or not).
• Intra–range: This corresponds to the probability that a GDA finds
a PA to interchange the items in the next range.
Inter–range: The model follows a probability distribution of binomial
random variable. In the model, success happens when the GDA pass from a
rangei to a range rangei+1.
In a scenario when the success rate is measured at 80% 14 (i.e. in the
80% of the cases exists an agent in the upper range that is more interested
in the item offered by the GDA than in the ownership). Thus, p = 0.8 and
1-p = 0.2. Taking n = 100 items. The probability of getting 100 successful
jumps is in equation 7.6.
P (X = 100) = f(100; 100, 0.8) = 2.03e− 10 (7.6)
Intra–range: In a range the most important variables are the quantity
of items, the distribution and the standard deviation of the PV , assuming
14The probability to jump from a rangei to a rangei+1 is independent of the range.
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that a range has a fixed PV and that the PV follows a uniform distribution
in this range. Let, X ∼ N (µ1, σ1) and Y ∼ N (µ2, σ2). There exists an
exchange iff the value of the item x1 is greater than the value of the item x2
by the node that has x2. This is equivalent to saying that ∃ an exchange iff
µ2(x1) > µ2(x2). This will be characterized by the event E. In this case the
scenario has one agent that has an item µ1 and n agents that have items in
µ2. The objective is to set a bound k, as is showed in equation 7.7.
{P ((µ2(x1) > µ2(xα=1..n)) = k) = P (
n∑
α=1
P (Eα))}. (7.7)
This is the probability of passing from the item with a MV of µ1 to the
item with MV equal to µ2 has a value k. The table 7.2 shows the quantity
of items that are necessary in order to reach probabilities of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8
working with a range of standard deviation from 2 to 5.
P = 0.2 P = 0.5 P = 0.8
µ2-µ1=7 µ2-µ1=20 µ2-µ1=7 µ2-µ1=20 µ2-µ1=7 µ2-µ1=20
σ=2 860 ≃ ∞ 2,149 ≃ ∞ 3,438 ≃ ∞
σ=3 21 ≃ ∞ 51 ≃ ∞ 82 ≃ ∞
σ=4 5 666,252 13 1,665,630 20 2,665,008
σ=5 3 6,292 7 15,729 10 25,166
Table 7.2: The quantity of items that are necessary in each scenario in order
to reach a P = 0.2, P = 0.5 and P = 0.8.
The standard deviation σ splits the simulations into two graphs (see Fig-
ure 7.9). When σ is equal to two and when this σ is equal to five. The σ
is related to the variation of taste that the agents have with respect to the
value of an item The y–axis shows the distance between a pair of items. This
distance is equal for each item in the market. The four different scenarios
are when the distance has a value of 5, 10, 15 and 20. Along the x–axis, each
column is the mean value of the range. The mean is taken from one hun-
dred simulations. The legend shows the quantity of items that are involved
in the scenario. Three quantities of items are studied: when the market has
420,000, 42,000 and 4,200 items. In all the simulations we work with one hun-
dred ranges (i.e. levels of price for the items). The GDA starts with an item
that is in the range0 and wants an item that belongs to the range100. The
results obtained clearly shows behaviour according to the these parameters,
quantity of items, σ and distance, as follows:
• As the quantity of items in the market increases, more ranges/levels
can be added.
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Figure 7.9: Mean value of the range obtained when a) σ = 2 and b) σ = 5
• A larger σ should increase the value of the range.
• The standard deviation (i.e. the dispersion of a collection of numbers)
reveals as an item has a range greater value, the item will be easier to
exchange.
• The distance between ranges reveals that no one is interested to turn
a non valuable item into a valuable item (ex. a pen into a car).
• The few items to exchange in an upper range there are, the probability
to exchange decreases.
The graph shows that with a σ equal to 2 it is only possible for a goal
driven agent to make trades when the distance is equal to five or lower (i.e.
the distance between MV is lower than five). Focusing on this scenario, when
µ2 - µ1 = 5, the results show the relevance of the quantity of items. With
420,000 and 42,000 items, the range obtained over one hundred different
simulations the range obtained maximum is ≡ GDA reaches the targeted
item. But when the quantity of items is reduced to 4,200 items it is not true.
In this case the mean value is 1.2.
The maximal length of the chain of trades was seven. The reason to
this low value is because as the number of items is reduced, the chances of
jumping from one level to another reduce. Concretely when σ is equal to 5
with µ2 - µ1 ≤ 5, the GDA always gets the desired item. In this scenario
is independent the quantity of items that the market has. Figure 7.9 shows
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that when µ2 - µ1 = 5 and σ equal to 5, a GDA gets the item of upper range
with 420,000, 42,000 and 4,200 items.
In the rest of scenarios, a greater distance implies smaller ranges. Increas-
ing the distance between MV s the value of the range obtained decreases.
Comparing graph 7.9 a) and b), we can compare what effect σ has on the
range obtained. The results obtained with σ = 5 are better than when σ = 2.
The results show that:
• Certain configurations assure the best value of the range (e.g. σ = 5
and µ2 - µ1 = 5)
• Certain configurations lead to the worst value of the range (e.g. σ = 2
and µ2 - µ1 = 10)
• The quantity of items, σ and distance has a deep impact in the results.
But none of these parameters can be managed by an unique agent,
these parameters are provided by the market.
• The Kyle’s scenario is one where the quantity of agents tends to infinite.
This ensures that the probability of finding out an item that allows
passing to an upper range increases. The problem is to contact with
the right person that has this item that GDA needs.
Distribution of GDAs:
• One GDA: The most basic form of the systems to be explored is that
in which there is only a single GDA looking for a desired item which
has the highest value in the market.
The probability of turning an item from rangex into an item of rangex+1
depends on the quantity of items per range, the quantity of ranges, the
range of PV and the distance between ranges associated to MV s.
When the quantity of items per range is near to zero, P (success) will be
zero. At the other extreme, when the quantity of items per range tends
to infinity, P (success) tends to be one. Figure 7.10 a) shows the effect
of the quantity of items per range. The only two parameters modified
are: the quantity of items per range and the distance between ranges.
The rest of the parameters are fixed. Simulations are related to the
case where the distance between the lower range and the higher range
is equal to fifty (i.e. fifty hops are necessary to transform a paperclip
into a house) and the range of PV is equal to five. The figure shows
that as there are more items per range there are more probabilities that
the GDA will reach the last range and thus more access to the most
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valuable items. Also the figure shows that in some configurations (for
example – with few items per range as 10 items x range), the probability
of reaching the last range is near to zero. And in other configurations,
for example with 1,000 items x range, a range of PV equal to 5 and a
distance between ranges equals to 2, this probability is high but not 1
– in this case 0.82.
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Figure 7.10: Results related to the parameters in the simulator a) items per
range and distance between ranges b) quantity of ranges and variations of
PV , c) quantity of ranges and distance between ranges
Figure 7.10 b) shows different variations of PV from 1 to 5 and the
quantity of ranges. The rest of parameters are: quantity of items per
range is 1,000 and the distance between ranges is equal to 5. Increasing
the value of PV the probability of reaching the last range increases.
Finally, Figure 7.10 c) shows the effect of the distance between ranges
combined with the quantity of ranges. The probability of reaching
the last range decreases as distances between ranges increase or the
quantity of ranges increases. The variation of PV is fixed to 5 and the
quantity of items per range is equal to 1,000. As the number of ranges
to cross over is lower, it is easier to reach the last range. It could be
noted that as the distance decreases between ranges it becomes easier
to get an item from the last range.
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The statement shows that GDA can turn an item from the initial range
to the last range with a high probability of success under many con-
figurations such as with a distance between ranges from 0 to 2, with
more than 1,000 items per range with a σ > 4 and where the number of
ranges are those included between 25 and 50 ranges. The probability
of reaching the last range is close to one. Furthermore, this probability
is completely independent of altruism. Because, by definition, neither
GDAs nor PAs accept any detrimental trade.
• Multiple GDAs: Social insects tend to arrange items in their sur-
roundings according to specific criteria, e.g. broods and larvae sorting
in ant colonies. This process of collectively grouping items is commonly
observed in human societies as well, and serves different purposes, e.g.
garbage collection. Once proven that an isolated GDA can reach an
item from the last range under some configurations, the next step is to
balance the quantity of PAs and GDAs, to check the behavior of the
market with other distribution populations. Therefore, the strategy is
to increase the percentage of GDAs in the market in order to reveal
the dynamics that appears in front of the variation of populations.
The set of experiments uses configurations with a percentage ranged
from 0, 0.02, 2, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 to 100 % GDAs.
Other parameters are set as follows: the variation of PV is equal to
five, the distance is equal to five (i.e. difference between two consecutive
MV ). These parameters are chosen from the previous section because
they form a fruitful environment where trades with one GDA can be
made. These results are presented in Figure 7.11 where the quantity
of crossed ranges or jumps is shown with respect to the percentage of
GDAs. The solid line is related to the maximum sum of jumps. This
value captures starting from a random distribution of the GDAs in the
different ranges, how many crossed ranges should be crossed to become
this initial situation in a situation where all the GDAs have the best
available items. On the other hand, the dotted line is related to the
sum jumps that were obtained by simulations.
Focusing on this later value, the figure shows that when the percentage
is reduced (i.e. less than 2 %) the value of jumps in our simulator and
the maximum value expected is equal. The best results with respect to
the quantity of crossed jumps are achieved when the balance of GDAs is
around 10 %. The reason is because many GDAs are making jumps but
not enough to decrease the opportunities to make exchanges from the
rest of GDAs in the market. Under other configurations this property
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Figure 7.11: The mean range value decreases as quantity of GDAs increases.
is not applicable. As the quantity of GDAs increases in the market
the sum of jumps go down slightly. At first glance, more GDAs in the
market should implies that more jumps could be done, the problem is
that the opportunities of jumps decreases, ending up with the opposite
of the expected value.
As the number of GDAs increases, it is more difficult to make trades
between agents. The reasons are:
– As great the distribution of GDAs is less probably to have an
encounter with a PA.
– Once a PA makes a trade the following events occur:
∗ The PA increases its PV .
∗ The PA moves downwards by one range.
Unsurprisingly, GDAs with an item near to the last range (i.e. rich
agents) tends to obtain better results than GDAs with an item far
from the last range.
– To be far from the last range implies more jumps between ranges.
The probability decreases when more jumps need be made to reach
the last range.
– GDAs share a common goal. They try to move upwards and the
competition amongst GDAs increases. The displacement of GDAs
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in the ranges of the market takes place, from an initial uniform
distribution in the initial step to an n–shape once the simulation
runs. In this last figure we can observe how GDAs are gathered
in the upper ranges making the swap more competitive between
these ranges
– GDAs near to the last range trade with PAs that allow to get
upper ranges. Once these PAs have made a trade it will be more
difficult for the next GDAs to offer an useful item.
At a large–scale, the inclusion of GDAs turn a fruitful market into one
without hardly any opportunities. With lower levels of GDAs (i.e. less
than 10 %) the GDAs can turn into best ranges. But once passed 10 %,
the opportunities to improve decrease and changes to get the desired
item disappear quickly.
These results show a decreasing refund in contrast of when the market
has an isolate GDA that the competition among GDAs reduces the
chances to reach the desired item.
Using backtracking: The objective in this section will be to compare
and contrast results using BT and without BT. Backtracking algorithms try
each possibility until they find the right one. It is a depth-first search of
the set of possible solutions. During the search, if an alternative does not
work, the search backtracks to the choice point, the place which presented
different alternatives, and tries the next alternative. When the alternatives
are exhausted, the search returns to the previous choice point and tries the
next alternative there. If there are no more choice points, the search fails.
Without backtracking, the process is to search for a unique path between
range0 and rangeN . Adding backtracking, the algorithm will always find the
solution if the solution exists, because the algorithm explorer all possible
paths between range0 and rangeN . The problem of brute force is that the
cost is proportional to the number of paths. One solution could be to limit
the space search, stopping the backtrack process when the gap between the
upper and lower bounds becomes smaller than a certain threshold. This can
greatly reduces the computation required with brute force. Other option is
to include a heuristic. An heuristic h(n) estimates the expected utility of the
game from a given position. Heuristic search algorithms typically take the
form of traditional algorithms, modified to make intelligent decisions when
choosing which path to travel first. The heuristic is a rule of thumb that is
used to steer the algorithm in a direction that seems more likely for the given
problem. These algorithms are useful in intelligent agent systems.
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The problem in this case is to determine how the heuristic function knows
whether or not an item is better? Better meaning that with this item the
agent will get an item from the last range. A good heuristic is one that
can detect the path from an initial range to the last range. In our problem
any heuristic could be applied because an agenti in a rangej only can know
the exchanged item in rangej+1 could be interchanged in rangej+2 once the
agenti has the item from rangej+1. Making a parallel with the well–known
heuristic to know if in a path of cities we are closer or farther each time by
the distance between the city where the agent is and the destination city. In
our case, the problem is that the heuristic could know that an upper range
is better than a lower range, because the agent is closer to the last range.
However, it could be that in a range the agent stays is a no way out state.
And this state is not detected until the agent reaches this range.
Figure 7.12 shows the mean range obtained when the GDAs work with
BT limiting the search to k=2 and without BT. The parameters remain as in
the previous configuration. Except for the range of PV that turns his value
from 5 into 2. With this change, opportunities to pass from a range to the
upper range are reduced. When a percentage of GDAs which is above 10 %,
the BT no longer is a benefit but has become detrimental to performance.
BT algorithm reaches the maximum ranges when the percentage of GDAs
is lower than 0.5 %. From 0.5 % to 2 % the BT algorithm gets best results
than when the agents are not working with BT. However in this range the
BT algorithm does not reach the maximum ranges. The reason is due to the
destructive nature of the search. From the rest of scenarios the BT algorithm
worse the results.
Surprisingly, the BT algorithm does not improve the performance. The
main reason is because the search process is destructive (i.e. making upward
and downward exchanges the environment changes), in terms of changes the
state of the market. The PAs become more demanding with each exchange
(i.e. reducing the marginal utility). In the initial exchanges PAs have a wide
range of values to exchanges (i.e. from PVpa(x) to MVx+1 + σ) where the PA
will accept an exchange. But during the simulations the PAs exchanges its
item by means of upward and downward exchanges and the range of items
interesting from the PA decreases. Following with results from Figure 7.12,
with 0.5 % GDAs and BT around 890 exchanges are made instead of 297
without BT. Obviously, BT increases the quantity of trades because the
search process BT looks for other exchanges instead of stopping as in the
original approach. However, when the market has 1 % GDAs the trades are
2,484 with BT with respect to 477 without BT. The growth of trades is not
supported by the market affecting to the performance.
The effect of an individual or few individuals in a population is insignif-
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Figure 7.12: The mean range with BT and without BT.
icant because although the trades are reducing, the marginal utility from
some PAsv others PAs are available in the population to deal. But when
the quantity of GDA is high, the destructive process eliminates the possible
benefit that the BT algorithm provides. Therefore, the results show that
when the quantity of GDAs is limited, the BT gets better results. But once
the market is plenty of GDAs differences between working and not working
with BT are negligible.
Interaction with the environment: Each exchange has an effect on
the environment. GDAs exploit PV differences from the PAs. In each
exchange, two participants want to improve their own payoff, increasing PV
for PA and MV for GDA. Once the exchange has been made, the GDA
improves its MV and the PA improves its PV . For every future exchange it
will become increasingly more difficult for a new GDA to achieve an exchange
with this PA. In fact, in each exchange the PA will be more demanding.
Therefore, it is more complex for GDAs to trade with a PA that has made
many exchanges than with another PA that has not made any previous
exchanges. The next task is to consider how the strategy has more effect in
the environment/market in terms of PVPA changes.
In V EE from a rangej to rangek, MAX = MIN (see equation 7.8):
{
k∑
i=j
(IV + PVPA(itemGDA))− PVPA(itemPAi+1)}. (7.8)
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In EV E from a rangej to rangek, MIN (see equation 7.9):
{
k∑
i=j
(PVPA(itemGDA))− PVPA(itemPAi+1)}. (7.9)
In EV E from a rangej to rangek, MAX (see equation 7.10):
{
k∑
i=j
(IV + PVPA(itemGDA))− PVPA(itemPAi+1)}. (7.10)
Thus,
• Minimum V EE > Minimum EV E
• Maximum V EE = Maximum EV E
• Maximum and minimum E = Minimum EV E
Combining value–enhancement and devaluation: Figure 7.13 shows
a scenario where the devaluation process with the past of time is revealed.
Figure a) and b) without value–enhance action and c) and d) with value–
enhance action. In this case, the obvious expected result is that GDAs that
can value–enhance items will get better results than GDAs that can not
value–enhance. In a market where the items devalue (Figure 7.13 a) and
c)) their value for the rest of members, without value–enhance action, the
GDAs only are determined to exchange when the item is not very devalu-
ated. Once the item has been devalued, the item is not valued by the GDAs
in the market. When GDAs can value–enhance the items the opportunities
to exchange items are greater.
Figures 7.13 b) and d) show the state when an item has suffered a deteri-
oration. In b) the GDAs with a MV better than MVCLASS ITEMS1 want
not to offer anything to the PA with the item1. Also the GDAs with a lower
MVCLASS ITEMS1 , but near to this value, want not to exchange with the
PA because MVitem1 is lower than MV for these GDAs. Finally, the GDAs
with a lower MVitem1 cannot exchange with the PA because for these GDAs
will be very unlikely to offer an item to PA better than item1 because the
distance between MVPA(item1) and PVPA(item1) and the item that can offer
these GDAs is too far. In d) where it is possible to value–enhance the items,
the pattern of exchanges is similar to the previous scenario with the differ-
ence that the GDAs with a MV between MVCLASS ITEMS1 and MVitem1
can exchange with the PA provided that the value–enhance plus MVitem1
will be upper to the MV of the GDA that want to make the exchange.
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Figure 7.13: Forecasting scenario mixing value–enhance action and the de-
valuation process.
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7.3 Experiments
7.3.1 Experimental Configuration
Bringing together descriptions of the problems from the previous section, the
high level properties of the model are the following:
• Initially, items are randomly assigned to agents. One item per agent.
• The number of ranges is fifty. Each range is composed of one hundred
items. In range1 there are the items with smaller value and in the
range50 the items with the higher value.
• GDAs know where the rest of the agents are.
• Items have a unique MV but each agent has its PV for each item in
the market.
• The number of categories is equal to 10.
• The quantity of categories where a GDA belongs are 2 or 8.
• The simulator offers the opportunity to make an action per cycle. An
agent can either value–enhance or exchange an item. Once, the GDAs
select an action it should wait until the next activation cycle returns
in order to make a new action.
• The market has 500 GDAs and 4,500 PAs.
• Each agent has an item, thus the market has 5,000 items.
• The improved value (IV ) the difference between the original PV item
and the value–enhanced item, is equal to 2 or 5.
• The devaluated value (DV ) the depreciation between the MVlocal and
MVglobal.
7.3.2 Easy/Difficult Environments
Simulations show the outcomes of the strategies when the market favours
and does not favour the trade. In the easy environment, a GDA has a high
probability of success, near to 90 % (i.e. to turn an item from initial rangex
into an item from the last range) is seen. On the contrary, in the difficult
environment the probability to success decreases to below 40%.
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easy environment the standard deviation is equal to 5 and in the difficult
environment is equal to 2.
Value–enhance–action: In this case, GDAs can improve the items
that they have. Figure 7.14 shows the performance in terms of quantity of
value–enhancements and jumps of the two environments. On the x–axis we
see the strategies studied, followed by two numbers A B. A is the IV and
B is the quantity of categories where the GDA belongs to.
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Figure 7.14: Comparing the easy and difficult environment in terms of: a)
Quantity of value–enhancements and b) Quantity of jumps.
The following results were obtained:
• As was presumed, the easy environment get better results with respect
to the difficult environment in terms of jumps (i.e. a jump is an ex-
change between a GDA and a PA. The result is that GDA gets an item
from an upper MV than before the exchange). However, the quantity
of value–enhancements made is large in the difficult environment. With
more jumps, more value–enhancing should be done. But in the easy
environment it is likely to exchange a value–enhanced item whilst this
does not usually happen in the difficult environment.
• Comparing the strategies, E gets the worst results. Both strategies
V EE and EV E get similar results but the last one is a little better.
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In any case, to value–enhance items improves the global market per-
formance.
• The greater quantity of items the GDA can repair the probability of
achieving.
• Focusing on V EE and EV E strategies, as great IV and the more
quantity of items that a GDA can value–enhance the better the results
are.
• In the easy environment, the distance in jumps between E and V EE
or EV E is not significant. It is due to the fact that the easy envi-
ronment is favourable to making exchanges. However, in the difficult
environment, the PAs have a more demanding criteria at the moment
to make exchanges. In this case, to be able to improve the value of
items is an advisable advantage. However, when the quantity of cate-
gories or value–enhance is not enough, the improvement to work with
any value–enhance strategy is not too evident. When the quantity of
categories is low in a difficult environment.
• A GDA with a value–enhancement that tends to ∞ and is able to
improve any item, always gets to the last range. However, these as-
sumptions are not very realistic.
Value–enhance–action and devaluation process: Figure 7.15 shows
the performance in terms of quantity of jumps of the two environments, the
first Figure shows the easy environment and the second one the difficult
environment. Were studied the case where DV = 2, 4 and 6, with IV = 5
and the GDAs can improve items belongs to 8 categories.
The following results were obtained:
• The greater the DV , the worse are the results.
• The most relevant issue is the strong difference between repaired strate-
gies (i.e. V EE and EV E) and strategy E. Without value–enhancing
actions present, once an item is devalued, it is not recoverable for the
market (i.e. it will never again be traded). However, with value–
enhancing action, and if the IV has a value similar or upper to the
DV , it is available to do exchanges.
• When the IV is significant lower than DV or when the quantity of cat-
egories related to the GDAs is lower the results that get the simulator
are far to the optimal.
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Figure 7.15: Comparing easy and difficult environments in terms of quantity
of jumps.
Comparing the quantity of jumps in Figures 7.14 and 7.15 both the easy
and difficult environment and focusing on 5 8 without value–enhance action
show that with devaluation process is the quantity of jumps reduced signif-
icantly. However, the value–enhance action does not change the quantity of
jumps.
7.3.3 Mixing Strategies
The aim of these second series of experiments is to compare the performance
of the strategies proposed dividing the population by the strategy. We eval-
uated the following mixed strategies under the difficult environment outlined
above:
• Half of the population follows a V EE and the other half an EV E
strategy.
• Half of the population follows a V EE and the other half an E strategy.
• Half of the population follows an EV E and the other half an E strategy.
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Value–enhance–action: From Figure 7.16 the following results were ob-
tained in a difficult environment:
• Strategy EV E is slightly better than V EE.
• Strategy E is a weak strategy in with respect to the rest of strategies.
GDAs that follow EV E or V EE trade up more quickly to ranges,
closing opportunities to the GDAs that follow strategy E. EV E closes
paths of trade more quickly than V EE.
• As worse results are obtained in strategies V EE and EV E strategy E
gets the best results.
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Figure 7.16: Quantity of jumps in mixing strategies with a) 50 % V EE and
50 % E, b) 50 % V EE and 50 % E and c) 50 % EV E and 50 % E.
Value–enhance–action and devaluation process: From Figure 7.17
the following results were obtained with 5 8 in a difficult environment:
• Strategy EV E is slightly better than V EE.
• The differences between value–enhance strategy and non–value–enhance
strategy are highlighted by mixing these strategies.
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Comparing the quantity of jumps in Figures 7.16 and 7.17 focusing on 5 8
scenario with devaluation the different between value–enhance strategy and
non–value–enhance strategy are evidence. The E strategy against V EE or
EV E strategy gets best results when the devaluation process is not present.
In the modelled market, there are sequences of trades that turn an item
from rangex into an item of the highest range. However, a number of condi-
tions need to be met in order for GDAs to be able to make these trades and
in particular the following parameters are of relevance:
• The distance between MV s: As this distance increases it is more
difficult to change an item – with increasing gaps between valuations.
• The variance of PV : The greater the variance in the PV , the greater
the probability that a PAs will be interested in to interchanging items
– since some outliers will have very high valuations.
• The quantity of items per range: A market where the quantity of
items is great will increase the possible chains to reach the target item.
• The quantity of ranges: The fewer the ranges the easier it is for
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GDAs to have access to the last range where the desired item resides.
In fact this parameter varies with the distance between ranges.
• The quantity of GDAs in the market: The more GDAs there are,
the more competition there is since many GDA may be trying to get
the best items in the market. On the other hand, the quantity of PAs
increases the opportunities to trade up by the GDAs.
Observing the results obtained with the simulator, we can address to the
questions proposed in the initial part of the paper:
• What conditions are necessary in the market in order to have satisfied
agents (i.e. goal driven agents obtain the item that they want)? The
cartesian coordinates that have been studied in this paper with respect
to the variability in the model are:
– The quantity of ranges and the distance amongst the ranges.
– The quantity of items and the distance amongst the PV of the
items.
• How does the goal driven agent (GDA) know that an exchange gets
them closer to their dream? When it has finished a trade any GDA
knows that the MV of the new item is better than the old one. This
information is useful because at the level of prices, the opportunities
to reach a flat increases if the item that you have has a near value to
the value of the house. But the internal preferences associated to the
members in the market are not known by the GDA. This unrevealed
information makes turn into blind search the fact to know how much
it is interested in that. Moreover the model proposed assumes that
the GDA has a link to any member of the market a few probable real
scenario. Assuming this limitation, the usual strategy of the GDA’s
accustoms to follow diffused objectives.
• How many GDA’s can achieve their dreams? Including more than
on GDA in the market is like including rival agents. When the others
GDA are nearer to the targeted items is because they have interchanged
with other agents. During this process the GDA takes profit of the
marginal benefit. This is that the marginal benefit have been totally
or partially consumed in the transaction, being more complex for the
previous agents reach their targeted items due to the marginal benefit
(i.e. the change to make a trade) has decreased. This environment will
be face with these issues:
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– The fact of having more than one GDA in the market could be
realized by the PA’s. With the knowledge of the demand the PA’s
can impose the price most beneficial to him.
– With more than one GDA in the market coalitions of these agents
could appear in order to reach their desired items.
Because the value of material things is subjective. People base the value
that they place on any good or service on the satisfaction that they expect
to derive from it. Parties trade with one another because each one expects
to gain more satisfaction from what he obtains than from what he gives up.
People value things differently, in part because people just have different
values but also because of marginal utility. Marginal utility is just the idea
that the value to you of something is based on the value of getting it in
addition to what you already have. e.g. if you already have enough food to
eat, you might not value extra food as much. A second car is not as valuable
as the first. A third even less so.
Finding a profitable exchange depends most importantly on how many
members are shaping the market. Thus, when the number of agents and
items increases, chances for GDAs increase. In the model, GDAs start with
an item belonging to a range and aims for an item from the last range. Social
mobility is the degree to which an individual’s social status can change within
a society throughout the course of their life through a system of stratification
(i.e. levels based on wealth or power). Subsequently, it is also the degree
towards where individual’s or group’s descendants move up and down the
class system. In the model, class is related to the range that the item’s agent
belongs. For example, societies which use slavery are an example of low social
mobility because, for the slaved individuals, upward mobility is practically
nonexistent. Only rich individuals have opportunities to improve.
We have explored the behaviour of population of selfish agents. The most
significant findings are:
• Under some conditions in the market it can be shown with certainty
that a GDA reaches the desired item, even when all the agents in the
market are selfish.
• As greater numbers of GDAs enter the market, the more difficult it is
to reach the desired items – however that this change is non-linear in
the growth of the number of GDAs.
• The richer an agent is (i.e. more close to the last range) the more
opportunities, the easier it is to reach the highest level.
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• BT mechanisms improves the performance when the quantity of GDAs
is reduced but with many GDAs BT does not improve the results.
With respect to value–enhance action and devaluation process:
• GDAs that can value–enhance more categories and that make best
enhancement (i.e. maximizes the IV ) are more likely to get an upper
range.
• Obviously, the fewer categories a GDA is related to the quantity of
value–enhanced items decrease. Also, as decreases the IV the quantity
of jumps decreases.
• In a scenario where a GDA can improve one item enough to be useful
for a PA in a range the GDA will trade up. If this GDA is capable of
doing this in all the ranges in the path (i.e. from the paperclip to the
house) it should get its objective.
• To be able to value–enhance items is more valuable in environments
where it is more difficult to exchange items. However, when the quan-
tity of GDAs is off–balance with respect to the PAs, the ability to
value–enhance items is not enough to improve the performance in the
market.
Kyle’s environment differs from our environment in two main points:
• The quantity of agents and items tends to infinity. Also, the market
is composed by one GDA and the rest are PA. But this is only one
instance of the proportions of agents that a market can have. For
example on www.eBay.com there is a red paper–clip on sale for $1 but
nobody offers even this $1.
• Some agents accept trades that are not beneficial to them. At least not
beneficial with respect to the established/general economical rules (i.e.
the agent gives more value than that it receives in exchange). Merely
evaluating the value of the item in the exchanges way lead us to a as-
sume that a seemingly altruistic exchange has occurred. However, as
we should always bear in mind that the goal of the GDA is a final
objective, other factors need to be taken into account when evaluating
the exchange. These may include publicity, excitement and so on com-
pensating the seller and turning an altruistic exchange into a beneficial
exchange.
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7.4 Conclusions and Future Work
The experiment reveals that Kyle’s feat is possible but only under a strict
a set of environmental conditions. Furthermore, this experiment shows the
environments where the above is possible and where it is not.
With respect to the results obtained from the simulator:
• With limited information is not guaranteed that GDA reaches the ob-
jective. GDA’s knows how far to the MV is but also does not know
what is the right sequence of trades nor what are the next items.
• With competition (i.e. more than one GDA) many chains of trades
could be cut.
• The quantity and type of agents have a direct impact in the perfor-
mance.
• When items tends to infinite the probability of passing from gworst to
gbest is ≈ 1.
The advantage of this environment is that it succeeds because it only
relies upon the exchange of reciprocally valued items in the system. This
will continue until the goal driven agent reaches its desired items, but during
the process everyone else gained too.
The enormous opportunity of peer–to–peer commerce ([36], [32], [124])
is that it is the most extreme form of dynamic pricing, where each party
values their currency differently. The dynamics of completely decentralized
bilateral exchange are complex systems consisting of larger numbers of agents
involved in massively parallel local interactions/decisions. See [88], [181]. As
Negroponte predicted in its article Peer–To–Peer Payoff “Swapping is a very
attractive form of exchange because each party uses a devalued currency, in
some cases one that would otherwise be wasted”. See [111], [162], [1]. Like-
wise, the person with whom you are swapping is giving something of value
to you which is less valuable for them. Speculation and arbitrage oppor-
tunity is in ordinary usage in the Internet Age and it appears in examples
as betting exchange or Massive Multi–player Online Role–Playing Games
(MMORPGs). With respect to the value–enhance process when there are
few GDAs many paths to the end are open for them. Increasing the pos-
sibilities to search a counterpart interests in the item. However, when the
quantity of GDA increases they eliminates many paths that allow to improve
to the rest of GDAs population.
The economies studied in this case are simple but show interesting dy-
namics as the result of even simple effects/actions. A value–enhance action
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allows to agents improve the values of the items. This action increases the
opportunities to trade. On the other hand, the devaluation process which
decreases the value of the items. This action decreases the opportunities to
trade.
• With one GDA using BT , the benefits for that GDA in relation to
others not using BT is very big. However, when BT is replicated by a
large number of agents the market becomes more competitive and the
advantage for individual GDAs is reduced.
• A value–enhance action is necessary to make the item attractive to
other agents.
• Agents with value–enhance (V E) action are selfish in terms of the ben-
efit, as the V E action only benefits themselves. The V E action has no
knock–on effect for agents not using the V E action.
A feature to emphasize is that in our model no one follows an altruistic
behaviour. In the trading process, every agent can improve their initial
satisfaction or they prefer not to trade. The GDA has a different perception
of value, they only care about MV and reaching the last range. Therefore,
the results show that where the quantity of PAs is greater than GDAs it is
possible that these GDAs reach the desired item. On the contrary, when the
quantity of GDAs is greater in the population, all of them do not reach the
desired item.
Future research includes other modelling choices, such as:
• Non–linear value ranges: Instead of ranges with the same quantity of
items the market will have ranges with a quantity of items depending
on its value. For example, as MV increases, there are less items in a
range.
• Opportunistic GDA: The new GDA can predict future price move-
ments for stocks and commodities through observing and analysing
past and current market trends (i.e. the economic benefits of specula-
tion).
• Looking up process and cost: To establish some balance or mechanism
to obtain the best balance between the cost to discover good trading
and the benefit obtained with the trade. The transaction cost of dis-
covery might be very high and this might be the undoing of a project
like One Red Paperclip. How does Mr Paperclip know that exchanging
P for Q gets him closer to Z? Do the self-organizing benefits of a free
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market really come into play when there is one person essentially trying
to coordinate? Finding the individual exchanges that would lead to a
particular goal sounds like a job for the market as a whole, not one
individual.
7.5 Summary
In summary this chapter shows:
• Environments’ parameters: Quantity of items, agents and ranges,
distribution of PV and MV .
• Distribution of GDAs: With many GDAs the opportunities to get
a good item decreases.
• Backtracking: Backtracking improves the results with few GDAs but
when the ratio of GDA:PAs is unbalanced, the backtracking also suffers
from saturated trading paths.
• Value–enhance action and devaluation process: These two pa-
rameters turn the model into a more realistic model. Showing the
dynamics when agents can value–enhance items and when the past of
time/use devaluates the items.
Chapter 8
Distributed Barter–Based
Directory Services
This chapter is motivated by the need for new solutions to the management
of directory services and in particular, the need to provide more autonomy
in such service [145]. In order to achieve this autonomy whilst maintaining
a fully functioning directory, a bartering strategy is used. The chapter de-
scribes the model and experiments carried out in Distributed Barter–Based
Directory Services (DBBDS ). The major challenge involved is to build a
workable system which not only responds to queries from users but A) en-
sures that directory items are never lost in the system and B) optimizes query
response time with respect to different patterns of query arrival.
The primary function of directory services is to repeatedly allocate a
set of entries in accordance with clients demands at successive times. The
basic model behind these services involves partial customer preferences over
entries, and the directory service aims to satisfy these preferences as quickly
as possible.
Distributed sets of networked computing resources require directory ser-
vices that store information about network resources. With the adoption
of decentralization approaches in the distribution of administrative control,
even though a common policy is adopted, no one individual entity is in
control of the whole information. In such scenarios, all individuals work co-
operatively following the same aim to respond to the queries delivered by the
clients.
An autonomous and distributed barter–based implementation of the di-
rectory services combines [93] simplicity and distributed nature of barter. An
additional benefit of bartering content is that its nature forces the nodes that
store information to maintain entries in the system, making entries highly
available and less likely to be lost due to failures. Furthermore, in a com-
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Figure 8.1: Clients request for directory items. The distributed directory
services manages these queries.
petitive environment such a marketplace, a peer may not forward search
requests nor can it maliciously not provide the content that it is responsible
for [195]. Bartering has implicit strategies based on reciprocity and feedback
which encourage cooperation between participants. These advantages over
the traditional server–based implementation promote this work.
The aim is to build a distributed directory service that:
• Manages the queries made by the clients using a team of cooperating
and competing directory services.
• Ensures that directory items are never lost in the system.
• Optimizes query response time with respect to different patterns of
query arrival (see Figure 8.1).
For Zheng [197] “A major drawback of existing large scale content distri-
bution systems is the directory services, which generally consists of an index
server and a tracker server. The index server (e.g. a web server) hosting all
the metadata of shared content. A user will have to contact the index server
to search for specific content and retrieve the metadata of the interested file.
After that the user launches the client download software to connect to a
tracker server in order to get a list of peers who are downloading the same
file. In effect, such a directory services does not scale well as it cannot ac-
commodate a large number of requests when the population of the system
increases rapidly.”
123
As the world grows more connected it becomes more complicated to find
out a desired item. In this complex world, we need ways of defining and iden-
tifying resources and services. The simplest way to do this is with registries
applications. An Internet back bone application has been developed using a
barter–based approach in order to contact easily a specific content. An auto-
nomic and distributed barter–based implementation of the directory services
combines [93] simplicity and distributed nature for bartering with scalabil-
ity, robustness, distribution of control from the peer–to–peer approach. An
additional benefit of bartering content is its nature that forces that nodes to
maintain entries in the system, making it more available and less likely to
be lost due to failures. These advantages over the traditional server–based
implementation promote this work. The innovation of this work is to manage
users’ access to the resources applying barter mechanism.
The primary function of distributed directory services is to repeatedly
allocate a set of entries in accordance with clients demand at successive
time instances. The basic model behind these markets involves (partial)
customer preferences over entries, and the directory services aims to satisfy
these preferences within the constraints of available own inventory (i.e. the
entries in the directory).[2]
The advent of powerful computing facilities in the participants has en-
abled two important paradigm shifts over the last decade. The first shift is
the move away from categorizing entities according to the traditional client-
server model, and the second is the progressive adoption of decentralized
overlay systems. Both paradigm shifts dramatically changes the way in which
communication systems are designed and build; and both are pertinent to
the realization of truly autonomic communication systems. The adoption
of further decentralization [163], which in part is expedited by the desire
to utilize the improved capabilities of end hosts, allows the distribution of
functionalities across a subset or the whole of the participating end hosts,
providing the advantage of robustness by removing single-point failures in the
system. Furthermore, the resources, and thus the cost, required to provide
the functionality can be distributed to all participants. Finally, decentral-
ization results in the distribution of administrative control so even though
a common policy is adopted, any individual participant is in control of the
whole system.[50]
Therefore, the major challenge in the implementation of directory decen-
tralized system is to build a system that without a central coordination unit
achieve that the system works correctly in an environment where:
• Participants can come and go.
• No participant hierarchy.
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• No naming structure.
• Data is of interest, not the participants.
Two approaches can be envisaged:
• Directory–based architecture: In this architecture some partici-
pants with better computation and memory resources are selected as
Directory Agents (DAs) that keep a repository of all the service in-
formation in the network in a directory. These DAs advertise them-
selves to other participants. Service provider participants register with
these DAs. Clients contact these DAs to get the location of service
providers. Examples include Jini1, Universal Description Discovery
and Integration (UDDI)2 and Salutation. This approach is suitable
for infrastructure–based networks or when changing topology is not a
matter.
• Directory–less architecture: In this architecture there is no service
coordinator. Clients contact service providers directly by flooding the
service query. This result in a high overhead produced due to flooding.
Examples of this architecture include Service Location Protocol (SLP)3
and Universal Plug and Play (UPnP)4.
Other relevant issues include:
• Resource Discovery:
– Centralized matchmaking: The simplest architecture for form-
ing exchange groups is for all participants to send a list of items
they possess and a list of items they are interested in to a central-
ized matchmaker service. Given such global information, to look
for a global optimal allocation is possible. Centralized match-
making has the advantage of complete information, but it has the
obvious disadvantage of being a scalability bottleneck and a sin-
gle point of failure in the system. And in many cases it is not an
available solution.
– Partitioned matchmaking: Instead of having a single central-
ized matchmaker, an alternative is to have many dedicated match-
makers, and to divide the population amongst these matchmakers.
1Jini in http://www.jini.org
2UDDI in http://www.uddi.org
3SLP in http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2608.txt
4UPnP in http://www.upnp.org
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This suggests that a partitioning strategy would work well, since
each partition is effectively a separate, small population of users.
– Decentralized matchmaking [39]: Instead of having dedicated,
partitioned matchmakers, fully distributed equivalents could ex-
ist. One possibility is to have participants volunteer to be match-
makers, in a manner similar to how some participants in exist-
ing P2P item-sharing systems promote themselves to be super–
nodes, indexing content to satisfy queries. Another possibility
would have participants organizing into an overlay, and to broad-
casting their owns-item/have–list and wants-item/want–list sets
across the overlay; participants would listen to broadcasts as well
as sending them, searching for possible circles and proposing them
to each other as they form. A final possibility would be to use
distributed hash tables (DHTs) (see [20], [121]) to store the owns-
item and wants-item sets of each user in a distributed, inverted
index: given the name of an item, the DHT would return the set
of users that want the item. Given the name of a user, the DHT
would return the set of items that user owns.
• With respect to the quantity of entries per participants: Imag-
ine a configuration where every node maintains the complete entries.
In terms of query routing that would be a perfect situation, because
every query could be routed directly to the correct node(s) but updates
would be extremely expensive and indices would be very large.
• Selfish agents: Stirrat and Henkel (1997) argue that giving pure gifts
may also be harmful to the relationship between givers and receivers,
if reciprocity is wanted by the receiver but, for whatever reason, not
feasible. In this case, individuals who do not have the resources or capa-
bilities to give something back are left in a position of indebtedness and
powerlessness. “Pure gifts are good for the giver but, symbolically at
least, bad for the receiver”. On the other hand, if not meant as a pure
gift but in expectation of something in return, givers may feel exploited
over time and the problem of free-riding occurs. The community then,
suffers from the social dilemma which occurs when contributors, then,
cease from giving, although everybody would be better off if people
contribute. See [104], [132], [172]. Humans come equipped with self-
ish genes [53]. This result from the Darwinian selection process that
guides the evolution of life. In an environment of limited resources, the
particular gene tends to become extinct and so does the strategy that
this gene codes for. The selfishness and rationality of individuals has
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long been a standard assumption in the social sciences and in Game
Theory [134]. And this is the approach that we will follow in our model.
• Assuring replicas/availability: Participants may join and leave the
system at any time.[45]
• Performance: The query distribution is a relevant element that it
has a great effect in the performance of a directory system based on
bartering.
• Distributed authorization/manage/control: In DNS and X.500
the set of entries are partitioned in boundaries are often indicate orga-
nizational boundaries.[73]
8.1 The DBBDS Model
Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services (DBBDS ) is an approach based
on a set of interconnected peers called Directory Nodes (DN). Each DN only
has partial knowledge of the network, no one has all the information/entries.
A DN in DBBDS is part of a directory services team (see Figure 8.5). This
team manages the queries requested by the clients of the directory service.
This team is a community of cooperating and competing components. The
obligations that any DN has as a member of the DBBDS are:
• To keep a set of entries.
• To respond as fast as possible to the clients’ queries.
Each DN in the directory services has the following features:
• Each DN is autonomous and self–interested.
• Links between DN are used to find a DN which can resolve a query.
• Each DN takes local decisions. The information comes from requests
from own clients and requests provided by neighbours.
• Each DN keeps a list of entries and it is responsible for the storage of
keys (i.e. similar to Chord). The only way to change an entry is by
means of a bartering deal.
• Each DN has limited resources such as storage capacity, information.
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Figure 8.2: The DNs are linked shaping a directory services network. Each
DN has a set of clients associated.
The DNs have limited resources and are required to make a commitment
to keep local entries as members of the DBBDS. Perhaps these entries are
not useful for them at the current moment but these entries could be useful
in the future, or necessary for other DNs. Under no circumstances should
the DN removes an entry. As distributed cooperative directory services, the
team of DNs should respond to any entry that can be requested by any client
in the system at any time. The DNs keep the set of entries. If the storage
capacity has reached the limit of entries that it can store, no more entries
can be kept. The only way to change entries it is establishing an exchange
with a neighbour (i.e. barter an entry for another entry).
The set of DNs are a collaborative network such as Internet e–mail. In e–
mail there will only rarely be a direct connection between your network and
the recipient’s network, mail will make a number of stops at intermediate
networks along the way. At each stop, another e-mail system temporarily
stores the message while it figures out the best way to relay the message
toward its ultimate destination. In DBBDS the DN aims is to respond as
rapidly as possible to the clients’ queries. For this reason, each DN desires
to entries most requested by its own clients as near as possible at hand and
at the same time not to be responsible of entries that are not interesting for
its clients.
When a query can be directly responded to, the time to respond is equal
to one tick. When this is not possible, the client’s query is forwarded to
the DNs neighbours increasing the response time. The further away the
requested entry is, the more time it takes. Queries that cannot be answered
by the DN are re–sent to the DN neighbours. Once the client sends a query
to the DN which it is related to, these DNs search in its have–list. If the
requested entry is not in the have–list, the query is re–sent to the DNs
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Figure 8.3: Scheme of queries in DBBDS.
neighbours until some DN has the entry or the life–time of the query expires
(i.e. following a flooding queries schema – the query is propagated to all
neighbours within a certain radius). Figure 8.3 shows two DNs where the
clients send queries to the DNs which they are associate to. The clients of
DNsource are requesting Q3, Q4 and Q5. It makes that these entries have
more value for DNsource. The entries Q4 and Q5 can be respond by the
DNsource but, it is not so for Q3. This should be requested by DNsource at
its neighbours.
The information useful, and available to the DNs are:
• Have–list (HL): The list of entries that the DN has.
• Want–list (WL): The list of entries that the local and foreign clients
want.
– Local clients queries: Queries from clients directly connected to
DNs.
– Foreign clients queries: Queries come from clients of others DNs.
Each one of these lists is composed of two components:
• Node directory entry: Contains the address for each remote worksta-
tion.
• Request rate (RR): This component defines the order in the list.
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The experimentals have the following parameters: Time window (TW ):
The time window is employed to balance new information against past expe-
rience. A request is limited to a specified time window beginning with time
t1, and extending up to time t2 (i.e. window time interval [t1, t2]). Following
this approach, the oldest requests will be removed from the WL replaced by
new requests.
Query distribution (QD): The query distributions that the population
follows:
• An uniform query distribution: All the entries have equal probability
for getting requested.
• A Zipf query distribution: In Zipf–like distribution, the number of
queries to the i’th most popular object is proportional to i−α, where
α is the parameter of the distribution. The query distribution has a
heavier tail for smaller values of the parameter α. See [26], [148].
A Zipf distribution with parameter 0 corresponds to a uniform distribu-
tion and with a value α equals to the unity follows a Zipf distribution.
Content Distribution (CD): The volume and type of content each
DN carries.
Request Generation Rate (RGR): Clients in a DBBDS issue queries
to search for entries that match their interests. A client without an entity
will generate a search request for the entity at certain rate depending on the
preference for the entity. Each client i is assigned a query generation rate qi,
which is the number of queries that client i generates per unit time.[138]
Pressure of foreign queries (PFQ): This parameter allows the im-
portance/significance of the external queries with respect to the local queries
to be set up.
• λI = 0 the queries from foreign clients/DNs have the same importance
than the queries from local clients.
• λI = 1 the queries from foreign clients/DNs have less importance than
the queries from local clients.
Figure shows an example related to the lambda or pressure parameter.
In this case, the clientA of DNA sends the query QA. This query is resend to
DNB and DNC , when lambda is equal to zero the entry is the most relevance
for the three agents. However, when lambda is one, the rest of agents prefer
queries from own clients.
Topology (T ): The topology of the network establishes the links from
peers to a number of peers.
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Figure 8.4: Examples of relevance in the entries when lambda is equal to
zero and one.
Time to Live (TTL): Before re–sending a query the TTL field is in-
creased if the new value is higher than a certain threshold the query is not
resent. Otherwise, the query is resend to the DNs neighbours.
Updating WL and HL: The process to update the order in WL and
HL follows the algorithms proposed in algorithm 6. In the algorithm QL is a
query from a local client. For foreign queries the algorithm is the same as for
the local query except for the first conditional that it does not appear and
changing QL by QF that is the foreign query. The local queries update the
utility/satisfaction in the WL and HL of the entry associated to the query.
For foreign queries only the WL is updated because the HL is restricted for
local queries.
Algorithm 6 Local Query
if QL ∈ HL then
to update the rate request of QL in HL
HL ⇐ QL
end if
if QL ∈ WL then
to update the rate request of QL in WL
end if
WL ⇐ QL
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8.2 Implementation Overview
In order to analyse our model, we conducted simulation experiments to judge
what is the performance of query response time and how content is dis-
tributed and re-allocated in the system. Simulations were performed to as-
sess the effectiveness of the service directory infrastructure. It is assumed
that the agents themselves are reasonably long–lived and static.
A simulation starts by placing the m distinct entries randomly into the
DNs network. Then the clients start to generate queries according to a
Uniform/Zipf-like process with average generating rate at a queries per tick
to its DNs. These queries are analysed by the DNs. In case that the query is
one of the entries in the HL, the query is responded to and the entry updated
(i.e. increasing its value). If DN does not have the entry, the DN resend
the query to its neighbours and it updates the WL. With the information
provide from HL and WL, DNs offer to its neighbours the entries that they
want and it does not want. The only way to get valuables entries is offering
valuables entries to the neighbours. Therefore, the process to update the HL
and WL allows to DNs distinguish between devaluated and not devaluated
entries in order to establish beneficial exchanges. The simulation finishes
when all the clients queries are processed or time finish is reached.
8.3 Experiments
The paper provides experimental results for the following parameters:
• TW : 8.
• QD: Random distribution, perfect and non–perfect Zipf distribution.
• CD: 500 entries distributed in 5 entries per DN .
• RGR: Each DN only has an unique client. And each client only wants
an entry per unit of time following the QD.
• PFQ: lambda is equal to zero when the DN gives the same priority
to local and foreign queries and lambda is equal to one otherwise.
• T : 100 DNs following a Erdos–Renyi structure5 (see Figure 8.5). The
number of unreachable pairs is equal to 0.
5Erdos structure has a densely concreted core along with loosely coupled radial branches
reaching out from the core.
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(a) Network 1.
Pajek
(b) Network 2.
Figure 8.5: Topologies used in the experiments.
– Network 1: The average distance between reachable pairs is 3.66
and the greatest distance between vertices (i.e. diameter) equals
8.
– Network 2: The average distance between reachable pairs is 2.44
and the diameter equals 4.
• TTL: Time to live, with values from 0 to 4.
Performance parameters studied:
• Response Time: The response time is defined as the number of hops
between the source and the destination.
• Percentage/Rate Success Response: The percentage of request that are
responded.
• Quantity of exchanges: The quantity of exchanges (i.e. one entry by
other entry) that are made in the system.
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The first two parameters are related to service quality the third is related
to the performance of the exchange strategy.
8.3.1 Random and perfect Zipf query distributions
This section contains a comparison of the worst and the best scenario for
the exchange–based system. If the preferences of the clients follow a random
distribution, the DN cannot put a stable order to these preferences. The
bartering mechanism is a very attractive form of exchange but each decision–
maker needs to know the devalued and value–increased entry. Also, this
knowledge should be stable enough to be applied to the exchange process.
On the other hand, in a perfect Zipf distribution, with the passing of time,
DN knows the needs of their clients are, keeping the most valuable entries
and using the rest to barter. Also, in a perfect distribution there is no
competition amongst DNs.
Figure 8.6 shows the performance in network 1 of the system when the
clients follow a random query distribution. The exchange policy, in this case,
neither when λI = 0 nor with λI = 1 have positive results. Also, in both
cases the quantity of exchanges is significant. On the contrary, in Figure
8.7 when the distribution follows a Zipf shape. Using an exchange policy
the performance is improved. Concretely, the exchange policy reduces the
query response time in a 41 % when TTL = 4 and 3. At the same time, the
query success rate improves by 40 % when TTL =2. For lower TTLs values
the exchange policy does not improve significantly due to few changes being
possible. If the quantity of neighbours DNs that knows the needs of a DN
the opportunities are reduced. Comparing the pressure of foreign queries,
with λI = 1 the quantity exchange decreases due to the DNs giving more
priority to the queries from their own clients than queries for foreign clients,
but the performance is better.
When using the exchange–mechanism the improvement for clients is also
significant compared to a system where no exchange mechanisms are intro-
duced. This observation suggests that DNs have a good incentive to deploy
the proposed exchange mechanism.
Comparing the values in Figures 8.6 and 8.7 the first scenario corresponds
to the worst case scenario and the second to the best case for the barter–based
approach. When the clients follow a query random distribution, both param-
eters response time and percentage success response are similar. However,
when the clients follow a perfect Zipf query distribution, an improvement
in both the response time and in the percentage of successful responses can
be seen. Also, the quantity of exchanges reveals that with a random query
distribution the quantity of exchanges is much greater than with a perfect
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Zipf query distribution. The reason for this poor performance and the large
number of exchanges is due to in a random query distribution the DNs have
an unstable list of what the clients wants. This fact implies that they are
trying to get many different entries and usually they have not these requested
entries. On the other hand, when the clients follow a perfect Zipf query dis-
tribution, the DNs keep a stable list of entries that the clients want and
no other DN wants these requested entries. These two factors facilitate the
improvement of the performance.
With respect to the topology Figures 8.7 and 8.8 are simulations where
the only modified parameter is the topology used. In Figure 8.7 with net-
work 1 and in Figure 8.8 working with network 2. Being the average distance
amongst reachable pairs equal to 3.66 in network 1 and 2.44 for network 2, it
reveals the relevance of topology in the percentage of success response param-
eter. When TTL is greater than 3 in network 1 and TTL greater than 4 in
network 2 when the percentage of success with or without exchange policy are
similar. However, under these thresholds the results show that when working
with exchange policy, the percentage of success is always better. Without
the exchange policy and a limited TTL many queries are unreachable by the
clients.
8.3.2 Non–perfect Zipf distributions
In the previous section two extreme scenarios were shown. Now, the per-
formance obtained in middle scenarios is explained. From perfect to fully
non–perfect Zipf distribution in network 1:
• 0 %: The queries follow a perfect Zipf query distribution. The clients
related to each DN only send queries from the range that belongs to
the DN . This scenario is exactly the same when clients follow a Zipf
perfect query distribution.
• 25 %: 75 % of the queries follow a perfect Zipf query distribution but
25 % of the queries follow a Zipf global query distribution. This means
that the clients, in a percentage of 25 % send queries to the most
popular entries in the whole directory.
• 50 %: 50 % of the queries follow a perfect Zipf query distribution but
50 % of the queries follow a Zipf global query distribution.
• 75 %: 25 % of the queries follow a perfect Zipf query distribution but
75 % of the queries follow a Zipf global query distribution.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.6: Query random distribution in network 1.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.7: Query Zipf local distribution in network 1.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.8: Query Zipf local distribution in network 2.
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Figure 8.9: From perfect to fully non–perfect Zipf distribution.
• 100 %: the queries follow a Zipf–distribution. This means that the
clients always want the most popular entries the directory.
Figure 8.9 shows the non–perfect Zipf query distributions from 0 % to
100 %.
Figures 8.10, 8.11, 8.12 and 8.13 show the performance parameters in
non–perfect Zipf query distributions from 100 % to 25 % in network 1. As
more clients request the most popular entries (i.e. to turn a perfect into a
non–perfect distribution) the response time and the quantity of exchanges
increase, and the rate of success decreases, as more clients wants the most
popular entries of the directory. When all the clients are requesting the same
range of popular entries (i.e. 100 %) the response time is increased due
to DNs with popular entries not liking exchange these entries. Unpopular
entries are requested from time to time, but in any case these requests could
imply many exchanges.
Global Zipf query adds competition amongst DNs with respect to the
local Zipf query distribution. This competition has a dual consequence: both
the quantity of exchanges and the response time are increased.
8.3.3 Flash crowds
This section shows the behaviour of the policy exchange–based mechanism
which is constantly changing. A flash crowd is the attention of a large number
of people, and gets an unexpected and overloading surge of traffic. In this
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.10: Non–perfect Zipf distribution 100 %.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.11: Non–perfect Zipf distribution 75 %.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.12: Non–perfect Zipf distribution 50 %.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.13: Non–perfect Zipf distribution 25 %.
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case the experiments are showing the effect caused by many participants
repeatedly requesting entries. This is important as it is need to know if
the performance has some variation with the passing of time. The clients
have preferences that are not changed during the rest of the simulation.
The expectation is that, due to clients always wanting the same entries,
performance improves during the simulation. The experiments range from
perfect to fully non–perfect Zipf distribution. For each scenario, the three
parameters studied are: response time, percentage of success response and
quantity of exchanges.
The next three figures are related to flash crowds process:
• Figure 8.14 shows the results when lambda equals zero working with
network 1 and following a Zipf local query distribution. In this case,
this is a sudden change in the query distribution. In the experiments,
during 100 steps, the clients of the DN send queries into a similar
range. Once spend the time the clients changes the range of queries.
• Figure 8.15 shows the results when lambda equals zero working with
network 1 and following a random query distribution. In this case, only
the local query distribution is changed. This means that global queries
are stable. Therefore, when the global queries are the 100 % of the
queries, query distribution is the same in the three simulations.
• Finally, Figure 8.16 shows the results with lambda equals zero working
with network 1 and following a Zipf global query distribution with
100 %. In this case, the query distribution is the same in the three
simulations.
Figure 8.14 shows the increase in the quantity of exchanges due to during
the exchange process the DNs are getting the entries that they want. Once
changed the range in the query distribution the entries are fast to each DN .
On the other hand, in Figure 8.15 and Figure 8.16 the distributions are fixed
and at any flash crowd the quantity of exchanges decreases at any simulation.
8.4 Conclusions and Future Work
The following properties were obtained from the previous results:
• The topology affects the information that DNs should evaluate in the
exchange process.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.14: Flash crowds with Zipf local query distribution.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.15: Flash crowds with random query distribution 100 %.
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(a) Response Time.
(b) Percentage Success Response.
(c) Quantity of Exchanges.
Figure 8.16: Flash crowds with Zipf global query distribution 100 %.
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• The TTL parameter limits the propagation of the query. In our case
however, it also limits the propagation of the updating of the WL and
the opportunities to establish exchanges.
• Increasing the TW , the WL holds the clients’ requests longer. This
information increases the opportunities to make exchanges.
• Due to all the clients of a same DN following the same Zipf–local query
distribution the pressure on the DNs (i.e. in the DNs′ WL) increases,
thus increasing the response queries and diminishing the quantity of
messages. Turning perfect query distribution to non perfect one that
will have a negative effect on the performance.
Barter–based systems bring several advantages. Firstly, they preserve the
autonomy of individual participants. Each participant makes local decisions
about whom to trade with, how many resources to contribute to the commu-
nity, how many trades to try to make, and so on. Secondly, the symmetric
nature of trading ensures fairness and discourages free–loading (i.e. barter-
ing is an incentive scheme by nature). In order to acquire resources from
the community, each participant must contribute its own resources in trade.
Moreover, participants that contribute more resources receive more benefit
in return, because they can make more trades. Thirdly, the system is robust
in the face of failure. Robust in the sense that the exchanges are one–to–one
and this not has the weakness of economic environments.
The advent of powerful computing facilities in the participants has en-
abled two important paradigm shifts over the last decade. The first shift is
to move away from categorizing entities according to the traditional client-
server model, and the second is the progressive adoption of decentralized
overlay systems. Both paradigm shifts dramatically change the way in which
communication systems are designed and built; and both are pertinent to
the realization of truly autonomic communication systems. The adoption of
further decentralization, which in part is expedited by the desire to utilize
the improved capabilities of end hosts, allows the distribution of functional-
ities across a subset or the whole of the participating end hosts, providing
the advantage of robustness by removing single-point failures in the system.
Furthermore, the resources, and thus the cost, required to provide the func-
tionality can be distributed to all participants. Finally, decentralization re-
sults in the distribution of administrative control so even though a common
policy is adopted, no one individual participant is in control of the whole
system. Therefore, the major challenge in the implementation of a directory
decentralized system is to build a system that works correctly without the
need for a central coordination unit.
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The distribution of a set of entries amongst a set of distributed and au-
tonomous agents, with varying preferences, is a complex combinatorial prob-
lem. Bartering can be used as a form to resolve this problem. In barter ex-
change each party uses a devaluated currency, in some cases one that would
otherwise be wasted. The unused entries in your basement can be converted
into something you need or want. Likewise, the party with whom you are
swapping is giving something that has a greater value to you than it has for
them.
Future research includes the study of interest based communities, users
that in one cluster share a subset of common entries and are likely to be of
interest to other entries popular in the cluster. The transitivity property may
be used for enabling private information between users, in order to suggest
entries that are potentially of interest for members of the same cluster [117].
Other aspect to study is the tolerance of faults.[103]
8.5 Summary
The aim of the modelled application is to demonstrate that bartering could
be used in a real environments paradigm. Taking advantage of the features
that characterize Peer–to–Peer applications such as scalability, robustness,
and flexibility. And at the same time the market model incentives of the
participants publishing names to rely on other participants servers to respond
to those names.
In our proposal the system works by following a similar idea but apply-
ing a bartering mechanism ([1], [111]). The providers of entries want to have
or to have near the content most requested by its clients, it is achieved by
exchanging entries with neighbours that follow the same strategy. There-
fore, the provider’s aim is to respond to client queries. Each self–interested
provider/trader starts with some given initial bundle of entries. A new set
of required entries, is build up from the clients queries. The providers dis-
cuss the proposal distribution among themselves taking the best choice for
its clients (i.e. trying to get the most requested entries by its clients). If a
provider/buyer decides that it can do better on its own, with its given initial
entries, it makes a proposal of exchange that the other provider/seller should
evaluate and this proposal only will be accepted if it is beneficial. When
both parties accept the exchange entries are transfer among them.[102]
In summary, the oldest method of trade is making up a distributed direc-
tory services system. A directory service is simply the software system that
stores, organizes and provides access to information in a directory and one
of the most important/necessary services in Internet.
PART 3: Contributions and
Conclusions
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Chapter 9
Contributions and Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate resource allocation using
bartering mechanisms, with particular emphasis on applications in large–
scale distributed systems without the presence of altruistic participants in
the environment. In addition to the individual summaries that are included
at the end of each chapter, here we provide an overview of the content of this
thesis as a whole.
Throughout the research presented in this thesis we have contributed evi-
dence that supports the leitmotif that best summaries our work: investigating
interactions amongst selfish, rational, and autonomous agents with incom-
plete information, each seeking to maximise its expected utility by means of
bartering. We have concentrated on three scenarios: one theoretical, an use
case, and finally a realistic application. All of these scenarios are used in
order to evaluate bartering in electronic environments. Each scenario starts
from a common origin, but each of them has its own unique features.
9.1 Contributions
Let us briefly summarising the contributions of this thesis in relation to its
goals:
General Framework:
• A representation of the functioning of a bartering system. The design
and development of a general framework applied to three specific sce-
narios. Each one of these help us to show that bartering is more in use
than ever:
– Development of a bartering network in order to review the effi-
ciency of barter.
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– Development a simple agent population model based on active and
passive agents with ranges of personal value without altruism.
– Design, implementation and evaluation of a distributed directory
services based on a bartering mechanism.
• A general framework for bartering mechanism which is simple enough
to be applicable in a broad range of scenarios. Revealing the main
features related to markets that follow bartering mechanism. To this
end, we proposed a framework that can be broken down into three
principal components; the model description, the environment and the
agent–based simulator. These three components can be extended easily.
• A description of the environment. Focusing on relevant features such
as the value of the information, query distribution, topology and the
behaviour of the participants. These features appear in different ways
in the three technical chapters such as Bartering Networks, Trading
Paperclips, Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services.
Bartering Networks:
• Definition of bartering algorithms such as 2–way, 3–way and 3–way
recursive. Compare the performance of these algorithms with respect
to the optimal performance that it could be obtained by algorithms such
as Hungarian method, algorithm of J. Edmonds or integer programming
problem.
• Reviewing the conditions (i.e. time and content) of markets.
• Defining and analysing the propagation of preferences algorithm.
• Showing the progression of level of satisfaction with respect to propa-
gation of information and topology
Trading Paperclips:
• Showing that with competition (i.e. multiple active agents), active
agents can no longer always achieve their goals.
• Showing the behaviour of mixing strategies (i.e. devaluation and value–
enhance action).
Distributed Barter–Based Directory Services:
• Showing the relevance of the topology in the directory services.
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• Showing the performance of the service varying the query distribution
from perfect Zipf query distribution to non–perfect Zipf query distri-
bution.
The research presented in this thesis is supported by the following publi-
cations:
1. Studying viable free markets in Peer–to–Peer file exchange applica-
tions without Altruistic Agents (AP2PC 2006 and Technical Report
LSI–06–12–R)
This paper explores the use of simple market mechanisms for P2P file
sharing which function without the need for altruistic users considering
the conditions under which such markets may be viable.
2. Self–Organisation of content in file exchange markets with self–interested
agents (SOAS 2006)
This paper studies how self–organisation emerges in terms of content
distribution. Also, we compare in different scenarios the allocation with
respect to the optimal one.
3. Self–Organisation Amongst Non–Altruistic Agents for Distribution of
Goods: Comparing Bartering and Currency Based exchange (EUMAS
2006)
In this paper a number of economically inspired approaches which allow
the redistribution of goods amongst agents using self organisation and
do not require complete global information or centralised processing
are compared.
4. The emergence of order in goods distribution using information and
competition (SOAS 2007)
This paper is concerned with the feasibility of achieving a competitive
allocation of items in a decentralised context. The paper reviews the
three challenges that affect the optimal allocation such as detection of
needs, network structure and individual interest.
5. The impact of the topology on trade in bartering networks– devised
and assessed network information propagation mechanisms (CEEMAS
2007 and Technical Report LSI–07–21–R)
In this paper network information propagation mechanisms are devising
and assessing.
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Chapter Related Papers
Bartering Networks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Trading Paperclips 6, 7
DBBDS 8
Table 9.1: Relationship between thesis chapters and publications.
6. An Analysis of Paperclip Arbitrage (Technical Report LSI–07-39–R)
This paper shows the basis of the Trading Paperclips scenario. Showing
results related to single and multiple GDA and the first results about
the backtracking mechanisms.
7. Trading Paper Clips – An Analysis of “Trading Up” in Artificial Soci-
eties without Altruists (CCIA 2008)
This paper is an extension of the previous one. Mainly, the extension
comes from value–enhancing action and devaluation process.
8. Distributed Barter-Based Directory Services (CCIA 2008)
In this paper bartering mechanisms in a real application were applied.
These papers are available at:
http://www.lsi.upc.edu/~dconrado/
or by looking for David Cabanillas on the department website. Table 9.1
summarises the relationship between publications and thesis’ chapters.
In order to increase the access and visibility of this work, this thesis will
be introduced into TDX Server (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa) and a summary
will be published on Nodes ACIA report.
9.2 Conclusions
The results of this thesis demonstrate the relevance of bartering. The follow-
ing conclusions refer to barter experiments:
• The adoption of decentralisation as a paradigm, allows the distribution
of functionalities across the participants providing advantages but at
the same time distributing the control. Turning an unique centralised
manager into one where none of the participants has the control of the
whole system.
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• The free will of decision makers and the lack of information has a deep
impact in the performance.
• Social modelling: The main criteria for P2P networks is to be efficient
by having a large number of agents competing for different items. More
important than altruism is free market competition (i.e. large number
of agents competing for different items). Altruism is only necessary
when many participants want the same item because competition for
the same item, causes the coincidence of wants to go down.
• In P2P file sharing, due to the environments properties (i.e. selfish
and free–ride behaviours) a bartering mechanism is used amongst the
clients who are downloading the same file, which introduces a level of
fairness into the system. Trading Paperclips is a new example where
bartering is revealed as useful a powerful way of exchange.
• An altruistic society works better than a selfish society. However, by
means of bartering scenarios we have shown that in selfish societies:
– It is possible to achieve good performance depending on the con-
ditions in the market.
– Barter improves the participants’ involvement in the exchange and
the society as whole.
• Self–organisation: In a market approach the self–organisation is aware-
ness in the content distribution. From an initial distribution by means
of bartering and taking local decisions, the system goes from this ini-
tial random distribution to a distribution where the aim is for each
participants get the items that they want. For example, BitTorrent
empirically selects the peers that offer the best upload and download
rates to trade with (i.e. tit–for–tat strategy). The protocol has the
ability to self–organize by letting each peer select dynamically which
other peers to cooperate with over time.
The final conclusion is that barter is still relevant in the modern world.
There are many examples of such re–discovery in the Internet context, in the
real and literature world:
• Examples of online social bartering network such as Commuto1, Trade
a Favor2 and many others where members can exchange in person with
others members.
1Commuto in www.commuto.com
2Trade a Favor in www.tradeafavor.com
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• Corporate barter was a major element of the badly functioning Rus-
sian economy of the 1990s. Roughly 50% of Russian industrial sales
in 1998 were barter transactions. Explanations for the vast scale of
barter include liquidity constraints, implicit government subsidies, and
managerial rent–seeking.
• The book The People of Sparks by Jeanne DuPrau (the author of The
City of Ember) shows how a rustic community uses barter for the ex-
change of goods and services.
This thesis underpins shows the opportunities of bartering by means of three
relevant scenarios. Analysing the oldest method of trade within the context
of a new paradigm where everyone is connected, showing that bartering has
a great potential, but there are many challenges that can affect the realistic
application of bartering that should be studied.
9.3 Future Work
Following the investigations described in this thesis, there are a wide range
of further subjects to work on:
• The use of ontologies: How could an agent manage and exploit the
knowledge on a given domain to deal with such semantic information
and optimise exchanges?[147]
– The use of a logical language to express agent preference.
– Logic–based utility functions that allows to evaluate the semantic
similarity between items.
• The addition of learning mechanisms: In order to decide on best par-
ticipant to deal with and the best time to exchange. Deploying op-
portunistic GDAs, agents that can predict future price movements for
stocks and commodities through observing and analysing past and cur-
rent market trends.[133]
• Looking up process and cost – to establish some balance or mechanism
to obtain the best balance between the cost to discover good trading
and the benefit obtained with the trade.
• To integrate distributed trust and reputation systems in order to ap-
ply these systems in environments where the set of peers is large and
dynamic, the probability that any two peers interacts decreases.
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• An important aspect of electronic commerce is that often trust is absent
[176], since it is often difficult for a user to figure out who to trust
in online communities. To study how to include trust/reputation in
bartering environments.
• To extend market scenarios. For example to have a set of items for an
agent could be considered more valuable than to have only some parts
(e.g. chapters of some series), copies.
• To improve the propagation mechanism proposed.
• The study of interested–based communities. Participants that in one
cluster share a subset of common items and are likely to be of interest
to other popular items in the cluster.
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Glossary
Altruism The opposite of selfishness; the practice of cooperating with any-
one asking for help. Also known as unconditional cooperation. We
regard altruism as irrational in the sense that altruists do not attempt
to maximize their benefit.
Arbitrage and Speculation Taking large risks, especially with respect to
trying to predict future trades. Speculation and trades are in some
cases so closely allied that it is impossible to say at what precise point
trade ends and speculation begins. Speculation and arbitrage are very
common in the Internet Age, and betting exchanges and Massive Multi–
player Online Role–Playing Games (MMORPGs) are examples..
Assignment problems Deals with optimal pairing or matching of objects
in two distinct sets.
Autonomous behavior In P2P and MAS systems, independence is an im-
portant design parameter. Peers and agents may join and leave the
system at any time. In addition, peers that are part of the system may
dynamically tune their rates of contribution and consumption. System
functionality does not rely on any one specific peer and the P2P system
as a whole adapts to this dynamic behaviour of its components.
Bartering The exchange of products and/or services without the use of
money. Also called exchange.
Centralized and Decentralized Terms used to describe a system’s archi-
tecture and implementation. A centralized architecture relies on an
authority by definition. In a decentralized architecture no authority
exists.
Centralized weighted matchings Gabow gives an O(|V ||E|+|V |2 log |V |)
time algorithm, computing the maximum weighted matching. Both re-
turn an exact solution, as opposed to approximations.
181
182 Glossary
Collective utility function A social welfare ordering. For example, the
idea of aiming at maximizing the sum of all utilities for the members of
a society is a utilitarian concept. However, this is not the only approach,
the egalitarian social welfare has as an aim to maximize the welfare of
its weakest member. This approach could be used for example in the
community of lecturers at a university department. Another approach
could be to find a popular matching, or a matching that is preferred by
a majority of agents to any other matching.
Community A set of entities that use a specific peer–to–peer application in
order to contribute and consume a resource. A successful community
is a community that generates positive social welfare over time. A
successful community can, however, contain at any one time a mixture
of dissatisfied entities and satisfied entities.
Complexity The economy may be described as a complex adaptive system,
i.e. a system where complexity arises because of the way a large num-
ber of agents interact. Complexity thus stems from the fact that the
economy is a large composite system. What we observe as the economy
is the result of millions of agents interacting.
Cooperation The act of working or acting together to achieve a common
goal. Cooperation occurs when the actions of each agent satisfy either
or both of the following conditions:
• The agents have an explicit or implicit goal in common, which no
agent could achieve in isolation. Their actions tend to achieve this
goal.
• The agents perform actions which enable or achieve not only their
own goals, but also the goals of agents other than themselves.
.
Directory services A directory services is a software application that stores
and organizes information about a computer network’s users and net-
work resources, and that allows network administrators to manage
users’ access to the resources. Additionally, directory services act as
an abstraction layer between users and shared resources.
Double coincidence of wants Jevons (1893): “The first difficulty in barter
is to find two persons whose disposable possessions mutually suit each
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other’s wants. There may be many people wanting, and many possess-
ing those things wanted; but to allow of an act of barter there must be
a double coincidence, which will rarely happen.”.
Economic system Consider an economic system for coordinating robots.
An economy is nothing more than a population of agents (i.e., citizens)
producing a global output. The agents coordinate with each other to
produce an aggregate set of goods. Centralized economies, such as so-
cialist/communist systems, suffer from an inability to gather all salient
information, uncertainty in how to optimize it, and unresponsiveness
to changing conditions. Additionally, since economic output is divided
equally amongst the entire population, individuals have little incentive
to work harder or more efficiently than what is required to minimally
comply with the economic plan. Individual input is de-coupled from
individual output. The net effect is a sluggish, brittle, inefficient econ-
omy.
Free rider A participant that takes advantage of the system, exploiting
the effort of other participants, e.g. searching for files or downloading
desired content, without any contribution in terms of tasks performed
or resources shared.
Incentive technique An incentive technique is any aspect of a system’s op-
eration that directly addresses user selfishness and rationality by giving
the users the right incentives to complete an action they would other-
wise consider costly and, being rational, would try to avoid. Incentive
techniques usually assume that the software and hardware modules
that implement the functionality of the system cannot be trusted to
follow the designer’s specifications because selfish peers may find ways
to alter this functionality if it is in their interest. We always assume
that the (benevolent) designer has the goal of maximizing social welfare
in mind.
Matching Matching is the part of economics that focuses on the question
of who gets what, particularly when the scarce items to be allocated
are heterogeneous and indivisible.
Pareto optimal A Pareto optimal outcome is one where no–one could be
made better off without making someone else worse off.
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Price of anarchy The tension between private incentives that encourage
opportunistic behaviour and the common good that comes from coop-
eration is a central feature of human interaction.
Prisoner’s dilemma In game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma is a type of
non–zero–sum game in which two players may each cooperate with or
defect from the other player. In this game, as in all game theory, the
only concern of each individual player is maximizing his/her own payoff,
without any concern for the other player’s payoff.
Resource The service that a community provides to its members. Members
acting as consumers consume the service (at a benefit to themselves)
and members acting as contributors contribute the service (at a cost to
themselves). Members may be to both contributers and consumers..
Resource discovery It is the process of binding specific resources to an
abstract description of the services required for a particular user or
program.
Risk A model is ultimately used to anticipate the opponent agent’s deci-
sions, or to simulate its actions. If, however, the model is not entirely
accurate, then relying on its predictions may harm the agent’s perfor-
mance rather than improving it. Note that even in the unlikely event
that the agent possesses an exact model of its opponent, utilizing it
will not guarantee an exact prediction due to the limited simulation
resources available during a real interaction. Agents in a competitive
interaction can greatly benefit from adapting to a particular adversary,
rather than using the same general strategy against all opponents.
Scale free networks The term scale–free refers to any functional form f(x)
that remains unchanged to within a multiplicative factor under a re–
scaling of the independent variable x.
Self–organization Decentralized system architecture, where no authorities
exist, not even to assist participants who first join the system/community.
Selfishness (or self-interest) The rational practice of community mem-
bers who avoid helping others in an attempt to minimize their costs.
In the terminology based on Trivers and Wilson, an act is said to be
altruistic if it is costly to perform but confers a benefit on another
individual.
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Simple distributed weighted matchings In this approach instead of send-
ing the input, the network topology as a weighted graph, to a central
processor, we let all the vertices of the network participate in the com-
putation themselves. By only allowing the vertices to communicate
with their direct neighbours in the graph, we keep the locality of the
original problem.
Social welfare The benefit of an action is a non–negative number that con-
veys the amount of satisfaction received by performing the action. The
cost of an action is a non-negative number that conveys the amount of
dissatisfaction received by performing the action. Social welfare is the
sum of the net benefits of a communities members.
The shadow of the future The possibility of future interactions allows
credible retaliations against opportunistic behaviour and casts the shadow
of the future in every decision. The theory of infinitely repeated games
studies cooperation under the shadow of the future and provides a more
realistic representation of everyday interactions.
Zipf’s law Web requests from a fixed user community are distributed ac-
cording to Zipf’s law. Glassman was perhaps the first to use Zipf’s law
to model the distribution of web page requests.
